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Back in 2011, while reading some of the latest on vagueness—by David Barnett (2009), Brian 
Weatherson (2006), Patrick Greenough (2003), Cian Dorr (2003), Crispin Wright (2001)—I was 
shocked to discover that people were denying what seemed the most plausible part of 
epistemicism: the claim that vagueness entails ignorance, or what I call the UNKNOWN 
principle—e.g. if it’s vague whether somebody is bald, you don’t know whether he’s bald. Such 
objections went either undiscussed or unnoticed. Evidently no one deemed it worthwhile to 
defend the epistemicist theory, even against criticisms that (I felt) were surely wrong. So I took 
the task upon myself. What emerged was my prospectus thesis: a longer, unwieldier version of 
Chapter 1 (“Epistemic Gaps”) written in response to Barnett’s (2010) claim that UNKNOWN fails 
to capture anything essential about vagueness: in a hypothetical scenario where our cognitive 
faculties were improved so as to enable knowledge, vagueness might still be possible, since 
people’s intuitions could still be vague over vague matters; it just wouldn’t entail ignorance. 
 It took 70 pages (including eight whole pages of endnotes) to respond to Barnett’s one 
counterexample. The reason being: it took quite some work to figure out the logical structure 
underlying Barnett’s arguments. It wasn’t trivial, for instance, spelling out how the determinacy 
(clarity) operator used to express claims of vagueness was supposed to interact with a knowledge 
operator and with conditionals. But that’s what’s exactly at issue because UNKNOWN involves all 
three. What I did was take some of the methods of reasoning about vague claims, which I had 
picked up from Greenough and Barnett, and apply these exhaustively to a whole range of 
claims—response-dependence conditionals (if it seems that p, one can know that p), ambivalence 
(if it both vaguely seems that p and vaguely seems that ¬p), intuition-completeness (if p, it will 
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seem that p), connections between clarity and knowledge (if p is knowable, p is clear, or vice 
versa)—tracing out all their possible interrelations, not just when things were vague, but (more 
crucially) when things were higher-order vague. What I discovered was that you can derive quite 
a lot just by using the minimal resources of a KT modal logic for determinacy (clarity) and 
knowledge. For instance, the type of response-dependence Barnett wanted, where one is never 
quite determinately ignorant about vague matters, can be shown to be compatible with UNKNOWN 
and any broader encompassing epistemicist theory. It merely imposes an extra constraint: you 
never have definite borderline cases. That’s enough to get you the same results, without meddling 
with the intuitive principles already in place linking vagueness and ignorance. 
 I took this as evidence for Greenough’s (2003) fundamental insight that some principle 
connecting vagueness to unknowability—contrary to the skeptical attitude of recent work—really 
could serve as a minimal theory of vagueness, or something like it. This was the seemingly 
undeniable part of epistemicism. To that extent, challenging epistemicism on epistemic grounds 
struck me as unthinkable. I found no reason to believe that any of the objections to UNKNOWN 
posed by Wright (2001), Dorr (2003), or Barnett (2010) were insurmountable. For their 
alternative proposals for what the relation between vagueness and unknowability should look like 
instead all represented variants of the same general type of view concerning the epistemology of 
vagueness, the overall structure of which was something that seemed easily recoverable on 
epistemicism—one merely had to deny the existence of knowable or definite borderline cases. 
 I later came to think there were independent reasons to question, on epistemic grounds, this 
entire family of views advanced by Wright, Dorr, Barnett, and others. In Chapter 2 (“Vague 
Unknowns”), I go through each of their alternative proposals one by one and show why there’s 
independent reason to find them implausible. What’s more, I came to find what Williamson 
himself had to say about the relations between vagueness and ignorance deeply unsatisfactory, or 
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downright puzzling at best. Since then I’ve come to doubt whether Williamson’s account should 
even be taken to be representative of the epistemicist perspective on vagueness at all (see 
Chapters 2 and 4; see also discussion in Outlook).  
 That said, I should pause here to pay my intellectual respects. It was while reading Timothy 
Williamson’s Vagueness (1994) in a seminar on vagueness co-taught by Hans Kamp and Mark 
Sainsbury in the spring of 2010 that I realized I had to work on vagueness. No other philosophical 
topic held so great an aura of enigma, for so ostensibly simple a problem as the Sorites paradox. 
Williamson’s book made this salient. The unparalleled rigor and clarity found in his discussion of 
the subject was infectious. 
 The first paper I ever wrote on vagueness was for that seminar: an embryonic version of 
Chapter 4 (“Margins for Error in Meaning”). I wrote it five years ago, while still very much 
within a Williamsonian frame of mind and earnestly trying to press out the wrinkles in his theory. 
Although I’ve since then come to think there are some fundamental, irremediable differences in 
my approach in addressing the epistemology of vagueness or even what it means to be an 
epistemicist theory, I still find it valuable to confront Williamson’s theory on its own terms, if not 
because it raises a host of fundamental questions about the epistemology of meaning.  
 My general line of argument there is this. There’s a real worry about whether the margin for 
error principles, so crucial to Williamson’s explanation of vagueness-related ignorance, won’t 
also rule out semantic knowledge, if the meanings of our vague expressions are themselves in 
constant flux. Even Sainsbury in his illuminating (1997) comment on Vagueness tries to come to 
the rescue by developing Williamson’s externalist idea of semantic knowledge as linguistic 
induction. But I think that Williamson must ultimately give up his claim of exact knowledge of 
meaning. By the lights of his own view, inexact knowledge is knowledge of something falling 
within a range, where for each thing within that range, you don’t know that it’s not that. But this 
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is exactly the sort of structure you get on Williamson’s picture of meaning: a range of candidate 
meanings for ‘bald’ arranged by their different cutoffs, where each remains an epistemically 
possible meaning for ‘bald’, since you don’t know that ‘bald’ doesn’t mean it.  
 Let me offer an analogy. I used to travel frequently between Mainland China and Hong Kong. 
In the mid-2000s, the currency exchange rates for the Chinese renminbi and the HK dollar 
relative to the US dollar were comparable: roughly 1 USD = 7.75 HKD = 8 CNY. At times I 
would get confused, and use the wrong rate when converting prices back to USD. No doubt this 
led to instances of unwarranted consumer overconfidence. On Williamson’s picture, meanings for 
vague terms are like currency rates: they are shared, collectively determined semantic features of 
our vague expressions that, although constantly fluctuating, nonetheless enable communication, 
much like how (unpegged) currencies, despite having precisely determined yet freely fluctuating 
exchange rates, nonetheless continue to facilitate consumption, trade, and exchange. On such a 
picture, inexact semantic knowledge should be the norm: surely, we can only know the meanings 
of our vague terms inexactly, just as any currency exchange rate, albeit perfectly determinate 
(down to the fraction of a cent) at any given point in time, can only be approximated. Having a 
mistaken belief about the meaning of a vague term does not prevent communication of an 
unjustified idea, any more than a mistaken belief about the real rate for a currency prevents 
making an unjustified purchase (if only it did!). Any transaction, whether monetary or verbal, is 
blind to the attitudes of the involved parties. 
 I must add that, whatever my disagreements with Williamson’s epistemicist theory, among 
the criticisms facing his account I find most pressing, the endorsement of sharp cutoffs for vague 
predicates is not one of them. I have never quite fully understood what is so appalling about the 
mere suggestion that things stop being heaps past a certain point, especially if this is a reasonable 
conclusion—indeed, the only conclusion, given classical reasoning—to draw from the Sorites 
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paradox. To this day, I must confess, I still fail to appreciate exactly why the view attracts such 
hostility from philosophers. Testing the same intuitions on untutored “folk” ears has so far failed 
to reproduce the same levels of prejudice. 
 Contextualist theories comprise my last main target. Through discussion with Josh Dever I 
came to see that contextualists too could deny epistemicist principles like UNKNOWN. Although 
none of the contextualist literature discusses the epistemic issues surrounding vagueness at any 
great length, the idea would be: you can settle the status of borderline cases differently in 
different contexts (calling a borderline F ‘F’ in one place, ‘not-F’ in another), and to do so is to 
issue a knowledgeable verdict about the borderline case in question; so vagueness doesn’t 
preclude knowledge after all. Any such permissibilist conception of vagueness threatened to be at 
odds with the UNKNOWN principle, and therefore with epistemicism at large. 
 Chapter 5 (formerly “Epistemicism, Paradox, and Conditional Obligation”, now “Ignorance 
and Open Texture”) was a partial answer to this challenge. There I reply to Shapiro (2006), who 
accuses epistemicism of giving the wrong predictions about the normative consequences of 
vagueness. The details revolve around showing why Shapiro’s counterexample doesn’t work, 
since the line of reasoning he uses against epistemicism rests on the same sort of faulty reasoning 
you use to derive paradoxical results in the miners paradox. The consensus from recent work on 
the miners paradox (Kolodny and MacFarlane 2010, Willer 2012) is that conditional obligations 
carry a sort of information sensitivity: what you ought to do may depend on what you know or 
what you don’t know. What I do is apply this lesson to Shapiro’s case: since epistemicism tells 
you that vague matters are unknowable, any information deficits resulting from vagueness will 
affect your normative situation, and possibly remove obligations you would otherwise have if 
vagueness wasn’t there to keep you from knowing the facts at hand. That’s enough to get you the 
sort of permissibility phenomena Shapiro thinks is closely tied to vagueness, except now the 
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explanation for such vagueness-related permissibility is epistemic rather than semantic. Going 
this route, however, does require relinquishing some central tenets of Williamson’s version of 
epistemicism—including his commitment to classical logic, at least for reasoning about norms. 
 In trying to combine epistemicism with open texture, I was staking out a claim on the 
underexplored topic of the normativity of vagueness. On Dan Bonevac’s suggestion, I applied the 
same logical technique I had developed earlier to this set of issues, to bring out exactly how 
vagueness interacts with conditional obligations. Shortly afterwards, I started toying with the idea 
of understanding tolerance in terms of deontic conditionals. The idea was that, assuming we can 
conceive of the very tolerance principles underlying the Sorites paradox as a series of conditional 
obligations (“If you call one guy bald, you’ve got to call the next guy bald”), the ignorance-
entailing feature of vagueness should block Sorites reasoning, in roughly the same way 
vagueness-related ignorance rendered conditional obligations inert in Shapiro’s case. What was 
needed was a suitable logic for deontic conditionals. For that, naturally, I turned again to Dan, 
whose joint work with Nick Asher in the 90s gave me exactly what I needed. Asher and 
Morreau’s system of commonsense entailment (1990) provided a theory of defeasible reasoning, 
with a conditional specially designed to handle generics, like “Birds fly”. Later work by Bonevac 
& Asher (1996, 2005) extended this account with an analysis of the deontic conditional, suited for 
representing prima facie obligations and conditional obligations, in order to solve a number of 
deontic paradoxes. What I sought to do was borrow the analysis and apply it to problems in 
vagueness. The result turned out to promise a compelling alternative to contextualist accounts. 
 Critical reaction to contextualist theories of vagueness, not just by epistemicists but generally, 
is scant, despite their recent growth in popularity among philosophers. Williamson’s dismissive 
and inadequately brief remarks in his (1994:214–5) only target contextualist theories that liken 
vague terms to indexicals. Contextual variation, he claimed, is no essential feature of vagueness: 
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fixing the context leaves vagueness intact. Of course, that was before contextualist approaches to 
vagueness had entered the mainstream philosophical literature. What Williamson didn’t seem to 
anticipate was how few contextualists about vagueness—Soames (2002:445) aside—would now 
take seriously the idea that vague expressions are to be understood on the model of indexical 
expressions: it’s not the meaning or content of a vague term that changes as the context shifts, 
only its standards of evaluation that vary with context. Almost a decade later, Stanley (2003) 
echoes the same misunderstanding. Stanley argues that the standard contextualist strategy for 
handling the Sorites arguments—predicting that vague terms are, like indexicals, contextually 
variable in meaning and so express different contents at different stages of the Sorites series—
fails to apply to verb phrase ellipsis versions of the Sorites (“If man #1 is bald, so is #2, and so is 
#3, and…”), which force an invariant reading upon the relevant vague terms, blocking any 
possible content shifts induced by contextual variation. The idea is the same as Williamson’s: 
vagueness remains when you fix the context—which here just means that the vague predicate 
must pick out the same property at each step. As Diana Raffman’s (2005) and Delia Graff’s 
(2008) replies confirmed, this objection clearly misconstrued contextualism about vagueness, 
since it mistook the contextualist proposal as advancing some sort of hidden indexical account of 
vague expressions. Åkerman & Greenough (2009) have argued that Keefe’s (2007:286) 
objections to contextualist views rest on similar unjustified assumptions. Yet besides this small 
slice of the literature—alongside relatively minor pieces, like Robertson’s (2000) critical notice 
of Soames (1999) and Sorensen’s (2008) whimsical review of Shapiro (2006)—there isn’t much 
else by way of criticism for contextualism. 
 My own discontents with contextualist accounts, mostly borne out of conversation with Mark 
Sainsbury and reading his papers, was their apparent obsession over the forced march Sorites and 
the insistence that any reversal of judgment be saved until the very end of the Sorites series. This 
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didn’t seem to account for the unease one feels about extending a vague predicate across the 
borderline range to begin with. A normative interpretation of tolerance, by contrast, did appear 
able to account for this datum about the phenomenology of Sorites reasoning. 
 All these pieces came together when writing “Generic Vagueness”, now retitled “Defeasible 
Tolerance and the Sorites” (Chapter 6). It’s here where I give the positive proposal. I claim that: 
(i) tolerance principles are prescriptive norms of judgment, that when properly analyzed take the 
form of deontic conditionals; (ii) Sorites reasoning is a type of defeasible reasoning; (iii) the 
defeasibility in question is epistemic in nature: they concern what conclusions may be suspended 
pending further information or overturned in light of additional knowledge; (iv) there are actually 
two types of tolerance, obligatory and permissive; (v) the Asher-Bonevac-Morreau framework of 
nonmonotonic deontic logic suits these purposes: being nonmonotonic, it models the defeasibility 
of Sorites reasoning, and being deontic, it captures the implicit deontic content of tolerance 
principles; (vi) the proposal beats out contextualist theories of vagueness, because it better 
accounts for the phenomenology of vagueness; (vii) it sheds light on two problem cases in the 
vagueness literature, the forced march Sorites and Mark’s paint shop case; (viii) a normative 
understanding of tolerance is compatible with the existence of cutoffs, where this simply 
demonstrates the division between the metaphysics vs. the epistemology of vagueness. 
 Material from Chapters 5 and 6 was presented to audiences at the University of Notre Dame 
(April 2013), Syracuse University (February 2014), Houston Baptist University (April 2014), 
University of Toronto (May 2014), and University of Maryland, College Park (Sixth NASSLLI, 






Ivan J Hu, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
SUPERVISORS: Richard M. Sainsbury, Johan A. Kamp 
 
I propose a new theory of vagueness centered around the epistemology and normativity of 
vagueness. The theory is a version of epistemicism—the view that vagueness is a fundamentally 
epistemic phenomenon—that improves upon existing epistemicist accounts by accommodating 
both the alleged tolerance and open texture of vague predicates, while foregoing excessive 
metaphysical commitments. I offer a novel solution to the infamous Sorites paradox, one that 
outrivals alternative contextualist theories in their ability to explain the phenomenology of 










Chapter 1: Epistemic Gaps...............................................................................................7 
 1.1 Intuitions, ambivalence, response-dependence.....................................................8 
 1.2 The argument from response-dependence ..........................................................13 
 1.3 Back to Zengland ................................................................................................18 
 1.4 Reply to Barnett ..................................................................................................24 
 1.5 The revenge argument from response-dependence ............................................30 
 1.6 The strengthened argument from response-dependence.....................................34 
Chapter 2: Vague Unknowns .........................................................................................40 
 2.1 Wright I...............................................................................................................41 
 2.2 Wright II .............................................................................................................46 
 2.3 Wright III ............................................................................................................55 
 2.4 Barnett.................................................................................................................58 
 2.5 Dorr.....................................................................................................................60 
 2.6 Williamson..........................................................................................................68 
 2.7 Greenough...........................................................................................................71 
Chapter 3: 'Vague' and Higher-Order Vagueness .......................................................75 
 3.1 Hyde's argument .................................................................................................75 
 3.2 From vague vagueness to higher-order vagueness .............................................80 
 3.3 Quantifiers and indeterminacy............................................................................82 
 3.4 Sorensen-Hyde vs. Tye-Deas-Hull-Varzi ...........................................................88 
 3.5 Higher-order vagueness ......................................................................................93 
 3.6 'Vague' at higher orders ......................................................................................97 
 xvii 
 3.7 Vaguely vague vagueness.................................................................................101 
Chapter 4: Margins for Error in Meaning..................................................................107 
 4.1 Knowledge of meaning.....................................................................................108 
 4.2 Linguistic deviance ...........................................................................................110 
 4.3 Semantic externalism and linguistic induction .................................................115 
 4.4 Linguistic abduction .........................................................................................122 
 4.5 Ignorant induction.............................................................................................125 
 4.6 Margins for error...............................................................................................129 
 4.7 Supervenience and skepticism ..........................................................................135 
 4.8 Indiscriminable meanings .................................................................................140 
 4.9 Knowledge of non-meaning..............................................................................142 
 4.10 Inexact knowledge ............................................................................................145 
Chapter 5: Ignorance and Open Texture ....................................................................148 
 5.1 Preliminary: vagueness, promises, obligations.................................................148 
 5.2 Presentation: Shapiro ........................................................................................151 
 5.3 Paradox: The Miners.........................................................................................154 
 5.4 Permissiblity: epistemic explanations...............................................................156 
 5.5 Proof: unknowable obligations .........................................................................159 
 5.6 Proposal: non-classical norms ..........................................................................163 
 5.7 Parity: semantic vs. epistemic permissibilism ..................................................166 
 5.8 Pairings: epistemic open texture .......................................................................168 
Chapter 6: Defeasible Tolerance and the Sorites .......................................................172 
 6.1 Worries for contextualism ................................................................................172 
 6.2 Tolerance principles..........................................................................................174 
 6.3 Generic ifs and oughts ......................................................................................179 
 6.4 Obligation-based sorites ...................................................................................185 
 6.5 Permission-based sorites...................................................................................195 
 6.6 Defeasible sorites reasoning .............................................................................198 
 6.7 Metaphysics vs. epistemology ..........................................................................203 
 6.8 Defeasibility vs. incoherence............................................................................208 
 6.9 Conditionals and consequence..........................................................................211 
 xviii 








Must vague statements be either true or false, indeterminate or truth-valueless? Are there hidden 
truths about borderline cases that elude clear classification, or are there no facts of the matter for 
vague matters? Which of these characterizations captures how vagueness is experienced? Do 
vague terms have sharp cutoffs at which they stop applying? Does vagueness prevent us from 
knowing how far our ordinary categories and concepts extend? How far can or should we extend 
these? What norms govern how we reason using vague expressions? Is the range of borderline 
cases itself vague? Are there higher orders of vagueness? Is vagueness a phenomenon of 
language, within the mind, or in the world? 
 Addressing these issues, typically conceived as falling within the purview of philosophical 
logic or philosophy of language, carries considerable import not only for traditional philosophical 
questions within metaphysics and epistemology, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of 
mind, but also for fundamental issues in linguistics, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science. 
Examining the normative and broadly deontic consequences of vagueness poses wide-ranging 
ramifications in applied ethics, rational choice theory, behavioral economics, and legal theory. 
 The theory known as epistemicism offers distinctive answers to these central questions 
surrounding the nature of vagueness. On this type of account, vagueness is fundamentally an 
epistemic phenomenon. This means there is an unknown fact of the matter for every vague 
matter. It may, for instance, be unclear whether a borderline bald should count as bald, but 
according to the epistemic theory, there is a fact of the matter, it is simply unknown. 
Epistemicists, most notably Timothy Williamson (1994), have defended the theory on account of 
two merits: among the entire catalogue of theories on market, it alone is able to preserve classical 
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logic and semantics in their entirety, and it offers the most promising treatment of the 
phenomenon of higher-order vagueness (i.e. the existence of borderline definite cases, definite 
borderline cases, borderline borderline cases, etc.). Yet the epistemicist theory has the 
counterintuitive consequence that each vague term has its own (albeit unknown) cutoff point. One 
can cease to be young after one day of aging; losing a single hair can make you bald; the sky can 
turn dark with the disappearance of a beam of sunlight. Furthermore, existing epistemicist 
theories fail to account for the alleged tolerance of vague predicates (roughly, the rule that vague 
predicates should never apply selectively to sufficiently similar things) and claims of open texture 
(roughly, saying it is permissible to judge borderline cases either way). This prevents them from 
accommodating the full range of facts about vagueness, including its phenomenology and its 
ethical implications. 
 Epistemicism defends a novel version of the theory that meets these challenges by rethinking 
how vagueness guides the interaction of logic, epistemology, and phenomenology. I show how 
epistemicism, contrary to criticism, is able to accommodate both tolerance and open texture after 
all, while retaining a fully epistemic conception of vagueness. I argue that these two features of 
an epistemicist theory are not threatened by the existence of cutoffs. 
 The thesis is organized as a compilation of six essays, each independently standing, with no 
cross references. The first half examines traditional epistemicist accounts. The second half gives 
the positive proposal for a new brand of epistemicism. 
 Epistemicists contend that there is an unknown fact of the matter for every vague matter. 
Thus they defend bivalence (roughly, the principle that any meaningful claim, even if vague, is 
either true or false) but posit epistemic gaps within the range of borderline cases. Most theorists 
balk at the commitment to sharp cutoffs. However, recent work by David Barnett, Cian Dorr, and 
Crispin Wright has challenged the latter, seemingly innocuous half of epistemicism: what I call 
 3 
the UNKNOWN principle, which claims that vagueness entails ignorance. I defend the principle in 
“Epistemic Gaps” and “Vague Unknowns”. 
 In “Epistemic Gaps” (Chapter 1), I reply to Barnett (2010). Barnett rejects UNKNOWN on the 
grounds that unknowability is not truly an essential feature of vagueness. To support this, he 
argues for the possibility of a hypothetical linguistic community in which speaker intuitions about 
certain vague matters could be response-dependent in the sense of enabling knowledge (roughly, 
if it seems that p then one can know that p). In response, I argue that the mere possibility of such 
response-dependence poses no threat to epistemicism and that any objection to UNKNOWN based 
on such alleged counterexamples is question begging at best. I outline how a broadly 
Williamsonian version of epistemicism can accommodate the possibility of response-dependence 
and how it has the resources to deliver the intuitively correct predictions about such cases. I also 
challenge the idea that our intuitions about vague matters might actually be response-dependent, 
arguing that linguistic data favor UNKNOWN in light of the phenomenology of vagueness. 
 It is here where I develop a general technique for reasoning about vagueness, using minimal 
logical assumptions (essentially, that any determinacy operator used to formulate claims of 
vagueness obeys a modal logic at least as strong as KT), and exploit it to establish a number of 
results demonstrating how the various notions of vagueness, higher-order vagueness, vagueness 
in knowledge, vagueness in intuition, and response-dependence are all interrelated. This same 
technique gets applied later to various issues in other debates: how vagueness should relate to 
ignorance (in “Vague Unknowns”), how vagueness interacts with quantification (“‘Vague’ and 
Higher-Order Vagueness”), and how vagueness impacts norms and obligations (“Ignorance and 
Open Texture”). 
 In “Vague Unknowns” (Chapter 2), I reply to the other objections against UNKNOWN 
advanced by Wright (2001, 2003), Barnett (2009, 2010), Bobzien (2010, 2012), and Dorr (2003). 
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I argue that each of the substitute principles they propose in place of UNKNOWN is to be found 
inadequate for reasons independent of vagueness. I also argue that Williamson’s (1992, 1994, 
1995) own account of how vagueness relates to ignorance is unsatisfactory. I draw some 
substantive conclusions about the nature of principles like UNKNKOWN that attempt to articulate 
the connection between vagueness and ignorance, the import of such claims, and how they relate 
to the prospects for a minimal theory of vagueness in the sense of Greenough (2003). The 
arguments here draw heavily upon the logical technique developed in “Epistemic Gaps”. 
 In “‘Vague’ and Higher-Order Vagueness” (Chapter 3), I defend the claim that any vague 
predicate is higher-order vague because the predicate ‘vague’ is itself vague. The original proof, 
based on a clever construction of Sorensen’s (1985), is given and defended by Hyde (1994, 2003) 
and criticized by Tye (1994), Deas (1989), Hull (2005), and Varzi (2003, 2005). A glaring 
omission in the debate is the general failure to say exactly what the relations are between vague 
vagueness and higher-order vagueness. To amend this, I derive some results showing exactly how 
the two notions are related, then explain how this affects the overall dialectical situation.  
 In “Margins for Error in Meaning” (Chapter 4), I critically examine the prevailing 
epistemicist theory: Williamson’s (1994) margin of error account. A lingering problem for the 
account is that Williamson’s margin for error principles, used to explain our failure to know the 
underlying status of borderline cases, might also wrongly predict that we fail to know exactly 
what our vague terms mean. Sainsbury (1997) argues that such semantic knowledge can be 
preserved on the account, by appealing to the notion of being properly inducted into a linguistic 
community where competent speakers all use a given vague expression with a single, shared 
meaning. I first offer an undercutting defeater to this strategy, arguing that the appeal to linguistic 
induction fails to preclude at least one type of semantic ignorance. I then offer a rebutting 
defeater, by detailing some counterexamples to Williamson’s assumption that being inducted into 
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the relevant linguistic practice guarantees semantic knowledge. Finally, I show why Williamson’s 
claim that we know the meanings of our vague terms exactly, turns out to be false on his own 
account: any semantic knowledge of the meaning of our vague terms must be inexact knowledge. 
 Having so far defended traditional epistemicist views on vagueness-related ignorance, 
semantic ignorance, higher-order knowledge, higher-order vagueness, and vague vagueness, 
while also examining the shortcomings of Williamson’s version of the theory, I go on to explore 
alternative ways to develop the epistemicist theory that, by contrast, can accommodate the 
tolerance and open texture of vague predicates.  
 In “Ignorance and Open Texture” (Chapter 5), I examine the ethical or, more broadly, 
normative implications of vagueness. The epistemicist theory, I argue, is well positioned to 
address such issues. However, this requires challenging the dominant approach taken by existing 
versions of epistemicism: that of preserving classical logic and semantics in their entirety. 
Although considered orthodoxy among epistemicists, such logical conservatism is problematic if 
epistemicists wish to accommodate the alleged “open texture” of vague predicates. The 
alternative I propose aims to relax certain logical commitments and thereby account for our 
permissibility intuitions. Contrary to recent criticism (Shapiro 2006, Soames 1999), I argue that 
epistemicists can endorse limited claims of open texture after all. The discussion here centers 
around a purported counterexample to epistemicism offered by Shapiro (2006): a case of 
conditional obligation where the relevant conditions are vague, so that epistemicism appears to 
predict (wrongly) the existence of unknowable hidden obligations. I argue that there is 
independent reason to reject any argument against epistemicism based on such problem cases, 
given the failure of analogous paradoxical reasoning in the Miners Paradox (Kolodny & 
MacFarlane 2010, Willer 2011). Such objections to epistemicism, I argue, overlook the 
information-sensitive nature of conditional obligation and presuppose an erroneous logic for 
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deontic conditionals. In fact, I shall argue, it is precisely such a logic that is needed for an 
adequate treatment of the tolerance of vague predicates. 
 In “Defeasible Tolerance and the Sorites” (Chapter 6), I present the key proposal: a novel 
form of epistemicism that, unlike its predecessors, is able to account for the alleged tolerance of 
vague predicates. The Sorites paradox concerns how repeated use of tolerance conditionals (e.g. 
If anyone with n hairs is bald, then anyone with n+1 hairs is bald) appears to lead to absurd 
conclusions (e.g. Anyone with 100,000 hairs is bald). I argue that, in order to avoid paradox, we 
should see the use of such tolerance conditionals as embodying certain prescriptive norms of 
judgment, where these exemplify a type of defeasible reasoning (i.e. good in many ordinary 
cases, but not in general), on par with rough-and-ready generic generalizations like “Birds fly”. I 
claim that the defeasibility in question is epistemic in nature: certain conclusions may be 
suspended pending further information or overturned in light of additional knowledge. I show 
how this can be done within the Asher-Bonevac-Morreau framework of nonmonotonic deontic 
logic: nonmonotonic, for modelling the defeasibility of sorites reasoning (Asher & Morreau 1991, 
Morreau 1997); deontic for capturing the implicit deontic content of tolerance principles (Asher 
& Bonevac 1996, Bonevac 1998). In this way the proposal ascertains the compatibility of 
tolerance with the existence of cutoffs. Notably, the account also draws a crucial distinction—
gone largely unrecognized in the literature—between obligation-based tolerance and permission-
based tolerance. I compare it to existing contextualist treatments of vagueness (Kamp 1981; 
Raffman 1994, 1996; Soames 1999; Graff-Fara 2000; Shapiro 2006) and argue that it better 
accounts for the phenomenology of vagueness by capturing key differences between these two 
kinds of tolerance. I also offer some in-depth comparisons of the defeasible approach to other 
closely related alternatives that adopt some form of “contextualist” logic (Kamp 1981; Cobreros, 
Egré, Ripley, and van Rooij 2010; Kolodny & MacFarlane 2010; Willer 2012). 
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Chapter 1: Epistemic Gaps 
 
Epistemicism identifies vagueness as an inherently epistemic phenomenon. On this conception, 
vagueness entails ignorance: if it is vague whether p, it is unknowable whether p. Epistemicists 
attribute this to human cognitive limitations: according to one familiar account, it is our 
insensitivity to the minutia of unstable use patterns governing vague expressions that prevents us 
from knowing how they apply to borderline cases (Williamson 1994). Yet, one may object, these 
limitations are only contingent. For cognitively enhanced speakers with perfectly reliable and 
consistent linguistic intuitions, vagueness might fail to have its familiar epistemic consequences, 
because their intuitions would be, in some important sense, perfectly response-dependent. This 
challenges the epistemicist idea that leaving epistemic gaps is not just an accidental but a 
necessary feature of vagueness. Worse yet, the possibility that ordinary speaker intuitions might 
actually be response-dependent casts doubt on whether it is even an actual feature of vagueness. 
 This paper offers a two-fold defense of epistemicism. First, I argue that response-dependence 
is no threat to the actual truth of epistemicist claims. I offer some linguistic data that favors 
epistemicism over its countervailing possibilities: whereas response-dependence fails to be 
realized among actual ordinary speakers, epistemicist principles comport surprisingly well with 
the phenomenology of borderline cases.  
 Second, I argue that response-dependence is no threat to the necessary truth of epistemicist 
claims. I offer a detailed reply to David Barnett (2010), who argues against epistemicism by 
counterexample. The possibility of a linguistic community exhibiting response-dependence, he 
claims, shows that epistemicism mischaracterizes the nature of vagueness. I explore various ways 
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of developing this objection—some unanticipated by Barnett—and argue that each version fails: 
however the alleged counterexample is to be construed, either Barnett’s criticisms are question 
begging against the epistemicist theory, or his envisaged scenario is simply incoherent. 
 The general lesson that will emerge is that the epistemicist need not deny, but can 
countenance, the possibility of response-dependence. I outline how a broadly Williamsonian 
version of epistemicism has the resources to deliver the intuitively correct predictions about such 
cases regarding both the phenomenology of vagueness as well as the epistemology of higher-
order vagueness. I show how to derive these nontrivial results from basic epistemicist principles, 
using minimal logical assumptions, within a KT modal logic for vagueness. In this way, the 
epistemicist can explain away objections from response-dependence without compromising the 
ignorance-inducing nature of vagueness. 
 
1.1  Intuitions, ambivalence, response-dependence 
Vagueness is the absence of clarity. Say that it is clear that p just in case p and it is not vague 
whether p. Conversely, it is vague whether p just in case it is not clear that p and not clear that 
¬p.1 The epistemicist claim under question says that vagueness entails ignorance. 
  UNKNOWN   
If it is vague whether p, then it is unknowable that p and it is unknowable that ¬p 
UNKNOWN appears plausible.2 In V. for Vendetta Natalie Portman’s character has her head 
shaved. At the beginning of the buzz cut, she is clearly not bald; by the end, she clearly is. At 
                                                 
1 I am following Barnett’s (2009, 2010) decision to avoid the standard terminology, though one may 
substitute determinately or definitely for clearly without harm in whatever follows. 
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some time in between, she is borderline bald—it is vague whether or not she is bald. So is she 
bald then? There’s no knowing, according to UNKNOWN.  
 Why not? A plausible explanation appeals to intuitions. Evidence for someone’s baldness 
comes in the form of intuition—whether or not someone in a certain hair situation looks or seems 
bald.3 To know whether someone is bald would require a certain kind of clarity in intuition: they 
need to clearly look or seem bald, at least if their baldness is to be assessed on the basis of looks 
alone. Yet the absence of such clarity in intuition is a token characteristic feature of vagueness. 
Intuitions about borderline cases conflict, whether across different speakers or within the same 
subject at different or even simultaneous times. We know that Samuel L. Jackson is bald and that 
Whoopi Goldberg is not. But borderline cases abound in between, whose statuses remain 
unsettled. Is Danny Devito bald? It’s debatable. Opinions differ. Verdicts waver. Our intuitions 
about baldness are too discordant and unstable to decide the matter once and for all. 
 Vagueness triggers a feeling of ambivalence in intuition. Opposite intuitions clash, each 
unclear. That is, for either judgment about a borderline case—bald or not—it is unclear whether 
things appear that way. 
                                                 
2 Other authors endorse weaker versions of the principle. Greenough (2003) endorses the existential claim 
that any vague predicate must have an epistemically borderline case (i.e. whose status remains unknown). 
Wright (2001), on one interpretation, appears to endorse the counterfactual claim that if something were 
clearly borderline F, its status would be unknowable (i.e. the weaker claim that clear vagueness entail 
ignorance)—although he does not think there exist any such cases. Williamson, surprisingly, nowhere 
offers any formulation or defense of any principle articulating the epistemic consequences of vagueness, 
except perhaps: “an interpretation s admits an interpretation t just in case if s were correct then speakers of 
the language could not know t to be incorrect. On this view, ‘definitely’ means something like ‘knowably’. 
Just one interpretation is correct, but speakers of the language cannot know all others to be incorrect. 
Vagueness is an epistemic phenomenon.” (Williamson 1994:164) 
3 More controversially, Barnett (2010:24-27) claims that “mundane” predicates like ‘bald’ are devoid of 
external environmental content, insofar as their extension is not determined by some hidden essence 
underlying appearances of baldness, but determined strictly on the basis of the appearances themselves. 
That would suggest that “external” facts such as the number of hairs on one’s head are not part of the 
meaning of ‘bald’ and that baldness is not a real external property of things. I intend to remain neutral on 
such controversial issues. 
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  AMBIVALENCE  
If it is vague whether p, then for any ordinary subject s who has any relevant evidence 
regarding whether p and considers whether p, it is vague whether it seems to s that p and 
it is vague whether it seems to s that ¬p 
AMBIVALENCE is plausible for many ordinary cases of vagueness.4 For consider how hedging is 
good evidence of vagueness. Asking “Is Danny Devito bald?” readily invites replies like:  
He sort of is bald, he sort of isn’t 
He kind of is, kind of isn’t 
It’s hard to say whether he’s bald 
Witness how such hedging behavior persists when reflecting upon our own responses to the issue 
at hand, as when asked “Does Danny Devito seem bald to you?” 
  Well, he sort of does, he sort of doesn’t 
  It kind of looks like he’s bald, it kind of doesn’t 
  It’s hard to say either way 
Hedged self-reports about how things appear suggest that our intuitions are themselves vague in 
the presence of borderline cases. Under severe ambivalence, intensifying my hedges, as in 
  He really only sort of seems bald, really only sort of doesn’t 
  He just kind of looks bald and just kind of doesn’t 
  It’s very hard to say which way he appears 
would indicate that my intuitions are not just vague, but clearly vague. 
 Ambivalence in intuition generally accompanies vagueness. Yet it prevents our knowing the 
true status (if any) of borderline cases—F or not F—for which it is natural to plead ignorance:  
                                                 
4 Barnett (2009, 2010, manuscript) defends a version of AMBIVALENCE. Although I doubt it is generally 
true of all cases of vagueness, I shall set aside such worries for dialectical purposes.  
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  Is Danny Devito bald? I don’t know—it’s vague 
  He sort of is, but he sort of isn’t—I can’t tell 
  I’m not sure—he’s kind of bald, kind of not 
Importantly, these are denials, not hedges, of epistemic claims. Consider the implausibility of 
knowledge-related hedges: 
  *I sort of know he’s bald, sort of know he isn’t 
  *You can kind of tell he’s bald, kind of tell he’s not 
  *I’m kind of certain he’s bald, kind of certain he’s not 
  *It’s hard to say whether I know he’s bald 
  *It’s hard to tell whether I’m sure he’s bald 
Even worse are ignorance-related hedges: 
  *I sort of can’t tell if he’s bald, sort of can’t tell if he isn’t 
  *It’s hard to say whether I’m uncertain about his baldness 
  *I kind of don’t know that he’s bald, kind of don’t know that he isn’t 
It’s not as if we vaguely don’t know the status of typical borderline cases; we really don’t know.5 
 This vindicates UNKNOWN. It also has implications for a principle of response-dependence. 
  RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE   
For any ordinary subject who has some relevant evidence regarding whether p and 
considers whether p, if it seems to s that p then s can know that p and if it seems to s that 
¬p then s can know that ¬p 
Response-dependent conditions can be known to obtain when they seem to obtain.6 Baldness is 
not response-dependent, since our intuitions about baldness do not even provide the possibility of 
                                                 
5 This asymmetry between denied and hedged epistemic claims distinguishes UNKNOWN from the similar 
but distinct principle UNCLEAR: If it is vague whether p, it is vaguely unknowable that p. The data, it 
appears, tells against UNCLEAR but supports UNKNOWN. 
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knowledge about borderline cases. We might otherwise have all the relevant evidence for 
assessing whether Danny Devito is bald. That includes facts about his total hair situation—
including hair count, head shape, hair length, hair follicle distribution, hair thickness, and the 
like—and how these contribute to his overall appearance—looks taken from different viewpoints, 
up close or from afar. It may also involve facts about overall use patterns for ‘bald’—including 
actual linguistic behavior, dispositions of individuals to assent to or dissent from various uses of 
‘bald’, reactions of speakers, both normal and idiosyncratic, to the application of ‘bald’ in a wider 
range of cases, paradigm, borderline, or unusual, opinions of both expert theorists and lay folk 
alike, whether explicit or tacit, whether in consensus or disagreement, about the semantic 
properties of ‘bald’ and its inferential roles in reasoning, and the like. The availability of such 
evidence, no matter how complete, does nothing to sharpen our intuitions. Possessing all this 
information gets us no closer to determining the overall status of Danny Devito’s hair situation: 
bald or not?  
                                                 
6 On another understanding, “response-dependent” conditions obtain just when they seem to obtain under 
normal circumstances. Call this response-dependence*. The paradigm case is color. Redness is purportedly 
response-dependent* insofar as: an object x is red if and only if for any subject s, if s is properly situated 
under normal viewing conditions with respect to x, then x looks red to s (see Johnston 1989, Pettit 1991). 
 The two notions, often misleadingly swept under the single label of “response-dependence”, are 
connected by the notion of luminosity, where a condition is luminous if it can be known to obtain whenever 
it obtains (see Williamson 2000:95). Consider a subject s who is properly situated toward an object x under 
normal viewing conditions. Assume that looking red is luminous, such that: (i) if x looks red to s, then s can 
know that x looks red. Assume moreover that redness is response-dependent* and that s, who has carefully 
reflected over the nature of redness as well as s’s own normal viewing conditions of x, is able to know this, 
such that s can know the truth of the response-dependence* conditional: if x looks red, then x is red. It 
follows given the closure of knowability over knowable entailment that: (ii) if s can know that x looks red 
then s can know that x is red. Combining (i) and (ii) yields the relevant response-dependence conditional: if 
x looks red to s, then s can know that x is red. 
 Such reasoning, if successful, might be used to support premise R1a of the response-dependent 
objection (below). Fortunately, luminosity is objectionable for independent reasons (see Williamson 2000 
ch.4). I shall set aside the notion of response-dependence* in what follows. 
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 The ambivalence of our actual intuitions about applying vague terms in the presence of 
borderline cases disqualifies their application from the ideal of response-dependence. Ordinary 
subjects who know perfectly well what Danny Devito looks like are still unable to know whether 
he’s bald, since their intuitions about the matter are vague. Hence response-dependence fails: it is 
not true that if it seems to them that he’s (not) bald then they can know that he’s (not) bald.7 
 It would appear then that the phenomenology of vagueness speaks in favor of epistemicism. 
Critics of epistemicism, however, may dissent. Failure of response-dependence, they will say, is a 
contingent feature of actual linguistic practice. It therefore reflects nothing about the nature of 
vagueness. The next section looks more closely at this objection. 
 
1.2  The argument from response-dependence 
David Barnett (2010) contests UNKNOWN on grounds of the possibility of a hypothetical 
linguistic community where speaker intuitions are both ambivalent and response-dependent.  
                                                 
7 More precisely: Let p mean Danny Devito is bald and s be some ordinary subject who knows what Danny 
Devito looks like. Given the impossibility of knowledge, both response-dependence conditionals—If it 
seems to s that p then s can know that p and If it seems to s that ¬p then s can know that ¬p—will have a 
false consequent. Given the ambivalence of s’s intuitions over the question of Danny Devito’s baldness, 
both antecedents will be unclear in their truth-value. This is enough to make at least one of the conditionals 
untrue in some circumstance, on any standard analysis of the indicative.  
 On non-bivalent treatments, both antecedents—It seems to s that p and It seems to s that ¬p—will 
either be indeterminate in truth-value (on a trivalent logic), have some intermediate truth-value (on a many-
valued logic), or have no truth-value, i.e. no fixed truth-value across all admissible precisifications (on a 
supervaluationist logic). Thus both conditionals will themselves either be indeterminate in truth-value (on a 
Kleene or Lukasiewicz trivalent logic), have intermediate truth-value (on a many-valued logic), lack truth-
value (on a supervaluationist logic), or simply get evaluated as false (on a Gödel trivalent logic). 
 On a bivalent treatment, so long as one of the antecedents is true, the corresponding conditional will be 
false. This has to be so in some circumstances, assuming that both kinds of borderline-seemings exist—
cases where it seems that p but only vaguely and cases where it seems that ¬p but only vaguely. Otherwise, 
the only way to guarantee that both conditionals turn out vacuously true is to maintain that in all cases of 
vague intuition, it neither seems that p nor seems that ¬p—which is implausible. I wish to set aside such 
“falsehood-entailing” conceptions of borderlineness, on which to be borderline F is to be not-F (although 
see Raffman 2005 for such an account). 
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 Imagine a hypothetical linguistic community, one just like ours, except whose speakers have 
enhanced cognitive faculties. Like ours, their language Zenglish contains vague predicates.  
However, their linguistic intuitions do not suffer the sort of unreliability and inconsistency that 
plague ours. Application conditions for vague predicates like ‘bald*’—the Zenglish analogue of 
our ‘bald’—are determined entirely by the collective dispositions among Zenglish speakers 
concerning use. For predicates as these, things just are as they seem. Linguistic intuitions 
straightforwardly fix their application conditions. Since Zenglish speaker intuitions are perfectly 
reliable and consistent, given their cognitive superiority, their linguistic intuitions are perfectly 
accurate indications about the application conditions for terms like ‘bald*’—in fact, so perfect as 
to offer knowledge of those conditions. Any Zenglish speaker who has the intuition that ‘bald*’ 
applies to someone and believes this under normal conditions—she has no reason to think her 
intuitions are misleading, and so on—comes to know this fact.  
 In this way, baldness* is response-dependent for Zenglish subjects. Zenglish intuitions make 
the application conditions of ‘bald*’ completely knowable: under normal conditions, ‘bald*’ can 
be known by anyone to apply just as it seems to apply. Such response-dependence is not 
dependent upon the reliability of perceptual faculties. A Zenglish speaker may consider, apart 
from any observation of some particular individual x’s hair situation, whether ‘bald*’ would 
apply to anyone in the same hair situation as x, call it h. Indeed, she need not actually view 
anyone with that hair situation; reflecting upon the application of ‘bald*’ may simply be done 
from the armchair. Her perceptual faculties may be terribly unreliable. Even so, her intuitions will 
nevertheless be knowledge-conferring: if it seems to her that anyone in h would/wouldn’t be 
bald*, then anyone in h would/wouldn’t be bald*.  
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 Zenglish intuitions represent an idealized version of our own intuitions, without all the 
instability and inconsistency. However, Barnett claims, this is not a way of imagining away the 
vagueness of terms like ‘bald*’ (contrary to Williamson 1994:232). Such predicates in Zenglish 
might still admit of borderline cases. Vagueness in the application conditions for ‘bald*’ simply 
corresponds to vagueness in the speaker intuitions that determine those very conditions. Some 
hair situations will be borderline bald*, and for any competent Zenglish speaker it will be vague 
whether it seems to her that ‘bald*’ would/wouldn’t apply to these. Yet her intuitions about the 
matter (if any) remain knowledge-conferring. It remains true that if it seems to her that anyone in 
some such situation would/wouldn’t be bald*, then she can know this. Response-dependence 
makes a claim about knowability that is conditional upon the presence of certain intuitions. It is 
simply vague whether these conditions are satisfied in borderline cases. But then it follows (as we 
shall see, on certain minimal assumptions) that whether things are knowable is itself vague. It is 
hence no longer clear that the status of borderline cases of ‘bald*’, although vague, must be 
unknown.  
 It follows that UNKNOWN, however extensionally adequate, is not clearly true in all worlds. 
For the clear truth of UNKNOWN would predict that clear vagueness entails a gap, not vagueness, 
in knowability. Zengland, however, is a world where vagueness is shielded from its familiar 
epistemic consequences. The possibility of Zengland is at odds with epistemicism or any other 
theory of vagueness claiming that vagueness by its very nature leaves a trail of epistemic gaps—
whatever the world, community, or language. 
 Hence, the inconsistent triad: AMBIVALENCE, UNKNOWN, RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE. 
Among these, according to Barnett, AMBIVALENCE is the only necessary truth about vagueness. 
AMBIVALENCE and UNKNOWN, but not RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE, correctly describe the 
 16 
situation of vague terms in English. Whereas AMBIVALENCE and RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE, 
but not UNKNOWN, correctly describe the situation of vague terms in Zenglish. Both UNKNOWN 
and RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE are contingent truths about vagueness: mere reflections of 
cognitive circumstance. 
 I have deliberately left the details of the Zenglish scenario roughly fleshed out for now. We 
shall see how there exist more than one way to spell out Barnett’s objection, depending on how 
these details are filled in. Give minimal assumptions, Zengland poses a weak counterexample 
contesting the necessary clear truth of UNKNOWN. Given additional assumptions, it poses a 
strong counterexample purporting to show UNKNOWN to be clearly false. We begin with the 
weaker variant, call it the response-dependence argument. In schematic form: 
 R1. Possibly, for some p: 
a. it is clearly vague whether p 
b. linguistic intuitions are clearly ambivalent over p, and  
c. whether p is a clearly response-dependent matter. 
 R2.  Necessarily, if intuitions about clearly response-dependent p are clearly ambivalent, 
then it is vague whether p can be known and it is vague whether ¬p can be known. 
       
 R3. Therefore, possibly for some p, it is clearly vague whether p, it is vague whether p 
can be known, and it is vague whether ¬p can be known; so UNKNOWN is not 
necessarily clearly true. 
 I shall eventually argue that the joint truth of claims R1a–R1c is untenable. Before examining 
the argument, however, let us introduce some notation for convenience.  
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 Let Cp mean it is clear that p, Ip mean it is vague whether p (such that Ip =def ¬Cp & ¬C¬p), 
Np mean it seems to one that p, and Kp mean one can know that p. We assume that both the 
clarity operator C and the knowability operator K obey the modal principles K and T.8  
  KC C(p → q) → (Cp → Cq) 
  TC Cp → p 
These say that clarity is both closed over implication and factive. These are not unreasonable 
assumptions to make, given that epistemicists already identify vagueness as a source of epistemic 
uncertainty and hold relatively uncontroversial commitments to a KT epistemic logic.9 Since my 
aim is to defend a broadly Williamsonian version of epistemicism, I shall assume classical logic 
throughout. 
 A couple of immediate results are in order. 
Result 1: The response-dependence argument is validated by basic principles of modal 
propositional logic together with the KT assumptions governing clarity and necessity.  
Proof. Assume premises R1 and R2 are true. Suppose p is the verifying instance of R1. By K, R1 
and R2 jointly entail ◊(CIp & IKp & IK¬p). Assume for reductio that UNKNOWN is necessarily 
clearly true (i.e. conclusion R3 is false). Instantiating with p yields C(Ip → (¬Kp &¬K¬p)). By 
K and KC, we get (CIp → C(¬Kp &¬K¬p)). Given KC and &-introduction, C distributes over 
conjunction, so (CIp → (C¬Kp & C¬K¬p)); by K, N and propositional logic, this is equivalent 
to ¬(CIp & (¬C¬Kp ∨ ¬C¬K¬p))—which contradicts the initial possibility claim. 
                                                 
8 Williamson’s (1994 ch. 8) epistemic logic of clarity is KTB. Bacon (2011) argues against the 
B(rouwerian) principle. The defense of epistemicism offered here is free of any commitment to the 
controversial B principle. 
9 For knowability: KE K(p → q) → (Kp → Kq) 
    TE Kp → p 
 18 
Result 2: Premise R2 can be shown using contraposition and the closure of clarity (principle KC) 
Proof. Assume that intuitions over clearly response-dependent p are clearly ambivalent. By KC, 
contraposing the response-dependence conditionals within the scope of the clarity operator in 
C(Np → Kp) and C(N¬p → K¬p), then distributing C, yields C¬Kp → C¬Np and C¬K¬p → 
C¬N¬p; contraposing again gives: (i) ¬C¬Np → ¬C¬Kp and (ii) ¬C¬N¬p → ¬C¬K¬p. By 
TE, both C(Kp → ¬K¬p) and C(K¬p → ¬Kp) are true. By KC, it follows from the clear truth of 
the response-dependence conditionals that C(Np → ¬K¬p) and C(N¬p → ¬Kp). Applying to 
these the same sequence using KC and contraposition delivers: (iii) ¬C¬Np → ¬CK¬p and (iv) 
¬C¬N¬p → ¬CKp. Results (i)–(iv) reduce to: (¬C¬Np &¬C¬N¬p) → (IKp & IK¬p). 
Strengthening the antecedent by ¬CNp and ¬CN¬p allows us to state things more compactly: 
(INp & IN¬p) → (IKp & IK¬p). By the standard rule of Necessitation N, we can strengthen this 
to be necessarily true. 
Since minimal assumptions suffice to secure validity and premise R2, the response-dependence 
objection, thus formulated, arguably hinges on premise R1—the possibility claim. It is worth 
examining in detail how Barnett argues for its truth. 
 
1.3  Back to Zengland 
How exactly is Barnett’s hypothetical Zengland supposed to illustrate the compossibility of 
vagueness, response-dependence and ambivalence? The matter deserves closer scrutiny. 
 1. Zenglish intuitions vs. actual intuitions.  Zenglish speakers’ intuitions are supposed to 
straightforwardly determine the meanings of predicates like ‘bald*’, in a way that our intuitions 
do not when it comes to determining the meanings of vague English predicates like ‘bald’. 
Physiological differences account for why Zenglish intuitions exhibit a level of reliability and 
consistency ours do not. Consider a Zenglish speaker considering under normal conditions 
whether ‘bald*’ applies to some individual x—that is, whether x is bald*, assuming ‘bald*’ means 
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bald*. His intuitions are reliable insofar as if it were to seem to him that x is/isn’t bald* then x 
would/wouldn’t be bald*. They are consistent insofar as if it were to seem to him that x is/isn’t 
bald* then it wouldn’t seem to him that x isn’t/is bald*.   
 These are robust features of his intuitions, which remain reliable and consistent even under 
changes in meaning. The requisite notions may be formulated metalinguistically. They are 
robustly reliable insofar as if it were to seem to him that ‘bald*’ does/doesn’t apply to x then 
‘bald*’ does/doesn’t apply to x. They are robustly consistent insofar as if it were to seem to him 
that ‘bald*’ does/doesn’t apply to x then it wouldn’t seem to him that ‘bald*’ doesn’t/does apply 
to x. Barnett therefore grants that Zenglish intuitions clearly demonstrate RESPONSE-
DEPENDENCE. So it is clearly true of vague terms like ‘bald*’ that if it seems to one that ‘bald*’ 
does/doesn’t apply to x then ‘bald*’ does/doesn’t apply to x.  
 In contrast, baldness is not a clearly response-dependent matter. For no single English 
speaker’s intuitions are reliable or consistent about the application of ‘bald’, nevermind robustly 
so. So no actual ordinary individual’s intuitions are clearly knowledge-conferring in the way a 
Zenglishman’s are. 
 2.  Zenglish intuitions and actual use. In actual practice, what plausibly determines the 
meaning of ‘bald’ is not how a single individual uses that term but rather community-wide 
patterns of use. Meaning supervenes on overall, not individual, use. Such meaning-use 
supervenience is reflected by the perfect response-dependence exhibited by terms in Zenglish. 
Just as actual overall patterns of use determine the meaning of ‘bald’, so do Zenglish intuitions 
about application determine the meaning of ‘bald*’. Individual intuition in Zengland is able to 
mimic what collective use realizes in actual linguistic practice. This is because intuitions do not 
vary across Zenglish speakers. Given their physiological differences, they are able to achieve 
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perfect consensus in their linguistic intuitions, resulting in Borg-like uniformity: one man’s 
intuition is every man’s. 
 ‘Bald’ and ‘bald*’ converge in application conditions. The relevant differences between 
Zenglish and English hold rather at the level of the supervenience base for application, whether in 
use or in intuition. Thus, it would seem to any Zenglish speaker under normal conditions that 
‘bald*’ does/doesn’t apply to anyone in hair condition h if and only if (roughly) overall patterns 
of actual use would determine that ‘bald’ does/doesn’t apply to anyone in h. This is no grounds 
for suspecting that collective use can after all achieve what individual intuition cannot. Although 
it may be unknown (or unclear) exactly how actual use determines meaning, it is nevertheless 
known (and clear) that actual use determines meaning. Accordingly, it is known (and it is clear) 
that Zenglish intuitions determine meaning; exactly how is (for all that’s been said) another 
matter.  
 Similarly for the determination of extension. Although overall use facts suffice to completely 
determine application conditions, whether ‘bald’ applies to certain borderline hair situations may 
be inscrutable if the totality of our actual use patterns is humanly unknowable—perhaps because 
overall use dispositions over borderline cases are themselves vague (and hence unknowable). 
Likewise, although any single Zenglish speaker’s totality of dispositional intuitions about using 
‘bald*’ is enough to completely determine the application conditions for ‘bald*’, she won’t 
clearly know the status of borderline hair situations if she doesn’t clearly know the state of her 
own intuitions about those cases. Even Zenglish intuitions—despite their response-dependence—
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are ambivalent over borderline cases. We may therefore suppose that Zenglish intuitions clearly 
demonstrate AMBIVALENCE.10 
 3.  Zenglish intuitions vs. actual use.  Zenglish intuitions might therefore be seen as 
encapsulating actual community-wide patterns of use, where each individual Zenglish speaker is, 
so to speak, the embodiment of an entire linguistic community. Yet differences still exist. 
Plausibly, even if we were somehow able to know all the actual facts about our overall patterns of 
use that determine the meaning of ‘bald’, we would still be unable to know the application 
conditions for ‘bald’ completely, because exactly how use determines meaning and extension 
remains inscrutable.11  
 ‘Bald*’ is importantly different. Suppose Zenglish speakers were somehow able to learn 
exactly what their ‘bald*’ intuitions are even in borderline cases. (Perhaps they undergo further 
physiological upgrades of the sort that made their intuitions robustly reliable and consistent in the 
first place.) Then they would thereby know what the exact application conditions are for ‘bald*’. 
For there is nothing unclear or unknown about how these would be determined by Zenglish 
intuitions. Given perfect response-dependence, such determination is straightforward: if it seems 
to one (under normal conditions) that anyone in h is/isn’t bald* then anyone in h is/isn’t bald*. 
 The relevant difference is arguably a difference in stability.  Overall use patterns for vague 
English terms are highly sensitive to slight changes in individual use patterns.  If just a few 
individuals used ‘bald’ slightly differently, the overall pattern of how ‘bald’ is used—and hence 
its meaning and application conditions—could be slightly different. Such slight changes are easy 
to come by, given the rampant unreliability and inconsistency of our intuitions about ‘bald’. The 
                                                 
10 We may at least suppose this for now. I shall later give reasons why we should not think Zenglish 
intuitions are clearly ambivalent, given that they are already clearly response-dependent. See §5. 
11 See for instance Williamson 1994 §8.4. 
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same cannot be said for ‘bald*’. Granted, Zenglish intuitions are in one sense highly sensitive to 
slight changes in individual use patterns, insofar as if just one individual in the community were 
to think that ‘bald*’ had slightly different application conditions, so would they all. But local 
changes in individual use patterns are hard to come by, for the very reason that intuitions of 
Zenglish speakers for ‘bald*’ always remain in perfect global alignment, given their robust 
reliability and consistency. 
 4.  Zenglish intuitions vs. Zenglish use. The stability of Zenglish intuitions singles them out as 
the true supervenience base for the meanings of vague Zenglish terms like ‘bald*’. It is speaker 
intuitions, not overall use patterns, that determine the application conditions for ‘bald*’. 
 To see why this is so, consider what happens if, following Barnett, we assume the principle of 
excluded middle. Given excluded middle, there will be (assuming, for simplicity, that baldness* 
supervenes on hair number) a cutoff in hair number for ‘bald*’—some n such that anyone with n 
hairs is bald* but anyone with n+1 hairs is not bald*. Barnett defends the idea that excluded 
middle is compatible with vagueness: expressions may still be vague, despite having cutoffs, 
because it will nonetheless be vague where those cutoffs are.12 On this picture, ‘bald*’ is still 
vague despite having a cutoff, since it is simply vague where that cutoff is. More generally, every 
borderline case for ‘bald*’ turns out to have some underlying status—either he is bald* or he is 
not bald*—though it is simply vague which he is. The guarantee of a fact of the matter is no 
threat to vagueness, if the facts themselves are unclear. 
 The cutoff for ‘bald*’—whose existence is guaranteed by excluded middle—cannot be fixed 
by use. For suppose, moreover, that Zenglish speakers are robustly guided entirely by their 
                                                 
12 Assuming excluded middle is therefore dialectially harmless. See Barnett 2009:§2.1.1, 2010:§3. See also 
§6 below. 
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intuitions when using ‘bald*’: Zenglish speakers are disposed to judge that an individual x is/isn’t 
bald*’ only insofar as it seems to them under normal conditions that x is/isn’t bald*. In that case, 
use patterns must be at least as stable as the intuitions they supervene on.13 If the underlying 
intuitions show robust reliability and consistency, then so must the ensuing use patterns. 
Individual use patterns for ‘bald*’ will then be uniform across the entire Zenglish speaking 
community. This leaves no room for discrepancies in use, even over borderline cases. Rather, 
when confronted with a borderline case, Zenglish speakers will either uniformly hedge or 
uniformly refrain from giving any verdict. Hence patterns of use will fail to specify a cutoff for 
‘bald*’.14   
 Given how the use of ‘bald*’ is constitutively dependent upon Zenglish speaker intuitions, it 
must be shared linguistic intuitions that fix its application conditions. By extension, it must be 
intuition, rather than use, that fixes a cutoff for ‘bald*’. Yet, whatever intuitions are responsible 
for fixing the cutoff for ‘bald*’, these can’t be used by Zenglish speakers themselves to locate 
exactly where it is. Not all changes in intuition—namely, switches from it seeming that anyone 
with n hairs is bald* to it seeming that anyone with n+1 hairs is not bald*—are epistemically 
accessible. This needn’t jeopardize the alleged response-dependence of cutoff intuitions. For they 
                                                 
13 Otherwise, someone could easily apply ‘bald*’ differently than they actually do (given the instability of 
his use patterns) while still sharing the same intuitions (given the stability of his intuitions), in which case 
he would cease to let his judgments be entirely guided by intuition—contrary to the robust reliance of use 
upon intuition. 
14 One may question if the hedging or refraining behavior of Zenglish speakers does not in fact suffice to 
fix cutoffs. Perhaps they hedge or refrain just slightly less before the cutoff, just slightly more after it? To 
think that use patterns might fix a cutoff for ‘bald*’ in this way is misguided. How a Zenglish speaker uses 
‘bald*’ will be determined entirely by his own intuitions about its application, for his intuitions are the 
same as everyone else’s and equally stable. If he hedges or refrains slightly less at n but hedges or refrains 
slightly more at n+1, it is because he recognizes that his intuition that ‘bald*’ applies is slightly stronger at 
n and slightly weaker at n+1. But such a cutoff in intuition, by assumption, is not clearly scrutable. For 
though cutoff intuitions exist, it remains vague where exactly they are (just as: though cutoffs exist, it 
remains vague where exactly they are). 
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needn’t themselves be clear or known in order to be clearly knowledge-conferring. Intuition may 
illuminate without being “luminous” (in the sense of Williamson 2000).   
 Consider a thermometer in a pool.  It is carefully engineered so as to reliably and consistently 
indicate the temperature of a pool. The pool is always as hot or cold as reported, it tracks changes 
in temperature, it never gives mixed readings, and so on. Yet the thermometer is covered by 
algae. So its readings are obscured from plain view. They are, in a word, unclear. Zenglish 
intuitions are like thermometers covered in algae: they are good indicators of what is or isn’t 
bald*, but their indications, however accurate, are not always clear. Their epistemic 
inaccessibility in borderline cases may be due to cognitive limitations. For Zenglish speakers may 
be cognitively advanced just enough to possess perfect faculties of intuition, but not so advanced 
as to possess perfect faculties of introspection. 
 In this way, Zenglish speakers are not clearly knowledgeable about the full application 
conditions for their vague terms, including whether ‘bald*’ applies to borderline hair situations. 
Yet neither are Zenglish speakers clearly ignorant of the status of such borderline cases. Rather, 
it is vague whether any competent Zenglish speaker who considers the matter knows the truth. 
That so much is a consequence of the response-dependence argument for clearly borderline cases 
of ‘bald*’. This challenges the epistemicist claim to the necessary clear truth of UNKNOWN. 
 
1.4  Reply to Barnett  
Recall the possibility premise R1 of the response-dependence argument, which says it is possible 
for some clearly ambivalent intuitions over some clearly vague matter to exhibit clear response-
dependence. Does Barnett’s Zengland scenario really illustrate this possibility? I am doubtful. 
Below, I offer two arguments for why there can be no clear cases of vagueness in a linguistic 
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community like Zengland. The core idea underlying them both is that the nature of Zenglish 
intuitions precludes Zenglish terms from being clearly vague—a fact that is accounted for after all 
by the epistemicist theory. If correct, this undercuts any attempt to use Zenglish or Zenglish-like 
examples to vindicate premise R1 of the response-dependence argument.15  
 Argument 1: precisifications as eligible candidates. Zenglish intuitions, as we saw, are 
perfectly stable. Given such uniformity in intuition across individuals, slight changes in 
individual use patterns for ‘bald*’, and hence its meaning, are hard to come by. But if ‘bald*’ 
could not have easily meant something different, it is hard to see how ‘bald*’ could, in some 
important sense, admit of various precisifications—without which, there arguably is no vagueness 
(at least of the sort Barnett claims exists in Zenglish). To count as clearly admitting of vagueness, 
a predicate must clearly have multiple admissible precisifications—which ‘bald*’ does not. As 
such, it is unclear whether Zenglish terms can be vague. That is, it is unclear whether borderline 
cases really exist for ‘bald*’. 
 The argument just given—admittedly Williamsonian in nature—may be summarized roughly 
as follows. 
 V1. Any vague predicate T must admit of multiple precisifications. 
 V2.  Having multiple precisifications requires meaning instability: it must be easy for the 
meaning of T to have been different. 
 V3.  Meaning instability requires use instability: it must be easy for the linguistic use 
patterns for T to have been different. 
                                                 
15 It also demonstrates how an epistemicist such as Williamson can dodge Barnett’s objection, without 
having to—as Barnett (2010:27) thinks Williamson must—deny the very possibility of Zenglish-like 
scenarios. 
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 V4.   Use instability requires intuition instability: it must be easy for speaker intuitions 
about the application of T to have been different.  
           
 V5.   Therefore, vagueness requires intuition instability. 
Assuming premises V1–V4 are all clear, so is the conclusion V5, which by KC then entails that 
clear vagueness requires clear intuition instability.  But intuitions for ‘bald*’ are stable; at least 
they are not clearly unstable. Hence bald*’ is not clearly vague.16 
 Argument 2: precisifications as local use patterns. On another understanding, to precisify a 
term is to adopt a local use pattern for that term, where this does not require seriously altering or 
otherwise disrupting the overall global use patterns (which perhaps are what determine the range 
of admissible precisifications for the term in the first place). Local use changes may be 
conventionalized for practical purposes, as in the court of law: the legal definition of ‘adult’ 
applies to anyone eighteen years of age or older. Yet no such understanding of precisification is 
readily available for the alleged vague terms of Zenglish. What would be the analogue of 
adopting a local use pattern for intuitions? The very idea that one may be allowed to hold 
intuitions about a certain matter within a restricted local context is psychologically dubious. 
Intuitions are not the sort of thing within one’s power to change at will. Even if they were, the 
conventionalization of such an act serves no clear function. How should the permissibility, say, of 
                                                 
16 A full defense of V1–V4 goes beyond the scope of this paper, as these all make substantive (indeed, 
distinctively Williamsonian) assumptions about the nature of vagueness—e.g. that meaning determines 
extension and that meaning is highly sensitive to changes in overall use patterns (see Williamson 1994). 
For discussion of the notion of “easy possibilities” at work, see Sainsbury (1997). At any rate, I shall later 
offer independent reason for doubting the possibility of clear ambivalence—and hence of clear 
vagueness—in Zenglish (see Result 5). 
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intuiting that ‘adult’ applies to just all those above a certain threshold in age or maturity serve a 
clear legal purpose? 
 Summarized: 
 V1.* Any vague predicate T must admit of multiple precisifications. 
 V2*.  Having multiple precisifications requires meaning flexibility: it must be easy for the 
meaning of T to adapt to a restricted local context of use. 
 V3*.  Meaning flexibility requires use flexibility: it must be easy for the linguistic use 
patterns for T to adapt to a restricted local context of use. 
 V4*.   Use flexibility requires intuition flexibility: it must be easy for speaker intuitions 
about the application of T to adapt to a restricted local context of use. 
              
 V5*.   Therefore, vagueness requires intuition instability. 
Assuming premises V1*–V4* are all clear, so is the conclusion V5*, which by KC then entails 
that clear vagueness requires clear intuition flexibility—which fails for ‘bald*’. 
 Just as the conception of precisifications as eligible candidates is not available to the 
opponent of epistemicism who wishes to establish the clear vagueness of Zenglish terms, neither 
is this alternative conception of precisifications as local use patterns. Whether any substitute 
conception of precisification will do is unclear—Barnett at least has provided no reason for 
believing so. The burden of proof falls upon objectors to provide a compelling story for how 
‘bald*’ can admit of various precisifications after all. Absent such an account, we have no reason 
to believe ‘bald*’ is clearly vague. 
 The nature of Zenglish intuitions thus induces a special sort of higher-order vagueness for 
Zenglish terms. I am not denying here that Zenglish terms can be vague. I am only denying that 
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they can be clearly vague. Either they are not vague, or they are only vaguely vague, if vague at 
all. But then the threat to epistemicism vanishes. For the assumption that things are clearly vague 
is essential to the response-dependence argument.17 Merely saying p is vague simpliciter entails, 
according to epistemicism, that it is unknowable whether p. This is compatible with saying it is 
vaguely knowable whether p. For then it is unknowable whether p, but only unknowably so.18  
 Furthermore, it can be shown on epistemicist principles that whatever is vaguely vague is 
vaguely knowable. Consider: 
  KNOWN  
It is clear whether p only if for any subject s who is suitably situated with respect to some 
relevant, non-trivial evidence for assessing whether p, where vagueness is the only 
potential source of ignorance preventing s from knowing whether p: if p were true then s 
could know that p and if p were false then s could know that ¬p 
A competent Zenglish speaker is “suitably situated” with respect to whether x is bald* when she 
is positioned to see (or envision, if deliberating from the armchair) x’s hair situation under normal 
viewing conditions (no occlusions, illusions, or the like). She need possess only some, rather than 
every, available piece of perceptual (or intuition-based) evidence to be in a position to assess the 
hair situation. There may be multiple viewpoints of x’s hair, each independently sufficient to 
warrant judging that p (either that x is bald* or that x is not bald*), but clarity of baldness* 
requires only that seeing things from one of these be enough to warrant a judgment that p. The 
non-triviality constraint ensures that one’s knowing p (or anything else entailing p) does not itself 
                                                 
17 Thus, response-dependence is unlikely to pose any threat to epistemicists like Bobzien (2010) who 
already deny the existence of any clearly borderline cases. However, I find such accounts independently 
implausible, give that we often appear to be clearly ignorant over the status of borderline cases (see §1)—
contrary to prediction (see Result 3). 
18 There exist independent reasons to think vagueness does not in general preclude truth or falsity (see 
Wright 2003). 
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serve as evidence for p.19 An intuition that p counts as “evidence” in this sense; knowledge that p 
does not.20 The restriction to only possibilities of vagueness-related ignorance serves to rule out 
extraneous, unintended obstacles to knowledge that are independent of vagueness (future 
contingents, Gettier cases, quantum indeterminacy, and so on). 
 Together, UNKNOWN and KNOWN ensure the proper coordination between vagueness and 
ignorance—and also between clarity and knowability under epistemically favorable conditions—
as required by the epistemicist theory of vagueness. These are not meant to aspire toward any 
reductive treatment of vagueness. Open to further refinement, they simply serve as a first-pass 
articulation of its epistemic consequences—both the obstacles to knowledge it presents and the 
open epistemic possibilities in the absence of vagueness. These links between clarity and its 
epistemic ramifications persist through higher orders of vagueness. In particular: 
Result 3: Given the clear truth of UNKNOWN and KNOWN, vague vagueness entails vague 
knowledge. 
Proof. Assume that UNKNOWN and KNOWN are both clearly true. The clear truth of UNKNOWN 
predicts C(Ip → ¬(Kp ∨ K¬p)). Repeated applications of contraposition and KC yield C((Kp ∨ 
K¬p) → ¬Ip); so C(Kp ∨ K¬p) → C¬Ip; so then ¬C¬Ip → ¬C(Kp ∨ K¬p). Distributing 
unclarity over disjunction gives (i) ¬C¬Ip → (¬CKp & ¬CK¬p).21 Next, the clear truth of 
                                                 
19 I leave it an open issue as to whether another’s testimony that p should count as non-trivial evidence that 
p. When considering whether p, less attuned subjects may defer to more experienced judgers whose 
intuitions are more refined, trusting their judgment and believing likewise, and thereby come to know 
whether p on the latter’s say-so, rather than their own intuitions. This way of gaining otherwise unavailable 
knowledge by another’s testimony, at any rate, is not possible for Zenglish speakers, since by assumption 
their intuitions are perfectly in sync. 
20 E = K theorists, along with others who reject this assumption, may substitute some knowledge-neutral 
notion (e.g. grounds) for “evidence” in the formulation of KNOWN. 
21 Proof. Suppose ¬C(A∨B). Assume ¬(¬CA&¬CB) for reductio, which is ¬¬CA∨¬¬CB by one of de 
Morgan’s equivalences. Assume ¬¬CA. Then CA by double negation elimination; hence C(A∨B) by ∨-
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KNOWN predicts both C(Cp → Kp) and C(C¬p → K¬p). By repeated applications of 
contraposition and KC these become (ii) ¬C¬Cp → ¬C¬Kp and (iii) ¬C¬C¬p → ¬C¬K¬p. 
Combining (i)–(iii) gives IIp → (IKp & IK¬p). 
This predicts that for any competent Zenglish speaker considering a borderline borderline case h 
of ‘bald*’, it is both vaguely known whether h is bald* and vaguely known whether h is not 
bald*. Consequently, the envisaged possibility of vague knowledge is not only compatible with, 
but is even accounted for, by the very theory it was designed to refute. The alleged vagueness of 
‘bald*’ turns out to be a mere disguised case of higher-order vagueness. This salvages the 
necessary clear truth of UNKNOWN. Epistemicism is able to countenance the possibility of 
perfect response-dependence after all. 
 
1.5  The revenge argument from response-dependence 
I have argued that the assumed existence of clear borderline cases is untenable for Zenglish 
predicates like ‘bald*’. Simply dropping the premise of clear vagueness, however, is not enough 
to disarm the response-dependence argument. For this assumption can be gotten back by 
strengthening the other premises of the argument. A revenge argument lurks. 
 R1*. Possibly, for some p: 
a. linguistic intuitions are clearly clearly ambivalent over p, and  
b. whether p is a clearly clearly response-dependent matter. 
                                                 
introduction and KC. Likewise, C(A∨B) is derivable from an assumption that ¬¬CB. C(A∨B) follows by 
proof by cases. Contradiction. 
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 R2*.  Necessarily, if intuitions about clearly clearly response-dependent p are clearly 
clearly ambivalent, then: 
a. it is clearly vague whether p 
b. it is clearly vague whether p can be known, and  
c. it is clearly vague whether ¬p can be known. 
       
 R3*. Therefore, possibly for some p, it is clearly vague whether p, it is clearly vague 
whether p can be known, and it is clearly vague whether ¬p can be known; so 
UNKNOWN is not necessarily clearly true. 
The same principles used to validate the original response-dependence argument R1–R3 validate 
the revenge response-dependence argument R1*–R3*. The key difference is that clear 
vagueness (R2*a) is now not assumed but derived.  
Result 4: Premise R2* can be shown using contraposition and principle KC 
Proof of R2*. Assume that intuitions over clearly response-dependent p are clearly ambivalent. 
The clear factivity of intuitions, expressed by C(Nr → r) and C(N¬r → ¬r), follows from TE and 
KC. Applying again the familiar sequence using KC and contraposition gets us: (i) ¬C¬Nr → 
¬C¬r and (ii) ¬C¬N¬r → ¬Cr. These reduce to (¬C¬Nr &¬C¬N¬r) → (¬C¬r &¬Cr).  
Simplifying the consequent and then strengthening the antecedent by ¬CNr and ¬CN¬r yields the 
more compact (INr & IN¬r) → Ir, which can be turned into a strict conditional by the rule of 
Necessitation. This secures R2*a. The others R2*b–c are easily gotten by repeating the proof for 
R2, strengthening the premises by C, then distributing C via KC to the conclusion. 
Let us say states Φ and Ψ are correlated just in case Φp → Ψp and Φ¬p → Ψ¬p. The revenge 




Given that being in state Φ is clearly correlated with being in clearly factive state Ψ, then 
clear vagueness in Φ entails both clear vagueness in Ψ and clear vagueness simpliciter: 
{C(Ψp → p), CC(Φp → Ψp), CC(Φ¬p → Ψ¬p), CIΦp, CIΦ¬p} |- CIΨp, CIΨ¬p, CIp. 
Generalizing from R1*–R3* confirms that any notion of vagueness obeying KC and TC will 
verify CORRELATEcc. The same considerations motivating the original possibility premise R1 
involving CIp appear to also motivate the truncated possibility premise R1* without CIp. 
 The revenge argument relocates the tension in the possibility premise as standing between 
clearly clear response-dependence and clearly clear ambivalence in Zenglish intuitions. The 
epistemicist is forced to choose between the two. Independently plausible principles suggest 
dispensing with (clearly) clear ambivalence. Consider: 
  GROUNDS 
For any subject s who considers whether p on the basis of some relevant non-testimonial 
evidence, where vagueness is the only potential source of ignorance preventing s from 
knowing whether p: if s can know that p then it seems to s that p and if s can know that 
¬p then it seems to s that ¬p 
Vague matters in Zenglish verify GROUNDS. Speaker intuitions are the only relevant source of 
evidence when considering whether an individual is bald* on the basis of looks or imagination 
alone (i.e. apart from another’s testimony). Obviously, not all knowledge is accompanied by 
intuition. One can know that two Müller-Lyer lines are equal in length without any perceptual 
appearance of them being so. One can reproduce proofs for complex mathematical theorems by 
rote, without any corresponding intellectual seemings. Yet competence with vague expressions 
requires that linguistic use be backed by intuition. One is only in a position to know based on 
looks alone that someone is bald* provided she has the relevant knowledge-grounding intuitions.  
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Result 5: Given the clear truth of RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE, UNKNOWN and GROUNDS, clear 
ambivalence is impossible.  
Proof. By the clear truth of RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE and GROUNDS, intuition and knowability 
are clearly equivalent. Since vagueness is closed over clear equivalence22, we have INp ↔ IKp 
and IN¬p ↔ IK¬p. Assume that the truth of RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE and GROUNDS are not 
just clear but clearly clear. This strengthens the biconditionals to being clearly true. It follows that 
clear ambivalence (CINp & CIN¬p) implies clear vagueness in knowledge (CIKp & CIK¬p), 
from which two mutually incompatible consequences follow. One is CIp, given TE (the factivity 
of K) and CORRELATEcc, from which it follows that C¬Cp by KC.23 The other is CIKp, by &-
elimination; or IKp, by TC. But IKp implies ¬C¬Kp. Note that the clear truth of UNKNOWN 
predicts C(Kp → Cp), by KC and contraposition. It follows that ¬C¬Cp, since vague “possibility” 
is closed over clear implication.24 Contradiction. 
It turns out that Zenglish intuitions cannot be clearly (hence, nor clearly clearly) ambivalent. This 
should be unsurprising, provided that the possibility of clear first-order vagueness in Zenglish 
was already dismissed, since vagueness in matters of baldness* merely reflect what vagueness is 
already there in speaker intuitions. The impossibility of clearly borderline cases corresponds to 
the impossibility of clearly ambivalent intuitions. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Closure of vagueness over clear equivalence. Proof. Assume A and B are clearly equivalent. By KC 
and contraposition: C(A→B) implies C(¬B→¬A); so C¬B→C¬A; so ¬C¬A→¬C¬B. By the same 
principles, distributing over C(B→A), then contraposing, delivers ¬CA→¬CB. Combining yields IA → 
IB, as desired. 
23 The substitution instance is: C(Ψp → p), CC(Np → Kp), CC(N¬p → K¬p), CINp, CIN¬p |- CIKp, 
CIK¬p, CIp. 
24 That is, ¬C¬A→¬C¬B given C(A→B). See the proof above (n.22) for the closure of vagueness over 
clear equivalence. 
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1.6  The strengthened argument from response-dependence 
One final variant of the response-dependence argument must be considered. Barnett (2010:§4) 
develops the Zengland scenario into a “strong counterexample” against UNKNOWN:  
“Given LEM and that it is now vague whether Harry is bald*, clearly, either Harry is bald* or 
Harry is not bald*, even though it is vague which. Clearly, if Harry is bald*, then it seems to 
[some competent Zenglish speaker] Sophie that Harry is bald*. Clearly, if Harry is not bald*, then 
it seems to Sophie that Harry is not bald*. Thus, clearly, either it seems to Sophie that Harry is 
bald* or it seems to Sophie that Harry is not bald*, even though it is vague which. Given the clear 
truth of [the relevant response-dependent conditionals], clearly, either Sophie knows that Harry is 
bald* or she knows that Harry is not bald*, even though it is vague which. Because a thinker 
knows whether p just in case she knows p or she knows not-p, clearly, Sophie knows whether 
Harry is bald*. (Barnett 2010:39)  
This is essentially the original Zenglish argument supplemented with some extra assumptions. 
First, the law of excluded middle clearly holds, such that p ∨¬p is clearly true for any p. Second, 
Zenglish intuitions are complete in the following sense. 
  INTUITION-COMPLETENESS  
For any subject s who considers whether p on the basis of some relevant non-testimonial 
evidence, if p then it seems to s that p and if ¬p then it seems to s that ¬p 
 Barnett thinks we are left in the following situation: it is vague and knowable whether p, 
although it is both vague whether p is knowable and vague whether ¬p is knowable. That 
situation, however, is impossible—at least, the epistemicist has grounds for thinking so, given his 
commitment to UNKNOWN.25 
 
                                                 
25 In fact, Barnett’s remarks elsewhere (2009:§2.2 last paragraph) indicate that he thinks this is not just a 
possibility, but actually(!) the case for our own vague statements. If so, this bodes ill for Barnett’s overall 
views on vagueness as a sui generis phenomenon. At least Result 6 shows how the epistemicist should 
resist that conception. 
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Result 6: Given UNKNOWN, clear knowledge-whether excludes vague knowledge-that. 
Proof. Assume for reductio both (i) C(Kp ∨ K¬p) and (ii) IKp & IK¬p. Knowledge is clearly 
factive; so C(Kp → p) and C(K¬p → ¬p), which by KC and contraposition yield C(¬p → ¬Kp) 
and C(p → ¬K¬p); hence (iii) C¬p → C¬Kp and (iv) Cp → C¬K¬p. But (the clear validity of) 
disjunctive syllogism gives: C(Kp ∨ K¬p), C¬Kp |- CK¬p and C(Kp ∨ K¬p), C¬K¬p |- CKp. 
From (i), (iii) and (iv), we can thus derive C¬p → CK¬p and Cp → CKp. Assuming UNKNOWN 
is true, we have ¬Cp → ¬Kp and ¬C¬p → ¬K¬p; or K¬p → C¬p and Kp → Cp. Therefore 
K¬p → CK¬p and Kp → CKp. Contraposing gives IK¬p → ¬K¬p and IKp → ¬Kp. Hence (ii) 
implies ¬Kp & ¬K¬p. But (i) implies Kp ∨ K¬p by TC, which by one of de Morgan’s laws is 
equivalent to ¬(¬Kp & ¬K¬p). Contradiction. 
It thus appears that Barnett’s intended “strong counterexample” presentation of the Zengland 
scenario is incoherent. He cannot simultaneously claim that whether p is clearly knowable while 
that p and that ¬p are both vaguely knowable. Perhaps the latter claims about vague knowledge 
should be dropped. Doing so, however, only partially amends the situation. There remains a 
strengthened response-dependence argument that does not assume any vagueness in 
knowability.  
 S1. Possibly, for some p: 
a. it is vague whether p 
b. intuitions about p are clearly complete 
c. intuitions about p are clearly response-dependent 
 S2.  Necessarily, if intuitions about vague yet clearly response-dependent p are clearly 
complete, then clearly it can be known whether p. 
       
 S3. Therefore, possibly: for some p, it is vague and knowable whether p, and so 
UNKNOWN is false. 
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If this argument is clearly sound, then UNKNOWN—a purported necessary truth about 
vagueness—is clearly false, and so is the epistemicist theory of vagueness.  
 Alas, the argument is unsound. But why? Observe that validity is guaranteed by the 
uncontroversial modal principle that possibility is closed over strict implication. Moreover, 
premise S2 is verified on minimal classical assumptions. 
Result 7: Premise S2 is verified on classical assumptions for modal propositional logic 
Proof. Assume that the law of excluded middle clearly holds: for any p, C(p ∨ ¬p). Assume for 
conditional proof that intuitions are clearly complete for some vague, clearly response-dependent 
matter. Thus for some p: Ip, C(p → Np), C(¬p → N¬p), C(Np → Kp), C(N¬p → K¬p). By clear 
excluded middle, we get C(p ∨ ¬p). Then C(Kp ∨ K¬p) is derivable given KC and basic 
propositional logic. Strengthening by N yields our desired result. 
This leaves premise S1. Can intuitions be complete when matters are both vague and response-
dependent? It appears not. The epistemicist who acknowledges the possibility of clearly response-
dependent matters in Zengland (premise S1c)—given his commitment to the classical principle of 
excluded middle—must either deny the clear completeness of Zenglish intuitions (premise S1b) 
or deny the possibility of vagueness in such a situation (premise S1a).  
 Either strategy is viable. There is independent reason to deny that Zenglish intuitions can be 
complete. To constitute knowledge, belief arguably need not be truth-tracking in the sense of 
verifying counterfactuals of the form If p one would believe p and If ¬p one would believe ¬p 
(see Williamson 2000 ch.7). Analogously, to be knowledge-conferring, intuition need not be 
complete, in the sense of verifying “sensitivity” conditionals of the form If p it would seem to one 
that p and If ¬p it would seem to one that ¬p. Sensitivity in this sense would require that the 
intuitions completely cover the facts. Thus, for any Zenglish speaker considering under normal 
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circumstances whether ‘bald*’ applies to some individual x, his intuitions would be sensitive 
insofar as: if x were/weren’t bald* then it would seem to him that x is/isn’t bald*. (They would be 
robustly sensitive insofar as: if ‘bald*’ were/weren’t to apply to x then it would seem to him that 
‘bald*’ does/doesn’t apply to x.) Yet, despite their stability and accuracy, Zenglish intuitions need 
not be sensitive. Whereas they do exhibit (robust) reliability and consistency, these features do 
not entail (robust) sensitivity.26 In this way Zenglish intuitions are able to meet the ideal of 
RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE without satisfying INTUITION-COMPLETENESS. 
 Alternatively, Barnett’s own considerations provide reason to deny the very possibility of 
vagueness, given that response-dependence and intuition-completeness are already in place. 
Barnett thinks that ambivalence in intuition is an essential feature of vagueness. But this is 
precisely what the situation rules out. 
Result 8: AMBIVALENCE is jointly inconsistent with INTUITION-COMPLETENESS, 
RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE, and UNKNOWN. 
Proof. Suppose that intuitions over some vague matter clearly satisfy all the relevant conditions 
for INTUITION-COMPLETENESS and RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE—for some p: Ip, C(p → Np), 
C(¬p → N¬p), C(Np → Kp), C(N¬p → K¬p). Assume for reductio that the relevant conditions 
of AMBIVALENCE are also satisfied, such that INp and IN¬p. By clear excluded middle, we get 
C(p ∨ ¬p). Given INTUITION-COMPLETENESS and RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE, it follows by KC 
that clearly it is known whether p: C(Kp ∨ K¬p). However, from clear factivity and INTUITION-
COMPLETENESS we can derive C(Kp → Np) and C(K¬p → N¬p); hence the biconditionals 
C(Kp ↔ Np) and C(K¬p ↔ N¬p), given RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE. Assuming closure of 
vagueness over clear equivalence (see n.22), AMBIVALENCE implies vagueness in knowledge: 
                                                 
26 Compare: safety requirements on knowledge are distinct from, and do not entail, their corresponding 
sensitivity requirements; knowledge-conferring belief can fail sensitivity while satisfying safety (see 
Williamson 2000 ch.7). 
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IKp and IK¬p. Given Result 6 (which uses UNKNOWN), these two consequences—clarity in 
knowledge-whether and vagueness in knowledge-that—are inconsistent.  
I have already showed how epistemicist assumptions rule out the possibility of Zenglish intuitions 
being clearly ambivalent (see Result 5). Result 8 is stronger: it shows why they cannot be 
ambivalent at all. Yet without ambivalence, vagueness—as Barnett conceives of it—is 
impossible in Zengland. But then, as before, the threat to epistemicism vanishes. I submit that the 
epistemicist, in reply to Barnett’s “strong counterexample”, ought to, as it were, baldly assert that 
the example is incoherent, so conceived.27 
 I hope to have demonstrated how both weak and strong versions of Barnett’s objection fail to 
provide any non-question-begging reasons to reject epistemicism. Conceived weakly as an 
objection to the clear truth of epistemicism, it fails to differentiate distinct orders of vagueness: 
                                                 
27 Yet another alternative option is to deny the rule of Necessitation for clarity (NC: |-φ ⇒ |-Cφ). This 
allows us to accept the truth of any instance of the law of excluded middle (|- p ∨ ¬p), without thereby 
committing to its clear truth (|/- C(p ∨ ¬p)). That is enough to block the derivation of Result 7. Though 
perhaps more radical than any reply offered so far, this move is not entirely unmotivated, since it also 
blocks the following derivation of an S4-like consequence for vague Zenglish terms. (The proof resembles 
that of Result 6.) 
 
Result 9: Any clarity operator obeying rules KC, TC, NC iterates, given INTUITION-COMPLETENESS, 
RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE and KNOWN. 
Proof. Suppose that intuitions over some potentially vague matter clearly satisfy all the relevant conditions 
for INTUITION-COMPLETENESS, RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE, and KNOWN. Thus for some p: C(p → Np), 
C(¬p → N¬p), C(Np → Kp), C(N¬p → K¬p), C(Kp → Np), C(K¬p → N¬p). Assuming excluded middle, 
we have p ∨ ¬p. Strengthening by NC yields C(p ∨ ¬p). By repeated applications of KC we get C(Np ∨ N¬p) 
given INTUITION-COMPLETENESS; hence C(Kp ∨ K¬p) given RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE; hence C(Cp ∨ 
C¬p) given KNOWN. Given the clear factivity of clarity (i.e. TC strengthend by NC), we get C(Cp → p) and 
C(C¬p → ¬p), which by KC and contraposition yield C(¬p → ¬Cp) and C(p → ¬C¬p); hence (i) C¬p → 
C¬Cp and (ii) Cp → C¬C¬p. By (the clear validity of) disjunctive syllogism, we have: C(Cp ∨ C¬p), C¬Cp 
|- CC¬p and C(Cp ∨ C¬p), C¬C¬p |- CCp. Given our earlier result C(Cp ∨ C¬p), from (i) and (ii) we can 
therefore derive C¬p → CC¬p and Cp → CCp. 
The guaranteed iteration of clarity is fatal for any possibility of higher-order vagueness. This is plainly 
undesirable, if one wishes to treat Zenglish terms as exhibiting unclear clarity: perhaps nothing is vague in 
Zenglish, though this itself is unclear, such that it is unclear whether anything is vague in Zenglish. (A 
coherent possibility—since it may be verified that {Cp ∨ C¬p, ICp, ¬CC¬p, IIp} are jointly consistent.) 
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things may be vague, just never clearly vague; intuitions about those matters may be ambivalent, 
just never clearly ambivalent. Conceived more strongly as an objection to the bare truth of 
epistemicism, clear or not, the example is incoherent: vagueness and ambivalence are entirely 
absent from the scenario. Either way, Zengland fails to present any reasons for rejecting the 
epistemicist theory of vagueness.  
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Chapter 2: Vague Unknowns 
 
Presumably, any vague term or concept F will admit of cases that are borderline in the sense that 
we do not know whether they are F or not-F. Patrick Greenough (2003) has argued that such 
failures to know the underlying status of borderline cases, if any, should figure into a “minimal 
theory” of vagueness: a theory-neutral characterization of vagueness agreeable to all parties in the 
debate over the nature of the phenomenon, regardless of their theoretical differences. Along these 
lines, Timothy Williamson suggests a way to ostensively define the notion of vagueness: give 
examples of borderline cases, where it is unclear whether something is F, then posit that “an 
expression or concept is vague if and only if it can resulting unclarity of the kind just 
exemplified” (1994:2). Mark Sainsbury agrees that “a certain kind of ignorance is a sign of 
vagueness” (1995:64).  
 Minimal or not, the idea that ignorance is intimately tied to vagueness is pervasive. It is 
intuitive enough to think that ignorance, in some sense, should be a characteristic feature of 
vagueness. Any such claims of ignorance as being a product of vagueness will, of course, not 
presuppose that there is any underling fact about a given borderline F—either that it is F or that it 
is not F—to be known in the first place. Let us assume that vague predicates admit of borderline 
cases, where something is a borderline case of Fness (or more simply, borderline F) just in case 
it is indeterminate whether it is F, i.e. it is neither determinately F nor determinately not-F. Then 
we might articulate the epistemic consequences of vagueness as follows: 
  UNKNOWN If it is indeterminate whether p, it is unknowable that p 
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Plausible as it may be, UNKNOWN has its dissenters. David Barnett objects to UNKNOWN on 
metaphysical grounds, arguing that even if is true, its truth is neither clear (2009:§§3-4) nor 
necessary (2010). Crispin Wright refuses to accept it on epistemic grounds, claiming that 
UNKNOWN is itself unknown (2001:§5.2). Cian Dorr positively rejects UNKNOWN on pragmatic 
grounds, claiming that it licenses consequences which, if uttered, would be pragmatically 
infelicitous.  
 Yet even these deniers of UNKNOWN offer substitutes of their own that are close cousins to 
the original. I argue that these various candidate ways of articulating how vagueness relates to 
ignorance are each problematic in their own right, in ways to which the original formulation is 
impervious. 
 
2.1  Wright I 
Wright (2001) argues that borderlineness—and by extension, vagueness, if indeed this is the 
paradigmatic manifestation of vagueness—should be conceived of in epistemic terms, since 
borderline cases constitute a subclass of the more general epistemic category of quandary-
inducing phenomena.1 According to Wright’s conditions for quandaryhood, a subject S is in a 
quandary over proposition p at time t iff at t: 
(i) S does not know whether p (i.e. does not know that p and does not know that ¬p) 
(ii) S does not know any way of knowing whether p 
(iii) S does not know that there is any way of knowing whether p 
                                                     
1 Wright concedes “that the proponents of the Epistemic Conception of vagueness have the matter half 
right: that indeterminacy is an epistemic matter, that borderline cases should be characterized as cases of (a 
complicated kind of) ignorance.” (Wright 2001:93) 
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(iv) S does not know that it is metaphysically possible to know whether p2 
(v) (for vague p) S does not know that it is impossible to know whether p3 
As Greenough (2008:§4) points out, if (i)-(v) are meant to be truly definitional and not just 
necessary constraints on quandaryhood, this analysis problematically predicts that anyone who 
has never thought about some claim p, and hence is ignorant in all the relevant ways, is thereby in 
a state of quandary over p. The unreflective masses are hence in constant quandary by default! To 
extend some charity to the folk, we may, following Greenough’s suggestion, patch the analysis by 
strengthening the ignorance conditions. Thus, S is in a quandary over p at t iff at t: 
 (i!)  S is not in a position to know whether p   
(ii!) S is not in a position to know any way of knowing whether p 
(iii!) S is not in a position to know that there is any way of knowing whether p  
(iv!) S is not in a position to know that it is metaphysically possible to know whether p 
(v!) S is not in a position to know that: it is impossible to know whether p4 
The key idea is that those in a quandary over p are not just unable to know whether p, but unable 
to know that they are unable to know whether p. The unknowability of quandary-producing p is 
itself a source of quandary. As Wright puts it: “a quandary is uncertain through and through” 
                                                     
2 Wright’s own remarks that “the region of quandary for F [just is] the region of cases where we do not 
know that knowledge of the truth of an F-predication is so much as metaphysically possible” (2003a:465) 
suggest that (i)-(iii) all reduce to condition (iv). Indeed, they are (assuming epistemic closure) all entailed 
by a strengthened variant of the latter: (iv*) S does not know that it is metaphysically possible to know 
there is some way of knowing whether p. 
3 Wright (2001:92) excludes (v) from the general definition of quandary: it applies only where the 
discourse is subject to some principle of Evidential Constraint (if p, it is feasible to know that p)—as with 
vague statements. 
4 This follows from Wright’s claim that it is “unwarranted” to think that any quandary-presenting p is 
feasibly knowable (2003a:§V), since “it is impossible to know whether p” entails “it is not feasibly 
knowable whether p”, and so the former is unknowable if the latter is (by contraposition and the closure of 
knowability over entailment). 
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(2001:92). The iterative character of such ignorance suggests a natural way to spell out the 
epistemic consequences of vagueness, conceived as a source of quandary: 
  UNCLEAR If it is indeterminate whether p, it is indeterminate whether it is knowable 
that p 
Of course, in the absence of such obstacles to epistemic clarity, whether due to vagueness or any 
other source of quandary, things can, all else held equal, be clearly known. 
  CLEAR If it is determinate that p (and vagueness is the only potential source of 
ignorance preventing one from knowing whether p), it is determinately 
knowable that p 
(The requirement that vagueness be the only relevant potential obstacle to knowledge is meant to 
exclude other quandary-inducing but determinate claims (e.g. Goldbach’s Conjecture), as well as 
other knowledge defeaters unrelated to vagueness (e.g. perceptual illusions, Gettier cases), from 
the scope of CLEAR. In what follows, for ease of exposition, I will assume this requirement is 
satisfied for the relevant discourse.) 
 For ease of exposition, I shall often abbreviate ‘knowably p’ and ‘definitely p’ as ‘Kp’ and 
‘Dp’. I take the resulting logic of determinacy to be at minimum KT, since determinacy is 
arguably factive and closed under implication.5 Indeterminacy is interdefinable with determinacy 
(Ip =def ¬Dp & ¬D¬p). I shall assume throughout that indeterminacy is invariant under 
negation:6 
                                                     
5 That is, determinacy operator ‘D’ obeys the modal principles KD: D(p → q) → (Dp → Dq) and TD: Dp → 
p. And given epistemic closure and factivity, knowability operator ‘K’ obeys KE: K(p → q) → (Kp → Kq) 
and TE: Kp → p. 
6 SYMMETRY is plausibly a basic datum for “it is vague whether…” claims. It is arguably a general feature 
of such wh-constructions that “it is F (vague, un/known, un/decided, etc.) whether p” entails “it is F 
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  SYMMETRY If it is indeterminate whether p, it is indeterminate whether ¬p 
 Instances of UNCLEAR and CLEAR are independently derivable given Wright’s principle of 
Evidential Constraint governing potentially vague atomic statements.7 
  EC  If Fa, then it is feasibly knowable that Fa 
Anything feasibly knowable is knowable, so EC reduces to:8  
(1) If Fa, then it is knowable that Fa 
Wright endorses the a priori knowability of EC on antirealist grounds. Presumably, those same 
grounds justify the determinate truth of (1). Assuming determinacy is closed over implication 
(KD), we get: 
(2) If determinately Fa, it is determinately knowable that Fa 
This validates CLEAR for atomic p (assuming vagueness is the only potential source of 
ignorance). Since “knowable…” is determinately factive, (1) can be strengthened to be a 
determinately true biconditional, from which it follows:9 
                                                     
whether or not p”, where this in turn (perhaps because it is equivalent to “it is F whether p or whether not-
p”, and hence to “it is F whether not-p or whether p”) entails “it is F whether not-p”. See also n.46. 
7 Wright cautiously restricts EC to atomic predications of form Fa or ¬Fa, expressible within any alleged 
antirealist discourse where cognitive command is assured (i.e. any difference of opinion will concern a 
knowable matter), including vague discourses (i.e. those that admit of vague statements). See Wright 
2001:59-60 and fn.15-17,41,44.  
8 For Wright, ‘it is feasible to know p’ is weaker than ‘one knows p’, yet is factive—presumably because it 
entails ‘it is knowable that p’, which is factive—and hence stronger than ‘it is logically (conceptually) 
possible to know p’. I shall from here on drop the qualifier “feasibly” for “knowable” (a cumbersome 
nuisance—what does it really add?). At any rate, any inference from ‘S can feasibly know p’ to ‘S is 
positioned to know p’ is licensed by Wright himself, who explains that for something to be feasibly 
knowable just is for it to be (humanly) knowable by someone “appropriately placed to recognise” its truth 
(2001:n.17). 
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(3) It is indeterminate whether Fa iff it is indeterminate whether it is knowable that Fa 
which validates UNCLEAR for atomic p. 
 Whether UNCLEAR and CLEAR are truly representative of Wright’s official views of 
vagueness as a type of quandary, there is independent reason to find these principles problematic. 
Observe that the notion of indeterminacy appears in both antecedent and consequent for (any 
instance of) UNCLEAR. It says that anything indeterminate is indeterminately knowable. 
Reapplying the principle to this claim of indeterminate knowability gets: 
(4) If it is indeterminate whether it is knowable that p, it is indeterminate whether it is 
knowable that it is knowable that p 
Thus anything indeterminate is indeterminately knowably knowable. We can then apply the 
principle to that claim of indeterminate knowable knowability. And so on, up through higher 
orders of knowability. Iterating the procedure results in the sequence of substitution instances: Ip 
→ IKp, IKp → IKKp, IKKp → IKKKp, etc. Chaining together any finite number of substitutions 
allows us to derive for any arbitrary n: 
(5) If it is indeterminate whether p, it is indeterminate whether it is knowablen that p 
(where being knowablen is being knowably knowably… [n-1 times] knowable) A similar result 
holds for CLEAR, which too can reapply without end to its own predictions, thereby producing 
                                                     
9 Strengthening KD gets us D(Kp → p) for atomic p. The determinate truth of (1) gives D(p → Kp). 
Combining yields D(p ↔ Kp). But from any D(A↔B) we can derive the consequence IA↔ IB. Proof. 
First consider D(A→B). By K and contraposition (i.e. distributing ‘D’ over D((A→B) → (¬B→¬A))), we 
can infer D(¬B→¬A). Distributing again gets D¬B→D¬A, which by contraposition is (i) 
¬D¬A→¬D¬B. Now consider D(B→A). By the same principles, distributing then contraposing delivers 
(ii) ¬DA→¬DB. Combining (i) and (ii) yields IA→IB. IB→IA follows by symmetry of reasoning; hence 
IA↔IB. But assumption D(A↔B) just is D(A→B) and D(B→A). 
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the sequence of substitution instances: Dp → DKp, DKp → DKKp, DKKp → DKKKp, etc. Or 
for any n: 
(6) If it is determinate that p, it is determinate that it is knowablen that p 
 In this way, UNCLEAR licenses unrestricted iteration of the knowability operator within 
contexts of indeterminacy, while CLEAR licenses its unrestricted iteration within contexts of 
determinacy. Together, they license unrestricted iteration for claims of knowability everywhere. 
That is to say, they validate the notorious—and widely rejected—KK Principle (see Williamson 
1994:§8.2 and 2000:§5). 
  KK  If it is knowable that p, it is knowable that it is knowable that p 
It appears that UNCLEAR and CLEAR lead to unpalatable epistemic consequences. Is there an 
alternative way to conceive of the epistemic consequences of vagueness available to the quandary 
account?  
 
2.2  Wright II 
Consider the following variants of UNCLEAR and CLEAR: 
  UNCLEAR* If it is determinately indeterminate whether p, it is unknowable whether p 
  CLEAR* If it is determinately determinate that p (and vagueness is the only 
potential source of ignorance over whether p), it is knowable that p 
UNCLEAR* and CLEAR* lack the self-iterating character had by UNCLEAR and CLEAR, and so 
pose no (at least, immediate) danger of validating KK.  
 Yet they appear to fit Wright’s conception of quandary. The idea is to stipulate that ignorance 
ensues only for a narrow, limited range of borderline cases (namely, the definitely borderline 
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cases), but not fully specify whether ignorance is mandated in all borderline cases. Partially 
stating the epistemic consequences of vagueness in this way leaves open the possibility that we 
are never in a position to know that it is unknowable whether p for some vague p, so long as we 
cannot know whether any vague p falls within that select range. This would vindicate the anti-
undecidability condition (v) for quandaryhood. 
 They can also be seen as verifying, in conjunction with other principles endorsed by Wright, 
Wright’s other views on vagueness, apart from the general discussion concerning quandary. 
Consider Wright’s DEF Principle for any suitable determinacy/definiteness operator ‘D’. 
  DEF If Σ |= φ and every atomic sentence in Σ is in the scope of a ‘D’,  
then Σ |= Dφ 
This effectively says that any true consequence of any set of propositions each definitely true 
must be a definitely true consequence. DEF immediately validates the S4 Axiom for determinacy: 
Dp → DDp. An important consequence of the resulting iterativity of the determinacy operator is 
that it collapses vagueness of higher orders into first-order vagueness:10 
  COLLAPSE If it is indeterminate whether it is indeterminate whether p, it is 
indeterminate whether p 
We can then reason as follows: 
  1  (1) DIIp    A (for reductio) 
  2  (2) DIIp → ¬KIp &¬K¬Ip  UNCLEAR* 
  1,2  (3) ¬KIp &¬K¬Ip   modus ponens,1,2 
  1,2  (4) ¬KIp    &-elim, 3 
                                                     
10 Proof. Assume IIp. Thus I¬Ip by SYMMETRY, or I¬(¬Dp &¬D¬p) by definition. By the determinacy 
of the de Morgan equivalences, I(Dp ∨ D¬p). Hence ¬D(Dp ∨ D¬p) by definition, which entails both 
¬DDp and ¬DD¬p (because DDp would imply Dp by TD, or D(Dp ∨ D¬p) by KD and ∨-intro, so ¬DDp 
by reductio; likewise for DD¬p). It follows, by reductio, that both ¬Dp and ¬D¬p, given DEF. Therefore 
Ip. (Note: This is essentially the missing proof for Bobzien’s (2011) unexplained principle (UU/U).) 
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  5  (5) DDIp → KIp   CLEAR* 
  6  (6) DIp    A (for reductio) 
  6  (7) DDIp    DEF, 6 
  5,6  (8) KIp    modus ponens,5,7 
  1,2,5  (9) ¬DIp    reductio,4,6,8 
  1  (10) IIp    TD, 1 
  11  (11) IIp → Ip   COLLAPSED,1011 
  1,11  (12) Ip    modus ponens,10,11 
  1,11  (13) DIp    DEF, 12 
  2,5,11  (14) ¬DIIp    reductio,1,9,13 
This essentially rules out the existence of definite higher-order vagueness—specifically, of 
definite borderline borderlineness. Wright would surely approve.  
 However, in order for quandary condition (v) to be satisfied in the borderlines, we must 
suppose that nothing can be known to be definitely borderline. Otherwise, by UNCLEAR* 
(assuming we know this to be true), knowing for some p that it is determinately indeterminate 
whether p would mean knowing it is unknowable whether p—which violates the anti-
undecidability constraint on quandaryhood. Consequently, given CLEAR* and DEF, nothing can 
be definitely borderline, knowably or otherwise.12 Therefore, anything borderline will be 
borderline borderline.13 Hence the iterativity of vagueness-related indeterminacy:14 
  ITERATE If it is indeterminate whether p, it is indeterminate whether it is 
indeterminate whether p 
                                                     
11 The ‘D’ subscript indicates that the principle in question is assumed to determinately hold, from which 
the relevant substitution instance is derived via TD, so as to license use of DEF later on. 
12 Otherwise, DIp would imply DDDIp by (two applications of) DEF, hence KDIp by CLEAR*, from which 
it follows by KE that K(¬Kp & ¬K¬p), assuming UNCLEAR* is known to hold (at least for definitely 
borderline p). 
13 Assume Ip. Suppose D¬Ip (for reductio). Then ¬Ip by TD—contradiction. Hence ¬D¬Ip. But ¬DIp, 
given CLEAR* and DEF. Therefore IIp. 
14 The “vagueness-related” qualifier is inherited from CLEAR*. DEF, by contrast, is presumably a principle 
that applies to all types of determinacy, vagueness-related or otherwise. 
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This is the converse of COLLAPSE (where vagueness is concerned). Together, they say that to be 
borderline borderline (or second-order borderline, as it were) just is to be (unqualifiedly) 
borderline. Insofar as vagueness of any order finds expression through iterated claims of 
borderlineness using a ‘definitely’ operator, any second-order vagueness (should it exist) can only 
be one of two things: borderline borderlineness or borderline definiteness. DEF already rules out 
the possibility of anything being borderline definite—since if definiteness iterates, nothing 
definite can be borderline definite. So any case of second-order vagueness must be a borderline 
borderline case, and therefore a borderline case by COLLAPSE. Thus, second-order vagueness 
reduces to first-order vagueness.  
 Any vagueness of higher order n > 2 is also reducible. For any nth-order vagueness (should it 
exist) must find expression through iterated claims of borderlineness, where these are either 
ID(…) or II(…).15 The first sort of claim is ruled out by DEF, leaving only the second possibility. 
Any case of nth-order vagueness must then be a borderlinen case (i.e. a borderline borderline… [n 
times] case), and therefore a borderline case by COLLAPSE. What ITERATE guarantees is that the 
range of borderline cases covers all borderlinen cases for any n. Therefore, no borderline case is 
merely borderline, in the sense of being first-order borderline without being higher-order 
borderline. Together, COLLAPSE and ITERATE might therefore be read reductively, as saying 
that all higher-order vagueness reduces to first-order vagueness. 
 Wright (1987, 1992) has used the DEF Principle to argue against the existence of higher-
order vagueness as something distinct from—and, given the expressive resources afforded by a 
definitely operator and its iterated variations when combined with negation, expressively 
                                                     
15 For any claim φ there are only four permutations for stacking Ds and Is: DDφ, DIφ, IDφ, and IIφ. But 
only the last two of these are claims of borderlineness. 
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distinguishable from—first-order vagueness. This combination of COLLAPSE and ITERATE, on 
their reductive reading, falls in step—if not in letter then surely in spirit—with Wright’s denial of 
(what is distinctively) higher-order vagueness, since it shows that there is really only one type of 
vagueness after all: first-order vagueness.  
 It is worth noting that, in contrast with most discussions in the literature (including Wright’s), 
I have made no mention of any “gap principles” typically associated with higher-order 
vagueness.16 The reducibility proof presented here simply rests upon certain independently 
motivated principles concerning the epistemic status of individual borderline cases. Nothing is 
assumed about how adjacent cases in a Sorites series are related—specifically, whether a gap of 
borderline cases must serve as a buffering zone for every pair of contrary determinate categories 
at any alleged order of vagueness, or how the subsequent lack of sharp boundaries for any vague 
category lends to the appearance, illusory or otherwise, of it achieving a smooth transition across 
a Sorites series without paradox. 
 Unfortunately, the view contains some surprising epistemic consequences. To streamline our 
discussion, let us make some initial observations. First, failure of determinate falsity is closed 
over determinate implication:17  
  DEBATABLE  If it is determinate that if p then q, if p is debatable then q is debatable 
                                                     
16 See e.g. Fara (2000), Wright (1987, 1992, 2011), Edgington (1992), Heck (1992), Sainsbury (1991). 
17 Assume D(A→B). Given D((A→B)→(¬B→¬A)) (i.e. assuming contraposition is ‘determinately’ valid), 
by KD and modus ponens we have D(¬B→¬A). By KD again, D¬B→D¬A. By contraposition again, 
¬D¬A→¬D¬B. 
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where “…is debatable” abbreviates  “it is not determinate that it is not the case that…” 
(‘¬D¬…’). Second, higher-order vagueness makes it debatable that first-order vagueness is 
absent, such that the determinacy of either p or ¬p remains debatable:18 
  DEBATABLE* If p is indeterminately indeterminate, either the determinacy of p is 
debatable or the determinacy of ¬p is debatable 
Third, vagueness excludes determinate knowability.19 
  EXCLUSION If it is indeterminate whether p, it is not determinately knowable that p 
Now consider an intuitionistically friendly version of what I shall call The IK Argument.20  
  1  (1) Ip     A 
  1  (2) IIp     ITERATE, 1 
  1  (3) ¬D¬Dp ∨¬D¬D¬p   DEBATABLE*, 2 
  4  (4) Dp → DDp    DEF (from Dp |- Dp) 
  5  (5) DDp → Kp    CLEAR*D 
  4,5  (6) Dp → Kp    transitivity, 4,5 
  4,5  (7) D(Dp → Kp)    DEF (from 4,5 |- 6) 
  8  (8) D(Dp → Kp) → (¬D¬Dp → ¬D¬Kp) DEBATABLE 
                                                     
18 Assume IIp. So ¬DIp, or ¬D(¬Dp &¬D¬p). Then ¬D¬Dp ∨¬D¬D¬p, given ¬D(A&B) |- 
¬DA∨¬DB. This last inference is justified by classical reasoning. Proof. Assume DA and DB. Since &-
intro is “determinately” valid, we have D(A → (B → (A&B))). By KD this becomes DA → D(B → 
(A&B)). By modus ponens on DA, we obtain D(B → (A&B)). Applying KD, &-elim, and modus ponens 
once more, now for DB, yields D(A&B). In this way determinacy collects over conjunction: DA&DB |- 
D(A&B). Contraposing gets ¬D(A&B) |- ¬(DA&DB). By de Morgan (¬&),¬D(A&B) |- ¬DA∨¬DB. To 
be sure, intuitionistic logic does not recognize the validity of the de Morgan (¬&) transformation. 
However, deriving ¬DA∨¬DB does not appear objectionable for any of the standard intuitionist 
considerations (against excluded middle etc.). Moreover, DEBATABLE* remains an intuitively plausible 
truth about second-order vagueness, despite failing to be independently derivable within an intuitionistic 
system (see also n.46 on SYMMETRY).  
19 Assume Ip, so ¬Dp and ¬D¬p. Suppose (for reductio) DKp. By TD, Kp. By TE, p. By DEF (using DKp 
|- p), Dp. Contradiction. Therefore ¬DKp. (Similarly, supposing DK¬p would contradict ¬D¬p. Therefore 
¬DK¬p.) 
20 Engineered to be intuitionistically acceptable, so not even intuitionism-sympathizers like Wright should 
object. 
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  4,5,8  (9) ¬D¬Dp → ¬D¬Kp   modus ponens, 7,8 
  10  (10) Ip → ¬DKp    EXCLUSION 
  1,10  (11) ¬DKp     modus ponens, 1,10 
  12  (12) ¬D¬Kp    A (for →-proof) 
  1,10,12  (13) ¬D¬Kp &¬DKp   &I, 11,12 
  1,10,12  (14) IKp     def(I), 13 
  1,10,12  (15) IKp ∨ IK¬p    ∨-intro, 14 
  1,10  (16) ¬D¬Kp → (IKp ∨ IK¬p)  →-elim, 12,15 
  1,4,5,8,10 (17) ¬D¬Dp → (IKp ∨ IK¬p)  transitivity, 9,16 
  18  (18) D¬p → DD¬p    DEF (from D¬p |- D¬p) 
  19  (19) DD¬p → K¬p    CLEAR*D 
  18,19  (20) D¬p → K¬p    transitivity, 18,19 
  18,19  (21) D(D¬p → K¬p)   DEF (from 18,19 |- 20) 
22 (22) D(D¬p → K¬p) →    DEBATABLE 
(¬D¬D¬p → ¬D¬K¬p)   
  18,19,22 (23) ¬D¬D¬p → ¬D¬K¬p   modus ponens, 21,22 
  24  (24) Ip → I¬p    SYMMETRY 
  1,24  (25) I¬p     modus ponens, 1,24 
  25  (26) I¬p → ¬DK¬p    EXCLUSION 
  1,24,25  (27) ¬DK¬p    modus ponens, 25,26 
  28  (28) ¬D¬K¬p    A (for →-proof) 
  1,24,25,28 (29) ¬D¬K¬p &¬DK¬p   &I, 27,28 
  1,24,25,28 (30) IK¬p     def(I), 29 
  1,24,25,28 (31) IKp ∨ IK¬p    ∨-intro, 30 
  1,24,25  (32) ¬D¬K¬p → (IKp ∨ IK¬p)  →-elim, 28,31 
      1,18,19,22,24,25 (33) ¬D¬D¬p → (IKp ∨ IK¬p)  transitivity, 23,32 
  1,4,5,8,10,18 (34) IKp ∨ IK¬p    proof by cases, 3,17,33 
    ,19,22,24,25  
In this way, vagueness can be seen to generate vagueness in knowledge. The disjunctive result 
here—that if p is indeterminate then either the knowability of p or the knowability of ¬p is also 
indeterminate21—is strictly speaking weaker than the old principle UNCLEAR, which predicted 
                                                     
21 The intended result is of form Ip → (…IKp…). Yet those who for broadly supervaluationist reasons 
reject conditional proof might question whether deriving …IKp… from a non-(super)true premise Ip 
guarantees the (super)truth of Ip → (…IKp…)). Fortunately, there is a way to reconceive the proof without 
the deduction theorem. Given ITERATE, we have |- Ip → I2p. Within a fully classical setting, one could 
derive ¬D¬Dp ∨¬D¬D¬p from I2p. This can be codified in the supervaluationist setting as a validity |- Ip 
→ (¬D¬Dp ∨¬D¬D¬p). (This is not derived, of course, by deriving the consequent from the antecedent, 
but rather justified, as it were, in its own right.) But we have |- Dp → DDp by DEF, and |- DDp → Kp by 
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that both p and ¬p are indeterminately knowable, provided the indeterminacy of p (and hence22 of 
¬p).23 Yet things are arguably just as bad with UNCLEAR* and CLEAR*, as they were with 
UNCLEAR and CLEAR.  
 Observe that because of DEF, CLEAR* reduces to CLEAR.24 Hence it too validates the KK 
Principle within the scope of determinacy: 
  KKDET  If it is determinate that p, it is determinate that it is knowablen that p 
Given DEF, ITERATE, KKD (and hence CLEAR*D), reductio ad absurdum, and other forms of 
(what are by Wright’s standards) intuitionistically acceptable reasoning, we can reproduce the 
reasoning exemplified above in the IK Argument, except now applied to generalized higher-order 
knowability claims, and derive the conclusion (¬DKn¬p & IKnp) ∨ (¬DKnp & IKn¬p).25 Thus,  
  KKINDET If it is indeterminate whether p, then either it is indeterminate whether it 
is knowablen that p or it is indeterminate whether it is knowablen that ¬p 
                                                     
CLEAR*, so |- Dp → Kp. But then |- ¬Kp → ¬Dp (since contrapositives of valid conditionals are valid). 
Definitizing by DEF gets |- D(¬Kp → ¬Dp), so |- D¬Kp → D¬Dp by KD. Contraposing again gets |- 
¬D¬Dp → ¬D¬Kp. By parallel reasoning, |- ¬D¬D¬p → ¬D¬K¬p. Therefore, |- Ip → (¬D¬Kp ∨ 
¬D¬K¬p), by conditionalized proof by cases: If |- φ→(ϕ ∨ ψ), |- ϕ → ζ, |- ψ → ζ then |- φ → ζ. 
22 Although intuitionism only recognizes I¬p ⇒ Ip (but not Ip ⇒ I¬p). Proof. Assume I¬p; so ¬D¬p and 
¬D¬¬p. Suppose (for reductio) Dp. By TD, p. By DNI, ¬¬p. By DEF, D¬¬p. Contradiction. So ¬Dp. But 
¬D¬p. Hence Ip. 
23 Unfortunately, the result (line 42) must remain disjunctive, without further simplication. To derive IKp & 
IK¬p, we need both ¬D¬K¬p and ¬D¬Kp. Given DEF and CLEAR*, these would follow from ¬D¬D¬p 
and ¬D¬Dp. But IIp only guarantees that one of these is true. 
24 Proof. Assume Dp. By DEF(x2), DDDp. Suppose CLEAR* is determinately true, so D(DDp → Kp). By 
KD, DDDp → DKp. So DKp by modus ponens. 
25 The proof is essentially the same, except now a series of reductios (provided Ip) of claims D¬Knp & 
D¬Kn¬p, DKnp, and DKn¬p, instead of reductios of D¬Kp & D¬K¬p (line 5), DKp (line 26), and DK¬p 
(line 32). 
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Given Ip, either p or ¬p will turn out to be indeterminately knowablen: which one (if not both), 
depends on whether it is ¬D¬Dp or ¬D¬D¬p that holds—although one of these must, given IIp 
(by ITERATE).  
 Hence, the following tetralemma. Either  
1. p is determinately true (Dp), in which case p is determinately knowablen for any 
arbitrary n, 
2. p is indeterminate but does not determinately fail to be determinately true (Ip & 
¬D¬Dp), in which case p is indeterminately knowablen for any arbitrary n, 
3. p is indeterminate but does not determinate fail to be determinately false (Ip & 
¬D¬D¬p), in which case ¬p is indeterminately knowablen for any arbitrary n, or  
4. p is determinately false (D¬p), in which case ¬p is determinately knowablen for any 
arbitrary n 
where, whatever the outcome, what is knowable is knowably knowable, determinately so or 
otherwise.26  
 We saw earlier that UNCLEAR and CLEAR validate the objectionable KK Principle. It 
appears that UNCLEAR* and CLEAR* suffer the same problem. Evidently, the suggested recourse 




                                                     
26 Di(tri, etc.)lemma arguments often appeal to some metarule of proof by cases: If A |- C and B |- C then 
A∨B |- C. Those with supervaluationist reservations (see n.21) may simply reconceive such reasoning by 
cases as proceeding on the (super)truth of conditionals, rather than inferential relations—i.e. as validating A 
→ C, B → C, A∨B |- C. 
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2.3  Wright III 
Is there no viable way then to codify Wright’s conception of quandary in epistemic principles for 
vagueness? Perhaps it will do to simply write the anti-undecidability condition (v) directly into a 
principle articulating the epistemic effects of quandary-inducing forms of indeterminacy like 
vagueness, as in: 
  UNKNOWN* If it is indeterminate whether p, it is unknowable whether p and 
unknowable whether it is unknowable whether p 
and its inverse principle: 
  KNOWN* If it is determinate that p (and vagueness is the only potential source of 
ignorance over whether p), it is knowable that p 
Like the previous account, UNKNOWN* and KNOWN* appear to jointly predict that nothing is 
definitely borderline. For anything determinately indeterminate will be knowably indeterminate, 
given KNOWN*. But by UNKNOWN* (assuming we can know this to be true), this means it is 
both knowably unknowable and (knowably) unknowably unknowable—which is impossible.27 
Therefore, any indeterminacy exhibited by a vague claim is itself indeterminate. This is 
consonant with Wright’s idea that any sense of quandary generated by a vague claim is itself a 
source of quandary. As Wright insists, a state of quandary is by nature not something one can 
know oneself to be in, since one’s own ignorance about the matter at hand must itself remain 
unknowable.  
                                                     
27 Pf. Assume DIp. Suppose UNKNOWN* determinately holds: D(Ip → Up & UUp), where Up =def ¬Kp & 
¬K¬p. So DIp → D(Up & UUp) by KD. By modus ponens, D(Up & UUp). By &-elim and KD, we get 
both DUp and DUUp. The former implies KUp, given KNOWN*. But the latter simplifies to UUp by TD; so 
¬KUp. Contradiction. 
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 However, the IK Argument returns to cause trouble. We saw earlier that, provided DEF, 
reductio ad absurdum, and other basic (yet intuitionistically valid) inference rules, we can use 
principles ITERATE and CLEAR*D to derive the result that indeterminacy produces indeterminate 
(un)knowability. The combination of UNKNOWN* and KNOWN*, assuming these are both 
determinately true, validates those same critical principles exploited in the IK Argument—
specifically, ITERATE and CLEAR*D. The IK Argument effectively shows that knowability 
claims iterate within contexts of indeterminacy. And because of DEF, KNOWN* guarantees that 
knowability claims iterate within contexts of determinacy.28 
 One may object: why accept KNOWN*, when this together with DEF already licenses KK, at 
least for determinately true claims? Implicit in the very enterprise of trying to characterize 
vagueness in terms of its epistemic effects is, I take it, the aim of advancing principles that 
identify some characteristic feature of vagueness that is epistemic. Such principles need not be 
reductive (recall UNCLEAR, which spells out the epistemic effects of indeterminacy in terms 
themselves indeterminate), nor need they be complete (recall UNCLEAR*, which specifies the 
epistemic features of only a limited range of borderline cases). They must however identify the 
epistemic markers of vagueness—that is, identify both markers that indicate the presence of 
vagueness as well as markers that indicate its absence. As such, these epistemic principles must 
come in pairs: one to address the effects of indeterminacy, another to address those of 
determinacy. If vague matters mandate ignorance (perhaps of some special sort awaiting further 
explication), surely non-vague matters—where neither vagueness nor any other potential obstacle 
                                                     
28 From DKp, we can show DKnp using induction on n. The base step is trivial. For the inductive step, 
assume DKp. By the inductive hypothesis, DKnp is derivable. By DEF, DDKnp. By KNOWN*D, D(DKnp → 
KKnp). By KD, DDKnp → DKKnp. By modus ponens, DKKnp, or (rewritten) DKn+1p. 
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to knowledge is present—enable knowledge (perhaps of another special sort). Why shouldn’t 
perfectly determinate truths be knowable?  
Relatedly, Bobzien (2010) has argued that borderlineness should be understood in epistemic 
terms, as producing a sort of radical unclarity, in the sense that it is possible, for any vague 
statement p, that some truthtelling speaker, who is maximally competent (with respect to 
evaluating whether p) and maximally informed (with respect to non-trivial evidence for 
evaluating whether p), is nonetheless unable to tell whether p, where this very claim of unclarity 
is itself subject to the conditions of unclarity (i.e. possibly some truthtelling speaker who is 
maximally competent and informed with respect to evaluating whether it is unclear whether p 
cannot tell whether it is unclear whether p), and that claim of unclear unclarity is itself unclear in 
the same manner, and so on up through all higher orders of unclarity. The iterative character of 
such unclarity eliminates the possibility of definite borderline cases. On Bobzien’s view, the 
absence of vagueness also results in a sort of self-iterating clarity, where for any determinate p, 
necessarily, all truthtelling subjects who are competent and informed with respect to evaluating p 
will be able to tell that p, and all higher-order claims about the clarity of (the clarity of…) p are 
themselves clear.  
The current view would appear to encapsulate Bobzien’s idea that, where vagueness is 
concerned, the epistemic aspects of both indeterminacy and determinacy take on a self-iterative 
character: UNKNOWN* ensures that vagueness produces unclarity at all higher orders, so that 
nothing is definitely borderline, while KNOWN*, in conjunction with DEF, ensures that 
determinacy produces clarity at all higher orders. Insofar as UNKNOWN*, KNOWN*, and DEF 
accurately represent the overall structure of Bobzien’s view, the objection raised here against this 
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combination of principles applies equally to the latter: the conception of vagueness as a source of 
radical unclarity has untenable epistemic consequences. 
 
2.4  Barnett 
Barnett (2009) has argued that vagueness is an irreducible, sui generis phenomenon. Nonetheless, 
it comes with epistemic ramifications, albeit not of the sort envisioned by the epistemicist. 
Consider some borderline case of baldness. According to Barnett, 
“[…] it is vague whether you believe that [the claim that e.g. Harry is bald, where Harry is 
borderline bald] is true and vague whether you believe that it is false. While you are in no position 
to assert either that it is true or that it is false, your state of mind is consistent with the absence of a 
hidden fact of the matter, for it is consistent with the clear truth of the following biconditionals:  
(16)  you know that Harry is bald iff Harry is bald.  
(17)  you know that Harry is not bald iff Harry is not bald.  
If (16) and (17) are clearly true, then vagueness in their right-hand sides entails vagueness in their 
left- hand sides. So, you need not be ignorant of what is going on. You simply do not clearly 
know what is going on, in the sense that you do not clearly know that it is true that Harry is bald 
and you do not clearly know that it is false that Harry is bald. This is no surprise, for nothing is 
clearly going on: there is no clear fact of the matter. Vagueness as to whether Harry is bald is, 
without any further analysis, sufficient to explain why you cannot clearly know either proposition: 
vagueness as to whether p entails vagueness as to whether a certain necessary condition on 
knowing p obtains, namely, p’s truth.” (Barnett 2009:§2.2) 
The idea is this: it may be indeterminate whether p is knowable, but this is compatible with there 
being a fact of the matter about whether p. Our epistemic situation toward p is indeterminate: we 
are neither clearly knowledgeable about whether p nor clearly ignorant about whether p. Rather, 
both p and ¬p are indeterminately (un)knowable. Given excluded middle, exactly one of these is 
in fact knowable (the other must be unknowable, given that ‘knowable’ is factive), it is just 
unclear which.  
 This appears, in part, to be an endorsement of UNCLEAR. That so much is a common feature 
shared by both Barnett’s view of vagueness as sui generis and (one reading of) Wright’s view of 
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vagueness as quandary. One might think that Barnett’s account is nonetheless safe from the 
complications facing Wright’s view, since it is free of any commitment to CLEAR, given that 
Barnett nowhere avows any determinacy-introducing principle such as Wright’s DEF that would 
license the iteration of determinacy. However, Barnett’s appeal to excluded middle proves to be 
uniquely problematic.29 The idea of us either knowing p or knowing ¬p, it being simply unclear 
which it is we know when p is vague, already grates harshly against all natural intuition.30 But 
setting intuitions aside, classical reasoning demonstrates that this ends up committing Barnett’s 
proposal to the truth of CLEAR. For Barnett assumes that the law of excluded middle not only 
holds but determinately holds for any vague p, so that it is determinately true that either p is 
knowable or ¬p is knowable (i.e. D(Kp ∨ K¬p)), albeit vague which. Thus, 
  1  (1) D(Kp ∨ K¬p)    A 
  2  (2) D((Kp ∨ K¬p) → (¬K¬p → Kp)) ∨-syllogismD 
  2  (3) D(Kp ∨ K¬p) → D(¬K¬p → Kp) KD, 2 
  1,2  (4) D(¬K¬p → Kp)   modus ponens, 1,3 
 1,2  (5) D¬K¬p → DK¬p   KD, 4 
  6  (6) D(K¬p →¬p)    (TE)D 
  7  (7) D((K¬p →¬p) → (¬¬p →¬K¬p)) contrapositionD  
  7  (8) D(K¬p →¬p) → D(¬¬p →¬K¬p) KD, 7 
  6,7  (9) D(¬¬p →¬K¬p)   modus ponens, 6,8 
  6,7  (10) D¬¬p → D¬K¬p   KD, 9 
  11  (11) D(p →¬¬p)    ¬¬-introD 
                                                     
29 Barnett’s biconditionals (16)-(17) are reminiscent of Wright’s Evidential Constraint. Indeed, Barnett’s 
argument turns out to be a simplified version of Wright’s “Basic Revisionary Argument” against classical 
logic. Whereas Barnett thinks knowing p ∨¬p allows us to conclude that either p or ¬p is knowable (and 
presumably, feasibly so) for vague p, Wright takes this conclusion to be a reductio against supposing 
excluded middle to ever be known. 
30 Consider the gross infelicity of hedging in one’s knowledge reports simultaneously for both p and ¬p: 
*“I kind of know he’s bald, kind of know he isn’t”, *“It’s sort of true that I can know he’s bald, sort of true 
that I can know he isn’t”, *“It’s roughly the case that you can know he’s bald, but also roughly the case 
that you can know he isn’t”, *“You can sort of tell he’s bald, but you can also sort of tell he isn’t”, *“It’s 
hard to tell if I know he’s bald, yet equally hard to tell if I know he’s not bald”, *“It’s hard to say if I know 
he’s bald, also hard to say if I know he isn’t”, *“I’m roughly certain he’s bald, roughly certain he isn’t.” 
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  11  (12) Dp → D¬¬p    KD, 11 
  6,7,11  (13) Dp → D¬K¬p    transitivity, 10,12 
  1,2,6,7,11 (14) Dp → DKp    transitivity, 5,13 
Given its commitment to UNCLEAR and CLEAR, Barnett’s view inherits all the problems faced 
by Wright’s quandary view of vagueness. 
 
2.5  Dorr 
Dorr has argued that the principle UNKNOWN has pragmatically objectionable consequences. 
Suppose you are asked “Is the glass pretty full?” of a borderline pretty full glass. Saying “I don’t 
know” is apt to mislead your hearer into thinking you can’t see the glass very well. In this way, 
pleading ignorance about the underlying status of borderline cases looks infelicitous.31 Dorr 
concludes that principles claiming that vagueness entails ignorance, such as UNKNOWN, should 
be rejected on pragmatic grounds in the sense of having unassertible consequences. 
 Dorr’s official substitute principle is:32 
  EXPORTATION  If it is knowable that it is not determinate that not-p, it is not 
determinate that it is not knowable that p 
which entails the more concise:33 
                                                     
31 The data is remarkably fragile. Notice that any appearance of infelicity with saying “I don’t know”, in 
response to being asked “p?” for some vague p, immediately vanishes, once followed up with some 
qualifier or hedge—“I don’t know, it’s vague” sounds perfectly fine. Oddly, this phenomenon is left 
entirely unaddressed in Dorr’s discussion. 
32 I have modified ‘unknown’ and ‘known’ in Dorr’s own formulations of UNKNOWN and EXPORTATION 
to be ‘unknowable’ and ‘knowable’, respectively, for reasons touched upon earlier (see also §6 below; see 
however n.39).  
33 Assume KIp. Given KE, we can derive K(¬Dp & ¬D¬p) by def(I), so both (i) K¬Dp and (ii) K¬D¬p 
by &-elim. From (i) and TE we get ¬Dp. Suppose DKp for reductio. By (the relevant determinate instance 
of) TD, we have D(Kp → p). Applying KD gets DKp → Dp. So Dp by modus ponens. Contradiction. Hence 
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  EXPORT If it is knowable that it is indeterminate whether p, it is 
indeterminate whether it is knowable that p 
Dorr motivates EXPORTATION as follows. 
“What does it take to make oneself a counterexample to [UNKNOWN]? The case of Respondent 
[i.e. being asked of some borderline pretty full glass whether it is pretty full] suggests that for 
many substitutions for P, it is sufficient if one knows as much about the precise facts upon which 
the question whether P supervenes as any normal human being could know, has a normal grasp of 
the meaning of the English sentence ‘P’, and meets a certain threshold of rationality and 
reflectiveness. But one doesn’t have to know as much as this about the underlying precise facts to 
be a counterexample to [UNKNOWN]. The following conditional looks determinately true: if 
Respondent, who knows that the glass is between 60% and 70% full, knows that the glass is pretty 
full, so does a less opinionated counterpart of Respondent who knows only that the glass is 
between 60% and 90% full. If so, then since it is indeterminate whether Respondent knows that 
the glass is pretty full, it is also indeterminate whether her less opinionated counterpart knows that 
the glass is pretty full.” (2003:§7) 
 The offered motivation for EXPORTATION is dubious. Even supposing it is determinately 
true that if Respondent knows p then her less informed counterpart also knows p, it does not 
follow from this alone that if it is indeterminate whether Respondent knows p then it is 
indeterminate whether her less informed counterpart knows p. All that immediately follows is the 
weaker claim: if it is not determinate that Respondent fails to know p then it is not determinate 
that her less informed counterpart fails to know p. For recall DEBATABLE: only failure of 
determinate falsity, or remaining debatable, as it were—and not full-blown indeterminacy—is 
closed over determinate implication.34 To derive Dorr’s conditional claim of shared indeterminate 
knowledge, one needs in addition to his conditional claim its determinate converse: it is 
                                                     
¬DKp. Now EXPORTATION gives K¬D¬p → ¬D¬Kp. So ¬D¬Kp by modus ponens on (ii). Hence 
¬DKp &¬DK¬p, or IKp. 
34 Assume D(A→B). Given D((A→B)→(¬B→¬A)) (i.e. assuming contraposition is ‘determinately’ valid), 
by KD and modus ponens we have D(¬B→¬A). By KD again, D¬B→D¬A. By contraposition again, 
¬D¬A→¬D¬B. 
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determinately true that if her less informed counterpart knows p then Respondent also knows p.35 
Granted, this converse claim is just as plausible, and equally (i.e. determinately) true. But then the 
conclusion of (conditionally) shared indeterminate knowledge is drawn entirely from independent 
principles of classical reasoning governing determinacy and knowability claims, without any 
reliance on principles linking the two such as EXPORTATION.36  
 Dorr’s objection to UNKNOWN on grounds that responding to borderline questions (any 
“p?” for vague p) with “I don’t know” appears to conflict with the very analysis of semantic 
indeterminacy which Dorr himself applies toward vague statements.37 On that analysis, p is 
semantically indeterminate in context c for population l iff there is some truth q about c such that 
asserting p and denying p would each be individually permitted for any speaker in c who knew q 
(intuitively, all the facts relevant to evaluating whether p), according to the conventions of 
language use prevailing in l.38 Yet Dorr’s principle EXPORT predicts that any case where it is 
                                                     
35 We already have ¬D¬A→¬D¬B, given D(A→B) (see n.34). Suppose we also have D(B→A). By KD, 
DB→DA. Contraposing gets ¬DA→¬DB. Combining results gets us IA→IB (by the validity of φ→ϕ, 
ψ→ζ ⇒ φ&ψ → ϕ&ζ). 
36 Nor is it obvious at all how Dorr’s conclusion, which has the form IKRp → IKCp, is meant to support 
instances of either EXPORTATION or EXPORT, whose predictions, of forms K¬D¬p → ¬D¬Kp and KIp 
→ IKp respectively, concern what a single individual knows (i.e. include only one knowledge operator 
relativized to a single subject), based on an antecedent condition of knowing (in)non-determinate facts, not 
(in)non-determinately knowing facts. In general it’s unclear how any consideration about the supervenience 
base for indeterminacy facts, counterparts with weakened evidential bases, or the like is supposed to 
support an epistemic principle like EXPORT(ATION). 
37 Dorr (2003:§3) mentions another notion of semantic indeterminacy, one that forbids, rather than permits, 
both asserting p and asserting ¬p—which he claims plausibly applies to partially defined predicates with 
incompletely specified extensions (like Soames’ (1999) ‘smidget’; also Fine’s (1975) ‘nice1’, Foster’s 
(1975) ‘pearl’, Sainsbury’s (1991) ‘child*’). By contrast, the permissive notion, he maintains, is found 
“arguably in actual vague languages”. 
38 Left as such, the analysis is clearly inadequate. Having to know all the relevant facts is surely too strong: 
knowing merely some of the relevant facts should suffice for permission to assert p. Nothing in the analysis 
rules out trivial interpretations of q: for all it says, the relevant evidence q might consist in p itself or the 
permission to assert p, in which case anyone who, per impossibile (arguably if p is vague), knew that fact 
would be forbidden from asserting ¬p after all—thereby voiding the concept of semantic indeterminacy of 
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knowably indeterminate whether p will be such that it is indeterminate whether p is knowable. 
Given the symmetry of indeterminacy (i.e. indeterminacy whether p entails indeterminacy 
whether ¬p), in such a case it will therefore be indeterminate whether p is unknowable. 
Presumably, this means that where the indeterminacy of p is known by someone (and is therefore 
knowable), it will be indeterminate whether that person does not know p.39 But according to 
Dorr’s favored analysis of indeterminacy, so long as the speaker knows the relevant facts, she is 
perfectly entitled to assert “I don’t know”.40 For although she fails to be determinately ignorant, 
                                                     
any application. A suitable notion of context might help rule out such unintended interpretations, but Dorr 
gives no exposition of such a notion. As such, the attempt to paraphrase away any loose talk of “all the 
relevant facts” (“weasel words”, he claims, that are unfit for an acceptable analysis) in terms of truths about 
the context is to be found wanting. Indeed, the most obvious relevant facts will presumably not be about the 
context at all—at least, not in any sense proposed by contextualists in the philosophical literature on 
vagueness (Dorr cites Lewis, Kamp, Raffman, Soames and Graff in fn.6), for whom “context” denotes 
something broadly linguistic or psychological that can affect standards of evaluation when applying vague 
predicates. Someone’s physical height must surely count (if anything does) among the “relevant facts” for 
evaluating tallness. But that has nothing to do with the context of judgment in any intended sense: whether 
record-keeping conversational scoreboards (Lewis 1979), salient background presuppositions (Kamp 
1981), internal psychological states (Raffman 1994, 1996), mutually agreed upon stipulations (Soames 
1999), or speaker-relative interests (Graff 2000). For further discussion on various construals of “context”, 
see Shapiro (2006: ch.1§5,7). 
39 This only provably follows provided it is determinately true that if p is knowable then p is known (by the 
subject under consideration, i.e. who knows p is indeterminate). (Symbolizing ‘S knows’ as ‘KS’: only 
given D(KSp → Kp) and D(Kp → KSp) does IKp → IKSp follow; see n.35.) But this is plausible enough: 
surely, some individual will (be determinately such that they) know what’s knowable concerning some 
(potentially vague) statement p. At any rate, this wrinkle only complicates my presentation. Dorr’s own 
formulation of EXPORTATION in terms of ‘known’ clearly predicts that some claim p (known to be vague) 
is vaguely unknown. 
40 Why not apply the permissive notion of semantic indeterminacy to the claim of vague knowledge, rather 
than vague ignorance, since indeterminacy of p allows for both asserting p and denying p (so, presumably, 
asserting ¬p)? One might question whether a denial of “I know p” is enough to justify a full assertion of “I 
don’t know p”. The use of SYMMETRY (IKp → I¬Kp) to secure the claim of vague ignorance (I¬Kp) is 
meant to circumvent this worry. 
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neither is she determinately knowledgeable—and where determinacy disappears, permission 
pervades.41  
 EXPORT(ATION) thus appears both unjustified and inconsistent with Dorr’s own views on 
vagueness-related indeterminacy. Setting aside these worries, how exactly are these 
considerations supposed to refute UNKNOWN anyhow? Dorr concedes that any falsification of 
UNKNOWN will be indirect: 
“If it’s not determinately the case that [the subject] doesn’t know whether the glass is pretty full, 
counterexamples to [UNKNOWN]—cases where it’s indeterminate whether P and also 
indeterminate whether a certain person knows that P—must be quite common […] I wouldn’t 
want to suggest that the only way to be a counterexample to [UNKNOWN] is to satisfy the 
antecedent of this principle [EXPORTATION—i.e. to satisfy K¬D¬p]. It might be enough, for 
example, if one didn’t determinately fail to satisfy the antecedent [i.e. for ¬D¬K¬D¬p to hold].” 
(2003:§7)  
The idea is that principles like EXPORT(ATION) rival UNKNOWN by offering competing 
epistemic predictions. So long as the consequent of either EXPORTATION or EXPORT is 
satisfied—that is, ¬D¬Kp or IKp (given Ip, these are equivalent, and in turn imply I¬Kp)—for 
some borderline case, there is a counterexample to UNKNOWN. Hence Dorr must be denying the 
very possibility of definite ignorance (D¬Kp) about the underlying status of any borderline case, 
                                                     
41 If pleading ignorance about vague matters is supposed to be infelicitous for wholly pragmatic reasons, 
apart from violating any general semantic conventions governing language use, this remains to be spelled 
out. At the very least, this is not the line of argument advanced by Dorr, who appears to think that 
answering “Yes” or “No” (without qualification) to borderline questions does in fact violate our 
conventional norms of language, and moreover is misleading only insofar as it does just that: “the fact that 
the conventions are what they are entails that one can typically avoid misleading one’s interlocutors only 
by conforming to the conventions. (Perhaps this is because the latter fact is partly constitutive of the fact 
that the conventions are what they are.).” (§3) In that case, simply answering “No” to the borderline 
question “Do you know if p?” would violate linguistic convention (even if a more elaborate answer “No, I 
don’t quite know if p” were still admissible). For possible pragmatic solutions, see for instance Brian 
Weatherson’s “Vagueness and Pragmatics” (manuscript) and J.R.G. Williams’ “On the Pragmatics of 
Vagueness” (manuscript). 
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whatever the epistemic status of that case’s borderlineness—whether knowable tout court (KIp) 
or only vaguely knowable (IKIp). There may be ignorance, it just can’t be definite.  
 Dorr’s “no-ignorance” view of vagueness essentially rejects the possibility that for some p it 
is vague whether p and definitely unknowable that p. This is classically equivalent to saying:42 
(7) If it is indeterminate whether p, it is not determinately unknowable that p 
And because ‘knowable’ is definitely factive, we already independently have:43 
(8) If it is indeterminate whether p, it is not determinately knowable that p 
But now, (7) and (8) together entail UNCLEAR (Ip → IKp). It appears that Dorr’s account of 
vagueness does not fall far from those of other deniers of UNKNOWN like (certain interpretations 
of) Wright and Barnett. Yet discrepancies remain. Dorr (2009) explicitly rejects all principles, 
including Wright’s DEF, that would license the unrestricted iteration of determinacy.44 Without 
any such iteration principle for determinacy, it may appear that there is no way to validate 
CLEAR on Dorr’s view. Might the no-ignorance theory of vagueness thus avoid the combination 
of UNCLEAR and CLEAR and its undesirable validation of the KK Principle within all contexts, 
determinacy and indeterminacy alike? There is reason to be doubtful. 
 Recall that being debatable, in the (admittedly artificial) sense of not being determinately 
ruled out (abbreviated “¬D¬…”), is closed over determinate implication: 
  DEBATABLE  If it is determinate that if p then q, if p is debatable then q is debatable 
                                                     
42 The step is even intuitionistically valid, since it only requires ∃x(…) ⇒¬∀x¬(…) and ¬(A&B) ⇒ 
(A→¬B). 
43 Suppose for reductio Ip but DKp. The relevant definitized instance of TE is D(Kp → p). By KD, DKp → 
Dp. So Dp by modus ponens. But ¬Dp by assumption (i.e. Ip). Contradiction. Therefore Ip → ¬DKp. 
44 His reasons there (2009:§7) concern the denial of anything being ultratrue (i.e. definitelyn true for any n).  
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Then we can reason as follows. 
  1  (1) IKp & IK¬p    A 
  1  (2) IKp     &E, 1 
  1  (3) ¬DKp &¬D¬Kp   def(I), 2 
  1  (4) ¬D¬Kp    &E, 3 
  5  (5) D(Kp → p)    (TD)D 
  6  (6) D(Kp → p) → (¬D¬Kp →¬D¬p) DEBATABLE 
  5,6  (7) ¬D¬Kp →¬D¬p   modus ponens, 5,6 
  1,5,6  (8) ¬D¬p     modus ponens, 4,7 
  1  (9) IK¬p     &E, 1 
  1  (10) ¬DK¬p &¬D¬K¬p   def(I), 9 
  1  (11) ¬D¬K¬p    &E, 10 
  12  (12) D(K¬p →¬p)    (TD)D 
  13  (13) D(K¬p →¬p) → (¬D¬K¬p →¬D¬¬p) DEBATABLE 
  12,13  (14) ¬D¬K¬p →¬D¬¬p   modus ponens, 12,13 
  1,12,13  (15) ¬D¬¬p    modus ponens, 11,14 
  16  (16) Dp     A (for reductio) 
  17  (17) D(p →¬¬p)    ¬¬-introD 
  17  (18) Dp → D¬¬p    KD, 17 
  16,17  (19) D¬¬p     modus ponens, 16,18 
  17  (20) ¬Dp     reductio, 15,16,19 
  1,5,6,17 (21) ¬Dp &¬D¬p    &-intro, 8,20 
  1,5,6,17 (22) Ip     def(I), 21 
This shows that when both p and ¬p are vaguely knowable, it is vague whether p. But UNCLEAR 
and SYMMETRY already guaranteed the converse entailment: Ip entails both IKp and IK¬p.45 In 
other words, any borderline claim p will be marked by the indeterminate knowability of both p 
and ¬p. The result here confirms that the indeterminate knowability of both p and ¬p is an 
epistemic marker of only borderline cases: nothing definite shares this epistemic feature. 
                                                     
45 Assume Ip. By UNCLEAR, IKp. But by SYMMETRY, it also follows from Ip that I¬p, hence IK¬p by 
UNCLEAR. 
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Equivalently, vagueness is exclusively marked by the indeterminate unknowability of both p and 
¬p.46 
 Hence the derivable equivalence of Ip and IKp & IK¬p. Now, at the first order of 
determinacy, there are only three options: either it is determinate that p, it is indeterminate 
whether p, or it is determinate that ¬p. These three possibilities {Dp, Ip, D¬p} partition the 
various ways p may be or fail to be (first-order) determinate. Given that the option first-order 
indeterminacy (Ip) is now seen to be equivalent to indeterminate knowability for both p and ¬p 
(IKp & IK¬p), it follows that either other remaining option of first-order determinacy (Dp or 
D¬p) is equivalent to the condition of determinate knowability (DKp or DK¬p, respectively). 
Thus {DKp, IKp & IK¬p, DK¬p} partition the various ways either p or ¬p may be or fail to be 
determinately knowable.  
 Hence the equivalence of Dp and DKp. This validates CLEAR, for we can now derive any 
instance of the form Dp → DKp.47 But then Dorr’s no-ignorance view of vagueness incurs the 
same exact problems facing all the previous views committed to UNCLEAR and CLEAR. 
                                                     
46 This follows from the equivalence of Iφ and I¬φ for any φ (including Kp). To demonstrate that, it 
suffices to show the equivalence of ¬Dφ and ¬D¬¬φ for any φ (since the other conjunct ¬D¬φ is shared 
by both Iφ and I¬φ). Pf. (RtoL) ¬Dφ is easily derivable from ¬D¬¬φ using reductio, ¬¬-introD (i.e. D(φ 
→¬¬φ)), KD, and modus ponens (in the manner of lines 15-20 above). (LtoR) The converse is classically 
derivable by similar means. Assume ¬Dφ. By ¬¬-introD, D(¬¬φ →φ). By KD, D¬¬φ → Dφ. By modus 
tollens (or contraposition and modus ponens), we get ¬D¬¬φ. Note the essential use of double negation 
elimination. Since this rule is intuitionistically invalid, the logical intuitionist lacks the resources to derive 
Iφ → I¬φ independently of any separate rule such as SYMMETRY. So much the worse for intuitionism, 
given the independent plausibility of SYMMETRY. Granted, some theorists do choose to reject 
SYMMETRY, but do so for reasons independent of intuitionism (e.g. Raffman 2005). 
47 Assume Dp. Then ¬Ip and ¬D¬p. By IKp & IK¬p ⇒ Ip, from ¬Ip we have ¬(IKp & IK¬p). From 
¬D¬p we have ¬DK¬p (otherwise DK¬p implies D¬p by KD and TE, contradicting ¬D¬p). But provided 
a “completeness” constraint DKp ∨ (IKp & IK¬p) ∨ DK¬p (i.e. either one of p or ¬p is determinately 
knowable or both are indeterminately knowable—since, we are assuming, neither is ever determinately 
unknowable), we then have DKp.  
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2.6  Williamson 
One might suppose my defense of UNKNOWN against its detractors constitutes a defense of the 
premier version of the epistemicist theory—Williamson’s. In a way, yes. But not entirely.  
 Williamson in more than one place appears to take a quasi-eliminativist stance toward the 
notion of definiteness, claiming ‘definitely’ has no robust, defensible meaning apart from an 
epistemic construal: 
 “If we cannot grasp the concept of definiteness by means of the concept of truth, can we grasp it 
at all? No illuminating analysis of ‘definitely’ is in prospect. Even if we grasp the concept as 
primitive, why suppose it to be philosophically significant? One can make sense of the 
supervaluationist apparatus [by which ‘definitely’ is defined in terms of admissible interpretations] 
if one assumes that an interpretation s admits an interpretation t just in case if s were correct then 
speakers of the language could not know t to be incorrect. On this view, ‘definitely’ means 
something like ‘knowably’. Just one interpretation is correct, but speakers of the language cannot 
know all others to be incorrect. Vagueness is an epistemic phenomenon.” (Williamson 1994:164) 
and 
“Let it be that [some vague claim] is neither definitely true nor definitely false. In reporting this 
obvious truth, the philosopher has no right to stipulate a theoretical sense for ‘definitely’. Rather, 
it must be used in a sense expressive of what is obvious. Yet what is obvious is just that vague 
sentences are sometimes neither knowably true nor knowably false. The simplest hypothesis is 
that this is the only sense in which the vague sentences are neither definitely true nor definitely 
false.” (Williamson 1992:150–1) 
The suggestion is that standard understandings of ‘definitely’ or ‘determinately’ (or any other 
cognate used to introduce and give expression to the notion of being a borderline case), construed 
in broadly supervaluationist terms of semantically admissible interpretations, should be replaced 
by an epistemic understanding—one perhaps (as in Williamson’s own account) given in terms of 
epistemically possible interpretations.48 Talk of determinacy, as far as vagueness is concerned, is 
                                                     
48 In this vein, Williamson proposes a logic of clarity, detailed in the Appendix of his (1994), in which the 
‘clarity’ operator obeys a KTB modal logic. His (2005:§9) discussion reiterates this idea that epistemicism 
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on this suggestion to be reinterpreted as, or otherwise understood entirely in terms of, talk of 
knowability. This falls short of any reductive aspirations for ‘determinately’, since presumably 
not everything determinate is knowable.49 Yet it comes close to saying the notion of 
(in)determinacy reduces to that of something’s being (un)knowable. 
 What the suggestion is not—it is worth pointing out—is to give a bridging principle 
connecting the notions of definiteness and knowability (or indeterminacy and unknowability), in 
the manner of UNKNOWN (or UNCLEAR(*), EXPORT, etc.). For this would be to treat the two 
operators, ‘definitely’ and ‘knowably’, as expressing distinct notions—contrary to the task of 
reinterpreting one in terms of the other. What Williamson wants, by contrast, is for ‘definitely’ to 
be completely reinterpreted as meaning “something like ‘knowably’”. 
 Although elsewhere, in his (1995) Williamson does appear to leave room for keeping the two 
notions of determinacy and knowability (at least conceptually) distinct. There, he defends the 
principle: 
  DETERMINATE If it is knowable that p, it is determinate that p 
which in turn validates UNKNOWN.50 However, nowhere in that discussion or elsewhere does he 
offer any explicit formulation for a converse principle articulating the epistemic consequences for 
definiteness. Instead, Williamson (1995:175–6) appears to be resigned to letting determinacy be 
only partially characterized in terms of epistemic conditions: knowability is a sufficient but not 
                                                     
“can take over and reinterpret the formal apparatus of supervaluationism” originally used to define the 
‘definitely’ operator.  
49 The favorite example Williamson and Wright, etc. all return to is: Goldbach’s (as of yet, unproven) 
Conjecture. 
50 By DETERMINATE, Kp → Dp and K¬p → D¬p. Contraposing gets ¬Dp → ¬Kp and ¬D¬p → ¬K¬p. 
Hence ¬Dp & ¬D¬p → ¬Kp & ¬K¬p, or Ip → ¬Kp & ¬K¬p. 
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necessary condition for determinacy, while unknowability is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for indeterminacy. One might have thought the epistemic theory of vagueness could do 
better. (It is a theory after all, is it not?) Can some principle complete the account? Our earlier 
discussion suggests a natural candidate: 
  KNOWN If it is determinate that p (and vagueness is the only potential source of 
ignorance preventing one from knowing whether p), it is knowable that p 
Together, KNOWN and UNKNOWN provide full necessary and sufficient conditions for 
determining whether any given case is one of (in)determinacy, where these are specified 
completely in terms of epistemic conditions of (un)knowability, on the assumption that vagueness 
is the only potential source of unknowability for the claim in question. The fact that this last 
qualification mentions both analysans and analysandum (if even alleged as such) disqualifies the 
account from being a proper, noncircular analysis. But this is as it should be—the epistemic 
characterization of vagueness was never meant to reduce the notion of (in)determinacy to that of 
(un)knowability, any more than Williamson’s endorsement of DETERMINATE strove toward full 
reductionism. 
 Any reductionist epistemic conception about vagueness, at any rate, should be rejected—and 
arguably along with any attempt to reinterpret the ‘definitely’ operator as meaning (“something 
like”) ‘knowably’. For both ambitions belie the real intent behind the epistemicist theory, since 
they presuppose that epistemicism somehow conceives of vagueness as a special sort of 
ignorance. Strictly speaking, it does not. Vagueness is no more a form of ignorance or 
unknowability, than determinacy is a form of knowledge or knowability. Rather, according to the 
epistemicist theory (at least Williamson’s version), vagueness is a special source of ignorance, 
the absence of which (i.e. determinacy), all else equal, enables knowledge. Vagueness is not so 
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much an epistemic phenomenon, as it is an epistemically characterized phenomenon, whose true 
nature remains to be determined. Indeed, on Williamson’s account, the underlying nature of 
vagueness turns out to be semantic. For Williamson claims that for any purportedly vague 
expression, it is its meaning instability—that is, the hyper-sensitivity of its meaning to the 
humanly undetectable minutiae of the term’s overall use patterns among normal competent 
speakers within the broader linguistic community—that accounts for its ever-shifting, humanly 
unknowable extension, and also therefore the unknowability of the underlying status belonging to 
any borderline case.51  
 
2.7  Greenough 
The foregoing discussion provides some structure to situate the other theories so far considered, 
all of which agree that vagueness results in some sort of epistemic deficit or another. Dorr 
essentially agrees with Williamson that the source of epistemic deficiency is semantic, but denies 
there is any underlying semantic fact of the matter about linguistic conventions to adjudicate the 
status of borderline cases. Alternatively, the source of epistemic deficiency can itself be seen as 
epistemic in nature. Bobzien claims the epistemic deficiency, although true of ordinary human 
subjects, really consists in the inability of idealized informed, competent, truthtelling speakers to 
                                                     
51 Some points worth noting: (i) The extension for ‘F’ need not in principle be complete, in the sense of 
preserving bivalence—i.e. anything truly satisfies either ‘F’ or ‘not-F’—although Williamson (notoriously) 
defends this claim. (ii) The explanation for ignorance or unknowability on Williamson’s view rests on his 
margin for error account of knowledge (really, a special case of his safety condition for knowledge; see his 
(2000)). (iii) Williamson identifies a vague term’s overall use patterns with speakers’ dispositions to either 
assent to or dissent from applying it in varying circumstances (although exactly how these aggregate and 
contribute to the collectively-determined extension of the term will, even at the individual level, be non-
algorithmic and irremediably unsurveyable). In this way, the (meta)semantics for vague terms proves 
ultimately to be a matter of collective psychology. So perhaps the nature of vagueness remains epistemic on 
the account after all (although not distinctively so, given how semantics and psychology are intertwined). 
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arrive at a knowledgeable verdict about vague matters. Wright claims the deficiency is a broader 
epistemic phenomenon of quandary. Although he does not specify the nature of this phenomenon, 
the self-referential character of its undecidable undecidability (i.e. that whether any case of it is 
what it is, is itself cast in doubt) perhaps explains why its nature would prove rather elusive. 
Barnett refuses to reduce things at all, whether to epistemic or semantic terms, since the source of 
the epistemic deficiency is for him sui generis in nature. Greenough simply chooses to leave the 
nature of the phenomenon unspecified (at least within the “minimal theory”), maintaining only 
that vague predicates must exhibit epistemic deficiency in some cases. 
 Uncovering the roots of vagueness-related epistemic deficiency, ignorance or otherwise, 
raises a host of questions. Is it knowable that p if it is vague whether p? If not, how bad is the 
epistemic failure—must p remain unknown, or vaguely unknown, or unknowably unknown, etc.? 
What sort of epistemic entitlement is afforded by the determinacy of p—knowledge of p, 
determinate knowledge of p, knowable knowledge of p, etc.? This set of issues concerns the 
epistemology of vagueness.  
 By contrast, determining whether bivalence, excluded middle, and other features of classical 
logic are preserved when reasoning about borderline cases arguably poses a separate group of 
issues, ones that are metaphysical in nature. Are there cutoffs to vague predicates, concepts, 
properties, etc.? Is there an underlying truth or fact of the matter about borderline cases? about 
borderline borderline cases, or borderline definite cases, etc.? These questions, as we saw, 
generate their own array of answers. Some believe the truth structure for the underlying facts in 
vague matters remains entirely classical (Barnett, Williamson) or at least concede that vague 
matters admit of classical reasoning (Bobzien, Greenough), while others may choose to 
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selectively reject the classical principles of bivalence and excluded middle (Dorr) or otherwise 
undertake the wholesale rejection of classical logic and semantics altogether (Wright).  
 The absence of any clear split or alignment along positions in both sets of issues—what to 
say regarding the truth status of borderline claims vs. how to conceive of the nature of the 
epistemic deficiencies presented by vagueness—gives some reassurance that the two domains of 
inquiry, epistemological and metaphysical, should indeed be kept distinct. 
 What then of the prospects for a minimal theory, in the sense of Greenough (2003)? The 
quest for seeking any universal agreement on the set of metaphysical issues is widely recognized 
by now to be utterly hopeless (as any survey of the literature on vagueness will quickly confirm). 
But maybe hope remains for finding a fixed point of consensus on the epistemology. We may 
concede that UNKNOWN cannot serve as a minimal theory of vagueness, since it is neither 
minimal, as evinced by skepticism from theorists like Barnett, Dorr, and Wright, nor a theory, 
since it states only necessary (but insufficient) epistemic conditions for vagueness. Yet the claim 
that vagueness has some epistemic consequence is incontrovertible—no one denies that. To think 
that vagueness could somehow be epistemically inconsequential is sheer madness. Perhaps then 
the dictum that “Ignorance is a consequence of vagueness” may serve as our minimal claim about 
vagueness. Stated loosely, it simply says that ignorance is present, in some capacity or another, 
whenever something is a borderline case. (Note that this is stronger in scope than Greenough’s 
own minimal theory, which predicts merely that ignorance will be present in some—hence not 
necessarily every—borderline case.)  
 How to unpack this notion of “consequence” turns out to be a source of contention. There is 
some disagreement over whether to construe ignorance as a de facto consequence (Greenough, 
Williamson (dipustably)), as a vague consequence (Wright (first reading), Barnett), as a qualified 
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consequence only when the case in question is definite borderline (Wright (second reading)), as 
an unknowable consequence (Wright (third reading), Bobzien), or as an epistemically qualified 
consequence only when the case in question is knowably borderline (Dorr). There is no 
disagreement, however, that some sort of epistemic deficiency is somehow intimately tied to the 
notion of being a borderline case. That deficiency is presumably gone when things are not vague. 
Although how exactly to construe this is equally contested: it is dispute whether the knowability 
is a de facto, determinate, qualified, knowable, or otherwise restricted consequence of 
determinacy. 
 That said, UNKNOWN and KNOWN, as I have argued, remain the most promising way of 
explicating the dictum, roughly put, that “Ignorance is a consequence of vagueness”. Crucially, 
the arguments I gave against the other contender methods for developing this idea made no 
question-begging assumptions about the metaphysics of borderline cases—they did not, for 
instance, rest on classical rules of reasoning that are intuitionistically unjustified. Those results 
were established on independent grounds. In that way, the plausibility of concluding that 
vagueness entails ignorance rests on no questionable metaphysical commitments (to cutoffs, 
bivalence, or any Williamsonian black-box metasemantics), at least not any that would already 
decide matters in advance of weighing the epistemic considerations. But if this is right, the 
original ignorance-entailing conception of vagueness, even if it doesn’t itself count as a minimal 
account of vagueness, nonetheless proves to be the best candidate for realizing what is a minimal 
account of vagueness.52 And that is reason enough to endorse it. 
                                                     
52 I say “minimal account”, because the label “theory” is often reserved for non-circular analyses and the 
analysis via UNKNOWN and KNOWN (or their paired variants), while nontrivial, remains circular (albeit of 
the acceptable kind). The use of “analysis” is less controversial, since both necessary and sufficient 
conditions are fully provided. 
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Chapter 3: ‘Vague’ and Higher-Order Vagueness 
 
3.1  Hyde’s argument 
Sorensen’s (1985) argument exploits the vagueness of ordinary predicates to induce a sort of 
vagueness in ‘vague’. Consider ‘small’. It is vague insofar as it admits of border cases: 0 clearly 
is small and 106, say, clearly isn’t, but in between there is no clearly last small integer. Hence the 
sorites argument for ‘small’: 
(1) 1 is small 
For any integer n, if n is small, then n+1 is small 
Therefore, 106 is small 
Sorensen’s series is constructed by defining predicates of the form ‘n-small’ for every n as 
follows:  
(2) x is n-small iff x is small or x < n 
Clearly, ‘1-small’ is vague: it shares exactly the same border cases with ‘small’ above 0. When n 
is clearly no longer small, say n=106, then ‘n-small’ is clearly precise because its extension is 
completely determined by the precise ‘less than n’ condition: anything less than 106 is n-small, 
anything greater is not. Since there is no clearly last vague ‘n-small’ predicate, we now have a 
sorites argument for ‘vague’: 
(3) ‘1-small’ is vague 
For any integer n, if ‘n-small’ is vague, then ‘n+1-small’ is vague 
Therefore, ‘106-small’ is vague 
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Hence the vagueness of ‘vague’. Hyde (1994) takes this to show that any vague predicate is 
higher-order vague, by the following argument.1 According to the “paradigmatic conception” of 
vagueness: 
(4) ‘… is vague’ means ‘there are border cases of …’ 
But Sorensen’s sorites setup appears to demonstrate that: 
(5) The predicate ‘… is vague’ is itself vague 
From (4) and (5), any vagueness appearing in the analysandum must appear in the analysans: 
(6) ‘there are border cases of …’ is vague 
But assuming ‘there are …’ is not vague, the vagueness of the analysans must appear elsewhere, 
namely 
(7) ‘border cases of …’ is vague 
which, analyzed via (4), means 
(8) There are border cases of ‘border cases of …’ 
Thus, any predicate that satisfies ‘… is vague’ will admit of “higher-order” border cases. That is, 
(9) Any vague predicate has border border cases 
 Tye (1994) disputes the validity of the argument. The argument’s premises, he claims, do not 
appear sufficiently general to establish its universal conclusion that every vague predicate has 
                                                     
1 The reconstruction largely follows Varzi’s (2003), with minor amendments. I have simplified ‘can be 
analyzed’ to ‘means’ in (4) to exclude other possible analyses (although all (4) really requires is 
coextension, not synonymy or meaning reduction), included the copula in ‘ ‘… is vague’ ’ in (5) (without 
which, the phrase would denote an adjective instead of an actual predicate), pluralized ‘border case[s] of…’ 
in (7) to match the previous premise, and chosen to stick with Hyde’s original conclusion (9), which makes 
a claim about all, not just some, vague predicates. 
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border border cases. All Hyde’s argument shows, if anything, is that such higher-order border 
cases appear somewhere among the vague predicates. That is because (7) and (8) are naturally 
read as implying only the existence of higher-order border cases for some, rather than every, 
vague predicate. Otherwise, if (7) really were true of every vague predicate, so would its 
preceding premise (6) universally apply to all vague predicates—which is absurd, since many 
vague predicates clearly do have border cases. Indeed, as shown by (5), all Sorensen’s 
construction guarantees is the existence of some border case for ‘… is vague’.  
 Varzi (2003) agrees with Tye that Hyde’s original conclusion is too strong. In contrast, I 
believe the argument can be suitably modified to restore full generality to its conclusion. Part of 
the worry, I take it, is that Sorensen’s setup generates higher-order border cases using only a 
single vague predicate, ‘small’. Without being told how to extend Sorensen’s argument to other 
vague predicates, however, one has little reason to believe this consequence will hold for all 
vague predicates in general. Fortunately, there is an obvious extension to the Sorensen 
construction. For any vague predicate ‘F’ with a sorites series consisting of items arranged in 
decreasing order of Fness, for any item n we may define ‘n-F’ as such: 
(10) x is n-F iff x is F or x is more F than n 
and construct a corresponding sorites series for ‘vague’ using the newly defined ‘n-F’ predicates. 
In this way, for many other vague predicates ‘F’ besides ‘small’, we can construct a series of 
Sorensen-style predicates with at least one border case of ‘vague’.2 So perhaps Tye’s generality 
objection is not insurmountable after all. 
                                                     
2 Note that x and n can range over individuals of any sort, so the result is not limited to just numerical 
predicates defined over integers (e.g. x is Bob-tall iff x is tall or x is taller than Bob). Nor does it require 
that the relevant sorites sequence we start with be enumerable (although any resulting Sorensen sequence 
must still be enumerable, since defining each ‘n-F’ predicate requires a name for the item n and there can 
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 Or is it? Unfortunately, the argument, left in its current formulation, fails to capture any 
generality of consequence that Sorensen’s sorites might have to offer. The problem lies not in its 
conclusion (9), as Tye and Varzi suggest, but rather in the inference from (6) to (7). The problem 
is that premises like (5) and (6) are too unspecific: all they entail is the existence of some border 
case or another for ‘vague’, without specifying exactly which vague predicate ‘F’ was used to 
construct the Sorensen sequence guaranteeing that existence. One may of course wish to read (7) 
as claiming that ‘border cases of ‘F’ ’ is vague for some particular vague ‘F’. But this can’t 
follow from (6), since the existential content of (6) is too weak to recover any particular 
information about the original predicate. 
 Besides, there is independent reason to object to Hyde’s argument in its current presentation. 
One obvious major deficiency is how it attempts to apply the paradigmatic conception of 
vagueness—an analysis presumably meant for claims of predicate vagueness, since it is only 
predicates, strictly speaking, that admit of border cases—to several other types of expressions, 
like sentences (‘there are border cases of …’), noun phrases (‘border cases of …’), and 
quantifiers (‘there are …’)—expression types for which the notion of a border case either appears 
incoherent (at worst) or remains undefined (at best). 
 The difficulty is brought out further by Tye’s criticism that Hyde’s argument conflates two 
distinct notions: vague vagueness and higher-order vagueness. A predicate is vaguely vague 
insofar as it is indeterminate whether it has border cases. This is not the same as being higher-
order vague, that is, having border border (border…) cases. Perhaps, Tye suggests, Sorensen’s 
setup rests solely upon the vague vagueness of ordinary vague predicates like ‘small’, in which 
                                                     
only be denumerably many of these). This is important for handling non-denumerably infinite sorites 
sequences, like phenomenal sorites (e.g. color continua). 
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case Hyde’s argument does nothing to demonstrate the existence of higher-order vagueness. Tye 
does not indicate exactly where he thinks this would invalidate Hyde’s argument, only that it 
casts doubt on Hyde’s conclusion. The suspect however is unmistakable. Whereas (6) appears to 
make a claim about vague vagueness (i.e. indeterminacy about having a border case), (7) appears 
to make a claim about higher-order vagueness (i.e. indeterminacy about being a border case). As 
before, the discrepancy between (6) and (7) remains unjustified.3 The scope difference between 
claims of vague vagueness (‘it is indeterminate whether there exists a border case of…’) and 
claims of higher-order vagueness (‘there exists a case such that it is indeterminate whether it is a 
border case of…’) is starkly apparent. Yet no party in the debate—neither Tye in his criticism, 
nor Varzi in his endorsement, nor Hyde in his (2003) reply—has bothered to address this 
outstanding issue. Nor, apparently, have any outsiders. Even Crispin Wright is dismissive about 
sorting out possible connections: 
“It seems obvious enough that there is little connection between [the thesis that ‘vague’ is vague] 
and [the existence of higher-order vagueness, as expressed by means of a ‘definitely’ operator, as 
in e.g. ‘borderline borderline…’ or ‘borderline definitely…’]. It seems quite consistent with 
holding to the Buffering view [i.e. that there exist borderline borderline cases], or with thinking of 
“Definitely P” as vagueness-inheriting though precision-increasing when applied to a vague claim 
P, that the notion of vagueness itself should divide all expressions into two sharply bounded 
kinds—that there is never any vagueness about the question whether an expression is vague or not. 
Conversely, one might think of the distinction between vague expressions and others as admitting 
of borderline cases but hold to a view of the nature of vagueness according to which there are no 
higher-order borderline cases; and one might simultaneously repudiate any operator of 
definiteness, or take the view that any legitimate such operator generates only precise claims. At 
any rate, these are all prima facie compatibilities. If there are deeper tensions, that would be 
interesting—but they remain to be brought out.” (Wright 2010, p.531) 
                                                     
3 Hyde appeals to Rolf’s (1980:§3) Inheritance Principle: If all the constituent phrases of a complex phrase 
are precise then the complex phrase is precise. But if I am correct, the principle is less innocent than one 
might suspect. 
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Evidently, things “remain to be brought out”. In the rest of this comment, therefore, I wish to 
clarify the relations between vague vagueness and higher-order vagueness and restate Hyde’s 
argument in a way that avoids the problems so far discussed. 
 
3.2  From vague vagueness to higher-order vagueness 
To abbreviate claims about border cases, let us introduce the standard operators, I: ‘it is 
indeterminate whether …’ and D: ‘it is determinate that …’.4  
 Let us assume the determinate truth of the biconditional defining any predicate ‘n-small’: 
(11) D(x is n-small  iff  x is small or x < n) 
Given the preservation of indeterminacy across determinate equivalence,5 we can derive the 
conditions under which something is a border case of ‘n-small’: 
(12) I(x is n-small)  iff  I(x is small or x < n) 
Notice that the right-side condition fails if x is (determinately) less than n. Hence (12) reduces to:6 
                                                     
4 One may still define indeterminacy in terms of determinacy (Ip:=def ¬Dp &¬D¬p), or vice versa (Dp:=def 
p &¬Ip), so long as the reducing notion is understood in terms of border cases, not vagueness (e.g. letting 
‘determinately, x is F’ mean ‘x is F and x is not a border case of Fness’ or letting ‘it is indeterminate 
whether x is F’ mean ‘x is a border case of Fness’, respectively). Otherwise, the paradigmatic conception of 
vagueness would be circular. 
5 Let us suppose the determinacy operator ‘D’ obeys rule K: D(p → q) → (Dp → Dq). First consider D(p 
→ q). By K and contraposition (i.e. distributing ‘D’ over D((p → q) → (¬q → ¬p))), we can infer D(¬q 
→¬p). Distributing again gets D¬q → D¬p, which by contraposition is (i) ¬D¬p → ¬D¬q. Now consider 
D(q → p). By the same principles, distributing then contraposing delivers (ii) ¬Dp → ¬Dq. Combining (i) 
and (ii) yields Ip → Iq. Iq → Ip follows by symmetry of reasoning; hence Ip ↔ Iq. But assumptions D(p → 
q) and D(q → p) are just D(p ↔ q).  
6 (LtoR) Assume I(A∨B) and DB∨D¬B. Suppose DA for reductio. By K and ∨-introduction, D(A∨B), 
which contradicts I(A∨B). So ¬DA. By parity of reasoning we get ¬DB. Hence D¬B by ∨-syllogism. 
Suppose D¬A for reductio. Since determinacy collects over conjunction (because ‘D’ distributes over 
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(13) I(x is n-small)  iff  I(x is small) and x ≥ n 
Therefore, the border cases of ‘n-small’ are exactly those border cases of ‘small’ not less than n. 
That such cases exist just is what it means for ‘n-small’ to be vague on the paradigmatic 
conception. That is,7  
(14) ∃x I(x is n-small)  iff  ∃x (I(x is small) and x ≥ n) 
This says that ‘n-small’ is vague iff there is some border case of ‘small’ that is greater than or 
equal to n.  
 What about the conditions for ‘n-small’ being vaguely vague? for ‘vague’ being vague? 
Further variations on (13) are derivable by iterating existential quantifiers and indeterminacy 
operators, such as8 
(15) I(∃x I(x is n-small))  iff  I(∃x (I(x is small) and x ≥ n)) 
This says that ‘n-small’ is vaguely vague iff it is indeterminate whether there is some border case 
of ‘small’ greater than or equal to n. Since it is one of these ‘n-small’ predicates within the 
Sorensen sequence that is supposed to account for the vagueness of ‘vague’, we can now state, 
                                                     
D(A→(B→(A&B))) via K), we get D(¬A&¬B). By K and de Morgan, this becomes D¬(A∨B), which 
contradicts I(A∨B). So ¬D¬A. Hence IA. (RtoL) Assume IA and D¬B. Now D(A∨B) would imply DA 
(by ∨-syllogism and K), contrary to IA; so ¬D(A∨B). And D¬(A∨B) would imply D(¬A&¬B), thus D¬A 
(by de Morgan and K), contra IA; so ¬D¬(A∨B). So I(A∨B). 
7 One way to obtain this is to quantify each side of (13). Someone worried about quantifying into 
indeterminacy contexts may simply read (13) (and each of its preceding premises) as an implicitly 
universally quantified sentence of the form ∀x(A(…x…)↔B(…x…)). The inference to (14) merely 
weakens this to ∃xA(…x…)↔∃xB(…x…). 
8 To derive this we assume that (i) we may strengthen (11) to be determinate; (ii) determinacy is closed 
over entailment (so that (14) is made determinate too); (iii) indeterminacy is preserved across determinate 
equivalence (as in (12)). Such a strengthening is surely permissible, since the entire deduction rests only 
upon a definitional truth. 
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somewhat more precisely than in Hyde’s original argument (or even later reconstructions), the 
exact requisite conditions.  
(16) ∃n I(∃x I(x is n-small))  iff  ∃n I(∃x (I(x is small) and x ≥ n)) 
For ‘vague’ to be vague, it suffices that for some ‘n-small’ predicate, it is indeterminate whether 
it admits of any border cases—i.e. it is indeterminate whether anything is n-small—which by (16) 
comes to the requirement that it be indeterminate whether anything greater than or equal to some 
n is a border case of ‘small’. Note that this is distinct from requiring that something greater than 
or equal to some n is a border border case of ‘small’ (i.e. ∃n∃x I(I(x is small) and x ≥ n)). This is 
because, as we shall see, it is not true in general that the indeterminacy operator commutes with 
existentials. As such, claims of vague vagueness having the form I∃x(IFx) are not equivalent to 
claims of higher-order vagueness having the form ∃x(IIFx).  
 
3.3  Quantifiers and indeterminacy 
Does Hyde’s argument equivocate between I∃x(IFx) and ∃x(IIFx)? Hyde takes himself to address 
“the problem of higher-order vagueness”, by which he means the existence of borderline 
borderline cases, rather than the borderline existence of borderline cases.9 But, as (16) shows, it 
isn’t clear that he is entitled to this assumption. Not without further justification, at least. The 
controversial inference moves from claims of vague vagueness to claims of borderline 
borderlineness:  
                                                     
9 Following standard parlance, I shall use ‘borderline’/‘border’ and ‘definitely’/‘determinately’ 
interchangeably. 
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 (I∃I ⇒ ∃II) If it is indeterminate whether borderline Fs exist, there exist borderline 
borderline Fs 
which is an instance of the more general problematic inference pattern:10 
 (I∃ ⇒ ∃I)  ?If it is indeterminate whether Fs exist, there exist borderline Fs 
 Notice that the converse move of exporting an indeterminacy operator outside the scope of an 
existential is clearly fallacious, since the mere possibility of borderline borderline cases plus 
definite borderline cases shows the former alone does not logically entail vague vagueness.11 
Hence the failure of: 
 (∃II ⇒ I∃I) *If there exist borderline borderline Fs, it is indeterminate whether 
borderline Fs exist 
And given that most vague predicates do admit of both determinate and borderline cases, this fails 
too: 
 (∃I ⇒ I∃)  *If there exist borderline Fs, it is indeterminate whether Fs exist 
                                                     
10 To appreciate just how hard it is to justify such inferences, consider the following strategy. To show 
I∃xFx → ∃xIFx, it suffices to derive the contrapositives of (i) ¬D∃xFx→ ∃x¬DFx and (ii) ¬D¬∃xFx → 
∃x¬D¬Fx. For (i): ¬∃x¬DFx iff (by duality) ∀xDFx only if (by K, ∃-Intro) ∀xD(∃xFx) only if (by vacuous 
∀) D∃xFx only if (by ¬¬-Intro) ¬¬D∃xFx. For (ii): ¬∃x¬D¬Fx iff (by duality) ∀xD¬Fx only if (by ??) 
D∀x¬Fx iff (by duality) D¬∃xFx iff (by ¬¬-Intro) ¬¬D¬∃xFx. The critical missing entailment ?? 
resembles the Barcan Formula in modal logic. It is, however, arguably licensed on a supervaluationist 
reading of the determinacy operator ‘D’ as a universal quantifier ranging over admissible precisifications, 
which then must surely commute with the standard first-order universal quantifier ‘∀’. (Perhaps this is why 
Varzi (2005), an avowed supervaluationist, accepts Hyde’s argument as sound.) 
 The reverse “converse Barcan” inference from D∀x¬Fx to ∀xD¬Fx, like its modal analogue, is more 
plausible. Pf. Assume for reductio (i) D∀x¬Fx but (ii) ¬∀xD¬Fx. Then ∃x¬D¬Fx by (ii). Suppose 
¬D¬Fa (as a witness). Since ¬Fa “determinately” follows from ∀x¬Fx, we have D(∀x¬Fx → ¬Fa). By K 
and (i), D¬Fa. Contradiction. 
11 Since ∃xIIFx and ∃xDIFx are compatible and the latter already entails D∃xIFx, the former can’t entail 
I∃xIFx. 
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In contrast, (I∃I ⇒ ∃II) does not admit of trivial refutation. Yet it remains contentious. Just 
because the very existence of borderline cases is vague, why should there thereby be borderline 
borderline cases? 
 Here is one way of providing the missing justification. Consider the iterative conception of 
vagueness, according to which any vagueness-related indeterminacy iterates.12 According to the 
paradigmatic conception, the relevant sense of indeterminacy is borderlineness. Together, these 
predict that anything that is a borderline case of ‘F’ is a borderline borderline case of ‘F’. This is 
equivalent to saying that there are no definite borderline cases of ‘F’.13 If true, this would 
guarantee the existence of higher-order borderline cases, assuming there are first-order borderline 
cases.  
 Can vagueness be shown to iterate in this way? Perhaps so. Consider any arbitrary predicate 
‘F’. Suppose ‘F’ has definite borderline cases. Thus, for some individual a, a is a definite 
borderline case of ‘F’. That is to say, it is definitely the case that a is borderline F. Therefore, it is 
definitely the case that something is borderline F. But in that case, it cannot be vague whether 
anything is borderline F. 
 Consequently, the existence of definite borderline cases implies the definite—hence, non-
vague—existence of borderline cases.14 That is, any predicate ‘F’ that has definite borderline 
                                                     
12 Versions of this thought may be found in (one interpretation of) Wright (2001, 2003) and Bobzien 
(2010). 
13 That is, assuming ‘D’ obeys T: Dp → p, which is uncontroversial (if anything is, about the logic of 
vagueness). Proof. Since ¬∃xDIFx iff ∀x¬DIFx (by duality), it suffices to show IFa → IIFa iff ¬DIFa for 
some arbitrary a. Thus, assume (for reductio) both IFa → IIFa and DIFa. By T, IFa. By modus ponens, 
IIFa, so ¬DIFa. Contradiction. 
14 Formally: Assume ∃xDIFx. Thus, DIFa for some a. Generalizing within the scope of ‘D’, we get 
D∃xIFx, hence ¬I∃xIFx. (This last step applies K to D(IFa → ∃xIFx)—which is the object-language way 
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cases is definitely, not vaguely, vague. Contrapositively, anything vaguely vague lacks definite 
borderline cases. Given our earlier observations, this consequence of vague vagueness—the 
absence of definite borderline cases—guarantees that borderlineness (relative to ‘F’) iterates: 
anything borderline can only be borderline borderline, if its own borderline status fails to be 
determinate. Assuming there are in fact cases of borderlineness, it immediately follows that there 
will be cases (indeed, the very same ones!) of borderline borderlineness.  
 Everything therefore hinges on the existence of—plain, old, unexciting—first-order 
borderlineness. But is that not exactly what is at issue in alleged cases of vague vagueness—
whether there are any (first-order) borderline cases to begin with? Although the situation might 
appear paradoxical, it really isn’t. The idea that something can admit borderline cases, but only 
vaguely so, remains coherent. That borderline cases exist can nonetheless be true, even without 
being definitely so. One can accept the claim that borderline cases exist without assenting to its 
determinacy; one can therefore accept the possibility that borderline cases exist, but only 
vaguely.15 This is coherent, so long as one does not determinately assert both claims at once—i.e. 
assert their joint determinate truth—which would lead to contradiction.16 Hence, the compatibility 
of vagueness and vague vagueness.  
 Similarly, there is nothing paradoxical about the idea of borderline cases existing, but only as 
borderline borderline (and at that, only as borderline borderline borderline, and at that…). But 
how, one might ask, can the borderlineness of a borderline case, at any given order, possibly be 
                                                     
of expressing the “determinate” validity (i.e. the determinacy-preserving nature) of the rule of ∃-
generalization.) 
15 One can easily derive p → ¬D¬p (using T and reductio). Thus, if p and¬Dp are true (consistent), so are 
p and Ip. 
16 Assume (for reductio) D(p & Ip). By K and &-elimination, Dp and DIp. But then Ip by T; so ¬Dp. 
Contradiction. 
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borderline itself? Unusual, perhaps—but there is no paradox here, since borderline Fness is 
compatible with Fness proper. And we have no reason to believe that being borderline F entails 
not being F. To insist otherwise is to commit what Wright (2003) calls the “third possibility” 
fallacy of thinking that vagueness somehow precludes truth or falsity. Indeed, the iterativity of 
vagueness might be thought to reiterate this very idea that borderline Fness, rather than 
disqualifying something from being F, is entirely compatible with being F: neither precludes the 
other. The notion of a borderline case itself is no exception: being borderline F cannot preclude 
being borderline borderline F (on pain of excluding the very thing it entails, given its iterative 
character). Hence, the compatibility of borderlineness and borderline borderlineness. 
 Furthermore, to claim that borderlineness appears somewhere is not to say exactly where. 
One can maintain the existence of borderline cases without having to identify any particular case 
as being borderline. Indeed, one can maintain the definite existence of borderline cases without 
having to identify any particular case as being definitely borderline. After all, given the iterative 
nature of borderlineness, it may turn out that nothing is definitely borderline. Hence, the converse 
direction of our earlier dictum—that existing definite borderline cases are borderline cases that 
definitely do exist—must fail.17 
 (D∃I ⇒ ∃DI)  *If there definitely exist borderline Fs, there exist definitely borderline Fs18 
                                                     
17 Otherwise, given both directions, D∃xIFx iff ∃xDIFx iff (by duality) ¬∀x¬DIFx, contrary to iterativity.  
18 Surprisingly, Wright’s (1992) DEF principle (any consequence of any set of propositions each definitely 
true must also be definitely true) appears to validate (D∃I ⇒ ∃DI), as follows. Assume D∃xIFx. By T, 
∃xIFx. Thus IFa for some a by ∃-instantiation. Applying DEF strengthens this to DIFa. Hence ∃xDIFx by 
∃-generalization.  
 This spells trouble. Wright’s (2001:§8) quandary view already appears to commit him to an iterative 
conception of vagueness, given his claim that any state of quandary induced by vagueness is itself a source 
of quandary. If so, he must deny the existence (or possibility) of definite borderline cases. Given (D∃I ⇒ 
∃DI), this means denying the definite existence (or possibility) of borderline cases. This consequence is not 
 87 
In general, importing the determinacy operator inside the scope of the existential is invalid.19 
 (D∃ ⇒ ∃D)  *If there definitely exist Fs, there exist definite Fs 
Exporting determinacy outside the existential, however, is unproblematic.20 
 (∃D ⇒ D∃)  If there exist definite Fs, there definitely exist Fs 
Contrapositively, the vague existence of Fs rules out the existence of definite Fs. By parallel 
reasoning, the vague existence of non-Fs rules out the existence of definite non-Fs. In that case, 
nothing is definitely F, nor is anything definitely not-F. Thus everything must be borderline F. 
This licenses  
 (I∃ ⇒ ∀I) If it is indeterminate whether any Fs exist and indeterminate whether any 
non-Fs exist, everything is borderline F 
                                                     
restricted to only the purported cases of vague vagueness, but applies to any vague predicate whatsoever. 
Therefore, Wright’s own views on vagueness force him to deny that vagueness, in the sense of 
borderlineness, definitely exists. (Although his later (2010:§VIII) advocates adopting a noncognitivist 
stance toward the contents of our judgments about borderlineness—which might suggest that he believes it 
is vague, after all, whether any vagueness, so conceived, exists at all.) 
 Don’t Wright’s broader views on higher-order vagueness preclude the iterative conception? I don’t see 
how. The use of definite borderline cases in his (1987) paradoxical proof against the possibility of higher-
order vagueness is entirely inessential. Elsewhere, Wright (1992:132fn.6) appears to concede this point: the 
proof does not—despite appearances—require the existence of definite borderline cases, but only requires 
the existence of definitely non-definite Fs, for which definite non-Fs suffice (since D¬Fx entails D¬DFx 
given K and T). 
19 Modeling determinacy off necessity makes this clear. D∃xIFx should not entail ∃xDIFx, any more than 
e.g. “Necessarily, a man on the FBI 100 Most Wanted is to be caught dead or alive” (∃x(◊Fx&◊¬Fx)) 
entails “A man on the FBI 100 Most Wanted is necessarily such that he is to be caught dead or alive” 
(∃x(◊Fx&◊¬Fx)). Such a modal interpretation of the determinacy operator (as quantifying over 
admissible precisifications instead of worlds) is essentially what allows supervaluationists to distinguish 
between de dicto and de re readings of determinacy claims and thereby admit the determinate existence of 
cutoffs while denying the existence of determinate cutoffs. (Although determinacy-introducing rules like 
Wright’s DEF principle threaten to render this incoherent; see n.18.) 
20 Assume ∃xDFx. So DFa for some a (by ∃-instantiation). Since ∃-generalization is determinacy-
preserving, we can ∃-generalize within the scope of ‘D’ (i.e. distribute over D(Fa → ∃xFx) via K) and get 
D∃xFx. Hence, ¬I∃xFx. 
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which can be equivalently expressed as importing the indeterminacy operator inside a universal:21 
 (I∀ ⇒ ∀I) If it is indeterminate whether everything is F and indeterminate whether 
everything is not-F, everything is borderline F 
 To recap: we have seen how to derive claims about the existence of borderline borderline 
cases from claims about the borderline existence of borderline cases, thus vindicating (I∃I ⇒ ∃II). 
This establishes the connection we sought between two otherwise disparate notions, the 
vagueness of ‘vague’ and higher-order vagueness. Some philosophers have been pessimistic 
about the prospects of finding any real connection between the two. Our discussion reveals such 
pessimism to be unfounded. 
 
3.4  Sorensen-Hyde vs. Tye-Deas-Hull-Varzi 
Where does this leave Hyde’s argument? Recall how its assumption that ‘vague’ is vague 
required there to be some ‘n-small’ predicate within Sorensen’s series that is borderline vague. 
The truth-conditions for ‘n-small’, when properly unpacked, showed exactly what was needed for 
this to happen. 
 (15) I(∃x I(x is n-small))  iff  I(∃x (I(x is small) and x ≥ n)) 
However, these conditions are given in terms of vague vagueness (specifically, that of ‘small’). 
Hyde’s intent, by contrast, was to draw a general conclusion about higher-order vagueness. What 
is missing is some justification for thinking that any predicate, so long as it is vaguely vague, is 
guaranteed to be higher-order vague. Our brief exposition on the interaction of indeterminacy 
with quantification promises a solution. There, I showed how claims of higher-order vagueness 
                                                     
21 We have I∃xFx iff (by def) I¬∃xFx iff (by duality) I∀x¬Fx. Similarly, I∃x¬Fx iff I∀xFx. 
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are derivable from claims of vague vagueness (though not vice versa), thus validating inferences 
of the form (I∃I ⇒ ∃II).22 As a result, the following is a derivable consequence of (15). 
(17) I(∃x I(x is n-small))  only if  ∃x I(I(x is small) and x ≥ n))23 
which, given the determinacy of inequality, simplifies to24 
(18) I(∃x I(x is n-small))  only if  ∃x (II(x is small) and x ≥ n) 
Hence, any vague vagueness for ‘n-small’ will be enough to guarantee that something greater 
than or equal to n is borderline borderline small, in which case ‘small’ is higher-order vague. The 
Sorensen construction shows that some ‘n-small’ predicate, formed out of the ordinary predicate 
‘small’, will be vaguely vague. Therefore, the ordinary predicate ‘small’ is in fact higher-order 
vague. We have already seen how the Sorensen construction can be extended to other vague 
predicates. So this conclusion is not limited to just ‘small’. If the argument is able to demonstrate 
higher-order vagueness here, it will surely demonstrate it elsewhere for any ordinary vague 
predicate that can be “Sorensen’ed”.  
                                                     
22 This creates trouble for Tye’s own views on vagueness (1990, 1994), since he denies the existence of 
higher-order vagueness but maintains that ordinary vague predicates are nonetheless vaguely vague. 
23 ‘Only if’ because of the failure of (∃II ⇒ I∃I). Regardless, (I∃I ⇒ ∃II) is the needed direction of 
entailment. 
24 (LtoR) Assume I(A&B), where DB∨D¬B. Then (i) ¬D(A&B) and (ii) ¬D¬(A&B). Observe that (i) 
entails DA→¬DB (otherwise, DA&DB would imply D(A&B) since determinacy collects over conjunction 
(call this rule D-Collect; for proof see n.6)—contrary to ¬D(A&B)). By contraposition, DB→¬DA. Recall 
that D(φ → ψ) entails ¬D¬φ → ¬D¬ψ (see n.5). In particular, given that &-elimination is “determinately” 
valid (i.e. D((A&B)→A)), we have ¬D¬(A&B)→¬D¬A. Thus it follows from (ii) that ¬D¬A. Likewise, 
we can obtain ¬D¬B, which by ∨-syllogism on our assumption DB∨D¬B implies DB. So ¬DA by modus 
ponens. Therefore IA (and also DB, or B). (RtoL) Assume IA and DB. Suppose D(A&B) for reductio. By 
K and “determinate” &-elimination, we get DA—contrary to IA. Hence ¬D(A&B). Suppose D¬(A&B) for 
reductio. By K and de Morgan(¬&), we get D(¬A∨¬B). But given DB, we can now derive D¬A by 
“determinate” ∨-syllogism (i.e. applying K to D(((φ ∨ ψ) &¬ψ) → φ) to get D((φ ∨ ψ) &¬ψ) → Dφ, 
which by D-Collect reduces to (D(φ ∨ ψ) & D¬ψ) → Dφ)—contrary to IA. Hence ¬D¬(A&B). Therefore 
I(A&B). 
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 This bridges the gap in Hyde’s argument. It also puts to rest Tye’s concerns about possible 
quantifier conflation. Tye’s suggestion was that perhaps all Sorensen’s sorites shows is that 
ordinary vague predicates like ‘small’ are vaguely vague, not that they are higher-order vague, 
and therefore Hyde’s use of Sorensen-style predicates does nothing to prove the existence of 
higher-order vagueness. The validity of (I∃I ⇒ ∃II) shows this is impossible.25 The existence of 
vague vagueness logically entails the existence of higher-order vagueness. So Hyde’s argument 
cannot demonstrate the first without the second.  
 Another issue, discussed by Deas (1989), Hull (2005) and Varzi (2005), concerns the true 
“source” of the alleged vagueness of ‘vague’. Deas and Hull claim that although vagueness must 
appear somewhere in the Sorites series of ‘n-small’ predicates, this can be traced to the vagueness 
of ‘small’, rather than to any vagueness of ‘vague’.26 As such, Hyde’s argument is unsound 
because Sorensen’s setup fails to demonstrate the existence of any higher-order vagueness.  
                                                     
25 Hyde’s (2003) own argument against the coherence of Tye’s suggestion is flawed, since it relies on 
supposing—fallaciously—that being vaguely vague entails not being vague (see fn.1-2). This looks like an 
example of Wright’s “third possibility” fallacy. Tye appears to make no commitment to such an inference 
anyhow. And if so, for good reason. It simply cannot be true in general that being vaguely F entails not 
being F. Otherwise, being vaguely F, since equivalent to being vaguely not-F (by the symmetry of 
vagueness), would entail not being not-F, hence being F (assuming anything not not-F is F), whereby 
nothing would be vaguely F for any F (indeed, nothing would be vague at all!). (Logically: If Ip entails ¬p, 
but is equivalent to I¬p, it entails ¬¬p, or p; therefore ¬Ip.)  
26 They argue for this on the basis that ‘n-small’ gets mentioned in subject position, rather than used in 
predicate position, in Sorensen’s argument. I fail to see the relevance of this observation. Instead of “ ‘n-
small’ is vague”, one could equally have said e.g. “some x is a borderline case of ‘n-small’ ”, “being n-
small admits of borderline cases”, or “some x is borderline n-small”. These are all truth-conditionally 
equivalent, intertranslatable variants of the same claim, only ‘n-small’ occurs differently in each 
(mentioned as subject, mentioned as predicate, used as subject, or used as predicate, respectively). Not even 
the observation itself is quite correct either, since the inductive premise in (3)—a universally quantified 
conditional—strictly speaking, doesn’t mention any specific predicate ‘n-small’ (for any n). Rather, these 
are mentioned by proxy through “ ‘n-small’ ” and “ ‘n+1-small’ ”, which stand in for individual predicate 
names (not the predicates themselves), such that substituting in appropriate values (i.e. predicate names) for 
“ ‘n-small’ ” and “ ‘n+1-small’ ” results in a statement that mentions, rather than uses, predicates ‘k-small’ 
and ‘k+1-small’ for some k. 
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 The truth-conditions for claims of vagueness derived earlier suggest that this objection is 
misguided. For we might interpret each derived condition as implicitly expressing what depends 
on what, as follows. By (14), any vagueness of ‘n-small’ derives from some corresponding 
vagueness of ‘small’. By (15), any vague vagueness of ‘n-small’ derives from some 
corresponding vague vagueness of ‘small’. But the alleged vagueness of ‘vague’ is given by the 
vague vagueness of some ‘n-small’ in Sorensen’s setup. Thus, any vagueness of ‘vague’ will 
ultimately derive from the higher-order vagueness of some ordinary vague predicate like ‘small’. 
In that way, the true source of vagueness does lie in ‘small’—but not, as Deas and Hull think, 
within its vagueness per se, rather only in its higher-order vagueness. And this is all Hyde’s 
argument intended to show: that ordinary vague predicates like ‘small’ are higher-order vague. 
Any reliance on the disputed idea that ‘vague’ itself is vague was inessential for reaching that 
result. 
 Finally, there is the charge of circularity. Varzi (2003) criticizes Hyde’s argument for being 
question begging, since it presupposes the very thing it seeks to prove: the existence of higher-
order vagueness. To that end, he offers a proof that any vagueness for ‘n-small’ reduces to that of 
‘small’, then attempts to argue on this basis that any vague vagueness exhibited by some ‘n-
small’ also reduces to the higher-order vagueness of ‘small’.27 In response, Hyde (2003) concedes 
the entailment relation between his premises and conclusion, but insists that the argument, while 
                                                     
27 Varzi’s proof that ‘small’ is higher-order vague relies upon assuming Sorensen’s sorites inductive 
premise to be true. Surely this is mistaken. All the soriticality of ‘vague’ requires is the premise’s apparent, 
not actual, truth. 
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deductively valid, is nevertheless able to support noncircular reasoning in favor of a nontrivial 
conclusion.28  
 This paper offers some means to ward off the threat of circularity. Observe that even if the 
vagueness of ‘vague’ reduces to (and hence presupposes) the higher-order vagueness of ‘small’, 
the reduction relation is not one of simple equivalence. For claims of vague vagueness only 
entail, and are not entailed by, claims of higher-order vagueness. This lends some support 
(however marginal) to the idea that the logical relations tying the vagueness of ‘vague’ to that of 
‘small’ are not trivial enough to warrant the charge of circularity.  
 More importantly, there really does, as Hyde claims, seem to be an epistemic gap in his 
argument between premises and the conclusion. Sorensen’s argument (3) is soritical, because we 
find ourselves unable to pinpoint a precise stopping point where the ‘n-small’ predicates cease to 
be vague. That is a simple first-order intuition about the soriticality of ‘vague’—specifically, 
about the lack of a sharp boundary for ‘vague’ along a sequence of Sorensen-style predicates. 
This is, importantly, not the intuition that there is no sharp boundary for ‘being less than or equal 
to some borderline case of ‘small’ ’ along the integers—which is a higher-order intuition about 
the soriticality of a complex predicate, one that embeds other predicates while involving notions 
like inequality, quantification and borderlineness. Although (as we verified) the contents of these 
intuitions are logically equivalent, they remain distinct intuitions. (Many surveying Sorensen’s 
setup for the first time, I gather, will likely have the first, not the second.) Likewise, there is the 
possible intuition (available perhaps to the logically acute) that no sharp boundary exists for 
                                                     
28 Nowhere, however, does Varzi bother to work out in detail the derivations of these claims. Nor does he 
address or acknowledge Tye’s concerns regarding the distinction between vague vagueness and higher-
order vagueness, as evidenced by his—somewhat hasty—endorsement of the validity of (his own 
reconstruction of) Hyde’s argument. Hyde’s (2003:304) reply offers little improvement, since he 
uncritically concedes “the absence of a logical gap”. 
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‘being less than or equal to some borderline borderline case of ‘small’ ’ along the integers. 
Although (as we saw) the content of this intuition logically follows from that of the first two, it 
remains a distinct intuition, with arguably different evidential value. Someone who intuited that 
would stand in a different epistemic position than someone who merely intuited the soriticality of 
‘vague’ (i.e. saw and appreciated its lack of sharp boundaries, without first working out the truth-
conditions for each ‘n-small’). To conclude that ‘small’ is higher-order vague on the basis of the 
first sort of intuition might be criticized, understandably, as constituting some form of circular 
reasoning. Reaching the same conclusion on the basis of the simpler intuition, however, arguably 
involves no circularity of inference. Deriving it simply confirms higher-order vagueness to be a 
real consequence of what we intuit.  
 
3.5  Higher-order vagueness 
I now wish to discuss some issues not mentioned in the Sorensen-Hyde vs. Tye-Deas-Hull-Varzi 
debate: Even if the possibility of some vaguely vague ‘n-small’ guarantees that ‘small’ will have 
borderline borderline cases, this only demonstrates second-order vagueness for ordinary 
predicates like ‘small’. What guarantees that predicates like ‘small’ will have borderline 
borderline borderline cases? or higher-order borderline cases at higher orders?  
 If we had some way of showing there were some vaguely vaguely vague ‘n-small’ predicate 
in the Sorensen series, that would be sufficient to derive the result that ‘small’ has third-order 
borderline cases, by repeated applications of (I∃I ⇒ ∃II). But we cannot assume this. All the 
soriticality of ‘vague’ along the Sorensen series shows—if this intuition is even correct—is that 
some ‘n-small’ is vaguely vague. There is no intuition or appearance of soriticality to support the 
idea that ‘vague’ has second-order borderline cases. Even if there were, nothing in Sorensen’s 
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sorites would show that ‘vague’ has borderline cases at yet higher orders. So there would be no 
way to confirm that ordinary predicates like ‘small’ are indeed higher-order vague, in the sense 
of admitting nth-order borderline cases for any n. 
 All Hyde’s argument has shown so far is that any vague predicate is second-order vague. This 
falls short of proving that any vague predicate is nth-order vague for any order n. Yet clearly that 
was Hyde’s intention: to demonstrate higher-order vagueness at all orders, by demonstrating how 
“ “border case” is vague, and “border border case” is vague, etc., resulting in the inadequacy of 
anything short of an infinite iteration within the characterisation.” (1994:39) Yet Hyde’s 
considerations never manage to establish that conclusion. Even if he is right in thinking that the 
self-characterizing, or “homological”, character of the paradigm analysis of ‘vague’ reveals the 
notion of ‘border case’ to be vague as well, this only guarantees the existence of border border 
cases, not the existence of border border border cases.29 The latter would be guaranteed if 
‘border border case’ were vague, but Hyde’s argument does nothing to show this. Indeed, it is 
doubtful whether any amount of conceptual analysis can show how the vagueness of ‘borderline 
F’ is supposed to generalize to higher orders, in order for it to be true that ‘borderline borderline 
F’, ‘borderline borderline borderline F’, etc. are all vague too. 
 So what can guarantee that any vague predicate is higher-order vague? I shall argue that 
Sorensen’s proof of the vagueness of ‘vague’ really is powerful enough to demonstrate the 
existence of higher-order vagueness at any order for ordinary vague predicates, assuming it 
already successfully demonstrates their second-order vagueness. To see this, however, requires 
                                                     
29 There is still the issue of what it even means to say “ ‘border case’ is vague”, as ‘border case’ is not a 
predicate. Plus, as Tye (1994:44) points out, this only guarantees border border cases for some, not all, 
vague predicates. 
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going beyond mere conceptual analysis of the terms ‘vague’ or ‘border’ and instead employing 
semantic reasoning. 
 In our proof for (I∃I ⇒ ∃II) (see n.14), we saw that a consequence of vague vagueness is the 
iteration of borderlineness: any predicate F that is vaguely vague will admit only of borderline 
borderline cases, if it admits of borderline cases at all. Hence the result of restricted iterativity: 
 (I∃I ⇒ I/II) If it is indeterminate whether borderline Fs exist, anything borderline F is 
borderline borderline F 
This iterative effect is not limited to just second-order borderlineness: anything second-order 
borderline will be third-order borderline, anything third-order borderline will be fourth-order 
borderline, and so on. Notice however that this iterative behavior only holds selectively for those 
predicates that are vaguely vague. Thus, while it may be true that some ‘n-small’—one of the 
vaguely vague ones in the Sorensen series—will exhibit higher-order borderline cases, it does not 
immediately follow that this will also be true of ‘small’, whose vagueness is, we may assume, not 
itself vague: there definitely are borderline small numbers. Nonetheless, (I∃I ⇒ I/II) guarantees 
that some ‘n-small’, because vaguely vague, will be higher-order vague. That is because, given 
restricted iterativity, anything borderline n-small will be borderline borderline n-small, and hence 
borderline borderline borderline n-small, etc. And, as I argued earlier (see n.25), there can exist 
borderline n-small numbers, even if only vaguely so, since being F is compatible with being 
vaguely F.  
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 Thus, we may suppose that some ‘n-small’ in Sorensen’s sorites will be vague, but only 
vaguely so, in which case it will admit of higher-order borderline cases of all higher orders. It will 
be convenient to first recall some previously established results:30 
 (I∨)  It is indeterminate whether A or B and it is determinate whether B or ¬B,  if and 
only if  it is indeterminate whether A and it is determinate that ¬B 
 (I&)  It is indeterminate whether A and B and it is determinate whether B or ¬B,  if 
and only if  it is indeterminate whether A and it is determinate that B 
We can then reason as follows. Consider first-order borderline cases of ‘n-small’: 
(19) I(x is n-small) 
 iff  I(x is small or x < n)  by definition(‘n-small’) 
 iff  I(x is small) and x ≥ n  by (I∨) 
Thus, whatever is borderline n-small is borderline small. Consider then second-order borderline 
cases of ‘n-small’: 
(20) II(x is n-small) 
 iff  II(x is small or x < n)  by definition(‘n-small’) 
  iff  I(I(x is small) and x ≥ n)  by (I∨) 
  iff  II(x is small) and x ≥ n  by (I&) 
Thus, whatever is borderline borderline n-small is borderline borderline small. Consider now 
third-order borderline cases of ‘n-small’: 
(21) III(x is n-small) 
 iff  III(x is small or x < n)  by definition(‘n-small’) 
  iff  II(I(x is small) and x ≥ n) by (I∨) 
                                                     
30 That is, (I∨): I(A∨B), DB∨D¬B -||- IA, D¬B (see n.6) and (I&): I(A&B), DB∨D¬B -||- IA, DB (see 
n.24). 
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  iff  I(II(x is small) and x ≥ n) by (I&) 
  iff  III(x is small) and x ≥ n  by (I&) 
Thus, whatever is borderline borderline borderline n-small is borderline borderline borderline 
small. Continuing in this way, we can show that anything higher-order borderline n-small is (to 
the same degree) higher-order borderline small. But (I∃I ⇒ I/II) guarantees the existence of 
higher-order borderline cases of ‘n-small’ at all higher orders. These will therefore be higher-
order borderline small at all higher orders.  Hence the higher-order vagueness of ‘small’. 
 
3.6  ‘Vague’ at higher orders 
And what of ‘vague’ itself—is it higher-order vague as well? The Sorensen sequence contains 
predicates that are borderline cases of ‘vague’. But are there also borderline borderline cases of 
‘vague’? or borderline borderline borderline (etc.) cases of ‘vague’? Perhaps ‘vague’ exhibits 
higher-order vagueness in the same way ordinary vague predicates are higher-order vague.  
 To be sure, the soriticality of ‘vague’, as exhibited by the Sorensen sorites, does not show 
‘vague’ to be higher-order vague, any more than the soriticality of any ordinary vague predicate 
like ‘small’ shows it to be higher-order vague. I claim nonetheless that ‘vague’ is higher-order 
vague. This can be shown by another Sorensen-style argument, except we must now use a 
modified version of the Sorensen construction. We define the predicate ‘‘n-small’-vague’ as 
follows. For positive integers k, n: 
(22) ‘k-small’ is ‘n-small’-vague  iff  ‘k-small’ is vague or k < n 
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Here, ‘‘n-small’-vague’ is a second-order predicate that takes first-order predicates ‘k-small’ as 
argument.31  
 Consider the predicate ‘‘1-small’-vague’. No k is less than 1, so the comparative condition is 
(definitely) not satisfied by any ‘k-small’. As for the other condition (namely, ‘k-small’ is vague), 
this will be satisfied by those ‘k-small’ appearing earlier in the series for smaller values of k 
(since these share the same borderline cases as, and hence are just as vague as, ‘small’ itself), but 
will not be satisfied by those ‘k-small’ appearing later in the series for greater values of k (since 
none of these are vague). Thus, the predicate ‘‘1-small’-vague’ holds true of ‘k-small’ when k is 
small, but not when k is large. Yet there is no clearly last ‘k-small’ predicate that is ‘1-small’-
vague, since (as the original Sorensen argument showed) there is no clearly last vague ‘k-small’. 
So ‘‘1-small’-vague’ is soritical and admits of borderline cases. Hence ‘‘1-small’-vague’ is 
vague. 
 Now consider the predicate ‘‘106-small’-vague’. We are assuming 106 is large enough to be 
definitely definitely not-small, so that ‘106-small’ is definitely precise.32 Thus, for any k ≥106, ‘k-
small’ will be definitely precise, since it too will have definitely lack borderline cases, but it will 
also be definitely false that k < n; so ‘k-small’ will definitely fail both conditions, and hence 
definitely not be ‘106-small’-vague. For any k < 106, it will be definitely true that k < 106, so ‘k-
small’ will definitely be ‘106-small’-vague. Thus, for any value of k, ‘k-small’ will be either 
                                                     
31 That it is second-order should be unproblematic, since ‘is vague’ is already a second-order predicate as 
well. 
32 By definition, we have: x is 106-small iff x is small or x < 106. For any x < 106: DD(x < 106), so DD(x is 
106-small) by K, ∨-intro; hence D¬I(x is 106-small). For any x ≥106: DD¬(x is small) by assumption, and 
DD¬(x < 106), so DD¬(x is 106-small) by K, D-Collect, de Morgan(¬∨); hence D¬I(x is 106-small). Thus, 
we can reason by cases: ∀x(x < 106 → D¬I(x is 106-small)) and ∀x(x ≥106 → D¬I(x is 106-small)), 
therefore ∀x(D¬I(x is 106-small)). 
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definitely ‘106-small’-vague or definitely not ‘106-small’-vague, but never borderline ‘106-small’-
vague. So ‘‘106-small’-vague’ has no borderline instances, and is therefore precise, i.e. not 
vague.33 
 We now see the makings of a sorites: ‘‘1-small’-vague’ is vague while ‘‘106-small’-vague’ is 
not vague, yet there is no clearly last vague ‘‘n-small’-vague’ predicate. The appearance of there 
being no boundary at all entices us to accept the following sorites argument. 
(23) ‘‘1-small’-vague’ is vague 
For any n, if ‘‘n-small’-vague’ is vague, then ‘‘n+1-small’-vague’ is vague 
Therefore, ‘‘106-small’-vague’ is vague 
This constitutes a higher-order Sorensen sorites. Like Sorensen’s original sorites, it demonstrates 
the vagueness of ‘vague’, except now the soriticality of ‘vague’ is relative to a sequence of ‘‘n-
small’-vague’ predicates. The absence of any sharp cutoff along that sequence—i.e. any n such 
that ‘‘n-small’-vague’ is definitely vague but ‘‘n+1-small’-vague’ is definitely not vague—means 
there is some borderline vague ‘‘n-small’-vague’.  
 From this fact we can then reason as before.  
(24) I(∃k I(‘k-small’ is ‘n-small’-vague)   for some fixed n 
iff  I(∃k I(‘k-small’ is vague or k < n)  by definition(‘‘n-small’-vague’) 
iff  I(∃k (I(‘k-small’ is vague) and k ≥ n)  by (I∨) 
only if  ∃k I(I(‘k-small’ is vague) and k ≥ n))  by (I∃I ⇒ ∃II) 
iff  ∃k (II(‘k-small’ is vague) and k ≥ n)  by (I&) 
Thus, given the soriticality of ‘vague’ and its failure to draw no sharp boundaries within the 
higher-order Sorensen sequence of ‘‘n-small’-vague’ predicates, it follows that ‘vague’ has 
borderline borderline cases. 
                                                     
33 The formal argument mirrors that in the previous n.32. 
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 Reasoning as before confirms that this is not limited to second-order borderlineness. Since we 
know there must exist some ‘k-small’ that is borderline ‘n-small’-vague (since the original 
Sorensen series guarantees the existence borderline vague ‘k-small’), then: 
(25) I(‘k-small’ is ‘n-small’-vague)   for some k 
…  
only if  II(‘k-small’ is ‘n-small’-vague)  by (I∃I ⇒ I/II) 
iff  II(‘k-small’ is vague or k < n)   by definition(‘‘n-small’-vague’) 
iff  I(I(‘k-small’ is vague) and k ≥ n)   by (I∨) 
iff  II(‘k-small’ is vague) and k ≥ n   by (I&) 
… 
only if  III(‘k-small’ is ‘n-small’-vague)  by (I∃I ⇒ I/II) 
iff  III(‘k-small’ is vague or k < n)   by definition(‘‘n-small’-vague’) 
  iff  II(I(‘k-small’ is vague) and k ≥ n)  by (I∨) 
iff  I(II(‘k-small’ is vague) and k ≥ n)  by (I&)  
  iff  III(‘k-small’ is vague) and k ≥ n)   by (I&)  
  … 
  etc. 
Therefore, ‘vague’ has higher-order borderline cases at all orders.  
 Sorensen used his original sorites to argue against the idea from Frege and Russell of 
effecting a clean divide of the precise from the vague in order to demarcate the former as the 
proper domain of logic. Our higher-order Sorensen sorites shows that any finer classificatory 
scheme must also be out of reach: we cannot precisely delineate the definitely precise from the 
borderline vague, given the existence of second-order borderline vague predicates34; nor among 
                                                     
34 Sorensen (1985:136) makes this point, but claims, without argument, that ‘vague’ has borderline 
borderline cases.  
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the definitely definitely precise and the borderline borderline vague, given the existence of third-
order borderline vague predicates; and so on, at any further order of precision.35  
 
3.7  Vaguely vague vagueness 
Our discussion has underscored the importance of separating claims of vague vagueness from 
claims of higher-order vagueness for any vague predicate. ‘Vague’ is not exempt from this 
division, since it too is vague. I have argued that it is not just vague but higher-order vague. But 
is it vaguely vague? Now, supposing ‘vague’ were vaguely vague, that would serve to show why 
it is higher-order vague, since the latter is a direct consequence of the former by (I∃I⇒∃II). But 
the converse entailment fails. So any higher-order vagueness of ‘vague’ is no guarantee of its 
vague vagueness. It remains an open question: Is ‘vague’ not just vague and higher-order vague 
but vaguely vague? 
 If ‘vague’ is vaguely vague, then it must be like one of the ‘n-small’ predicates in the original 
Sorensen sequence. Recall that for ‘vague’ to exhibit vagueness (i.e. unqualified, first-order 
vagueness) in Sorensen’s series, some ‘n-small’ predicate must be borderline vague. Thus, for 
‘vague’ to exhibit vague vagueness in the Sorensen series, it must be indeterminate whether any 
‘n-small’ predicate is borderline vague. Sorensen and Hyde think there is in fact some ‘n-small’ 
that is borderline vague. Yet is the existence of such a borderline vague predicate a determinate 
                                                     
35 Proof. By definition, ‘F’ is vague iff ∃xIFx iff ¬∀x¬IFx iff ¬∀x(DFx ∨ D¬Fx) iff ¬(‘F’ is precise). 
Definitizing these definitional truths gives D(‘F’ is vague ↔¬(‘F’ is precise)). Given D(A↔B) |- IA↔IB 
(see n.5), we can derive I(‘F’ is vague) ↔ I¬(‘F’ is precise), which is just I(‘F’ is vague) ↔ I(‘F’ is 
precise). Definitizing definitions again yields D(I(‘F’ is vague) ↔ I(‘F’ is precise)), hence II(‘F’ is vague) 
↔ II(‘F’ is precise). Repeating n times for any n shows that ‘F’ is nth-order borderline vague iff ‘F’ is nth-
order borderline precise. 
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truth or a vague one? That will determine whether ‘vague’ is definitely vague or borderline 
vague, at least within the context of the Sorensen series. 
 Hyde thinks ‘vague’ can only be determinately vague, if vague at all. As he puts it: 
“vagueness determinately is or determinately is not homological.” (2003:302) The Sorensen setup 
must then guarantee the determinate existence of borderline vague ‘n-small’ predicates. This is, 
of course, not to guarantee that some ‘n-small’ will be determinately borderline vague. For it may 
be true that all borderline vague ‘n-small’ turn out to be higher-order borderline (and hence not 
determinately borderline) vague. This is nonetheless compatible with it being determinately true 
that such borderline vague ‘n-small’ exist. (Recall the general failure of importing determinacy 
inside existentials, i.e. the invalidity of (D∃I ⇒ ∃DI).) Indeed, our discussion of the higher-order 
vagueness of ‘vague’ confirmed this to be the case. Given (I∃I ⇒ I/II), any vaguely vague ‘n-
small’ is not just borderline vague, but borderline borderline (etc.) vague.  
 In contrast, Tye thinks that ‘vague’ might be vaguely vague—which, according to his own 
views on vagueness, would make ‘vague’ just like all other “common or garden vague 
predicates.” (1994:45) In that case, the existence of some borderline vague ‘n-small’ may still be 
true, just not determinately so.36 This means that anything borderline vague must be borderline 
                                                     
36 One may even think that, given the vague vagueness of any purportedly vague predicate, nothing is 
vague at all—not even ‘vague’ itself! This type of nihilism about ‘vague’, although deeply implausible, is 
nonetheless coherent, assuming that being vaguely F is compatible with not being F (so that it is consistent 
to maintain both I(∃xIFx) and ¬∃xIFx for all F, in which case no predicate ever has borderline cases—
though this fact is only vaguely true).  
 Hyde appears to attribute this sort of view to Tye, when he describes Tye’s objection as offering “an 
alternative explanation of the soritical nature of ‘vague’ as evidenced by Sorensen’s argument—it is 
vaguely vague and thus not vague.” (2003:302) However, this is not the only way to take Tye’s suggestion. 
The vague vagueness of ‘vague’ could be meant to preempt the need for higher-order vagueness only—i.e. 
not the existence of first-order vagueness—in explaining the soriticality of ‘vague’ in the Sorensen 
sequence. Thus ‘vague’ could be vaguely vague without being higher-order vague. Unfortunately, given 
(I∃I ⇒ ∃II), this situation is impossible anyhow (see n.22). 
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borderline vague.37 Otherwise, if some ‘n-small’ were determinately borderline vague, it would 
be determinately true of it that some borderline vague ‘n-small’ exists, hence determinately true 
simpliciter that some borderline vague ‘n-small’ exists—contrary to assumption.38  
 The disagreement here reflects a difference in general attitude had toward ordinary vague 
predicates. One may think, following Hyde, that the soriticality of any ordinary vague predicate 
‘F’ guarantees the determinate existence of borderline Fs. For some predicates (‘small’ etc.) just 
are definitely vague, and hence, on the paradigmatic conception, definitely admit of borderline 
cases. Alternatively, one might think that all the soriticality of an ordinary vague ‘F’ guarantees is 
that there are some borderline Fs, not that there determinately are such cases: their existence 
remains indeterminate. Thus whether any predicate ‘F’ we would ordinarily count as vague really 
is vague, is itself a vague matter.  
 It is important to note that Tye’s suggestion that no predicate is definitely vague does not 
invalidate the point that ‘vague’ is vague. To be sure, Hyde and others commenting on Sorensen 
all take for granted that ‘n-small’ will be definitely vague for definitely small values of n, since 
these will just share the same borderline cases as ‘small’, and there definitely are borderline cases 
for ‘small’—that is, assuming ‘small’ is indeed definitely vague. Whereas Tye denies this: no ‘n-
                                                     
37 Other aspects of Tye’s general views on vagueness must be called into question in light of our discussion 
(noted earlier in n.22). Tye denies the existence of higher-order vagueness for ordinary vague predicates, 
on grounds that the vague vagueness of such “garden” vague predicates is enough to defuse the sorites 
paradox (see his 1990:551-2). Any higher-order vagueness of ‘vague’ is denied on the same grounds: it is 
the vague vagueness of ‘vague’, not any higher-order vagueness, that explains away the Sorensen sorites 
argument for ‘vague’ (1994:45). And yet, such distinctions are incoherent if, as I have argued, (I∃I ⇒ ∃II) 
is valid. Pending an explanation for why (I∃I ⇒ ∃II) should fail, the only way to restore logical consistency 
to Tye’s view and block the iteration of borderlineness (which is what generates higher-order vagueness), 
given the vague existence of borderline cases, is to deny that there are any borderline cases at all—in which 
case, everything purportedly vague is vaguely vague, but nothing is higher-order vague, nor even first-
order vague (see also n.36). No doubt some will find this solution unsatisfactory. 
38 Recall the proof for (∃DI ⇒ D∃I) from n.14. 
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small’ is definitely vague, not even ‘1-small’, because ‘small’ is not definitely vague in the first 
place—no vague predicate is. If so, can we still take the Sorensen series to demonstrate the 
vagueness of ‘vague’? Sorensen’s setup would appear to require the existence of both definitely 
vague ‘n-small’ and definitely precise (i.e. definitely not vague) ‘n-small’, so that the borderline 
vague ‘n-small’ may appear in between these. Instead, Tye envisages simply a range of borderline 
vague ‘n-small’ followed by definitely precise ‘n-small’. Yet Sorensen’s conclusion that ‘vague’ 
is vague still goes through. For even on Tye’s picture, ‘vague’ remains soritical: it is still true that 
no sharp boundary exists between the vague ‘n-small’ and the non-vague ‘n-small’, even if no 
definite instances of the former exist. That is enough to guarantee the existence of some 
borderline vague ‘n-small’, which is all the Sorensen sorites was meant to show.39  
 Nor would Tye’s denial of definite vagueness affect any other results established so far. The 
derivability of higher-order vagueness from vague vagueness (I∃I ⇒ ∃II), used to show that 
‘small’ is second-order vague, only required the existence of borderline vague ‘n-small’, not their 
definite existence. The iterativity of borderlineness (I∃I ⇒ I/II), used to show that ‘small’ is 
higher-order vague, only required the existence of borderline vague ‘n-small’, not their definite 
existence. The applications of these results to the higher-order Sorensen sorites, used to show that 
‘vague’ is higher-order vague, only required the existence of borderline vague ‘‘n-small’-vague’, 
                                                     
39 Whether to persist in calling ‘vague’ soritical is largely terminological. One may take the soriticality of F 
to consist in the absence of sharp boundaries for ‘F’, i.e. no point at which the definite Fs become definite 
non-Fs, where this presupposes that there are definite Fs to be begin with. On that understanding of 
“soritical”, although ‘vague’ fails to be soritical since it lacks definite instances, ‘non-vague’ nonetheless 
still counts as soritical, because plenty of predicates are definitely not-vague, and whatever reason one had 
for thinking that ‘vague’ isn’t sharply bounded counts equally in favor of thinking that ‘non-vague’ isn’t 
sharply bounded. Presumably, this means there will be borderline non-vague predicates—but these are just 
the borderline vague predicates. On another understanding, soriticality consists in susceptibility to sorites 
argument. This too is satisfied on Tye’s picture, since the sorites inductive premise (if ‘n-small’ is vague, 
then so is ‘n+1-small’) still appears (albeit illusorily) to be true, despite the fact that its antecedent is never 
definitely satisfied. 
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not their definite existence. Any assumption that ‘small’, ‘n-small’, ‘‘n-small’-vague’, or even 
‘vague’ itself is definitely vague was inessential. Thus, Tye’s suggestion that ‘vague’ can only be 
vaguely vague poses no real alternative to either Sorensen’s conclusion that ‘vague’ is vague or 
Hyde’s conclusion that higher-order vagueness exists, nor is it incompatible with the idea 
defended here that ‘vague’ may be higher-order vague. Indeed, it confirms Sorensen’s conviction 
that any perfectionist desire to excise all vagueness from the realm of logic by cordoning off the 
precise portion of our logical languages: for if ‘vague’ is vaguely vague, so is ‘precise’ only 
vaguely precise, with the result that no precise language can precisely describe its own 
precision.40 
 A theoretical choice must be made. One may construe the soriticality of ‘vague’ as evidence 
for the definite existence of borderline cases for ‘vague’, in which case ‘vague’ is definitely 
vague. Or alternatively, one may doubt whether any predicate definitely admits of borderline 
cases and so construe the soriticality of ‘vague’ as evidence merely for the weaker claim that it 
has (and not that it definitely has) borderline cases. Both proposals are coherent.41 
 Can Sorensen’s sorites settle the matter? If it can, I do not see how. The Sorensen 
construction at best guarantees the existence of borderline vague predicates. It does not guarantee 
their determinate existence. To get that result requires assuming things that go beyond Sorensen’s 
argument: issues that hinge on the nature of vague predicates and their alleged soriticality. Alas, 
Soresen’s sorites cannot prove everything. This arguably demonstrates yet another way in which 
                                                     
40 Pf. First, ‘vague’ is vague iff ∃F I(‘F’ is vague) iff ∃F I¬(‘F’ is vague) iff ∃F I(‘F’ is precise) iff ‘precise’ 
is vague. Definitizing these definitions gets D(‘vague’ is vague ↔ ‘precise’ is vague). Given D(A↔B) |- 
IA↔IB (see n.5), we then have: I(‘vague’ is vague) iff I(‘precise’ is vague). But: I(‘precise’ is vague) iff 
I¬(‘precise’ is vague) iff I(‘precise’ is precise). Therefore, ‘vague’ is vaguely vague iff ‘precise’ is vaguely 
precise. 
41 As noted earlier, Hyde’s reply to Tye rests on fallacious reasoning (see n.25). 
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the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness comes apart from that of vague vagueness: Sorensen-
style sorites are able to show that ‘vague’ exhibits the first, but are unable to decide whether it 
exhibits the second. Between the two, higher-order vagueness is the easier to demonstrate; the 
notion of vague vagueness remains elusive. 
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Chapter 4: Margins for Error in Meaning 
 
Timothy Williamson has sought to defend epistemicism against the objection that our inability to 
find sharp boundaries for vague terms is evidence for their nonexistence.  He argues that, if they 
were to exist, we would be unable to know exactly where they lay.  His explanation for this is in 
terms of margin for error principles to the effect that if one knows in a given case, one does not 
falsely believe in sufficiently similar cases.  Our vague terms could have undergone slight, 
undetectable changes in meaning.  The fact that we would, despite this difference, continue using 
them as we do violates margin for error principles, and therefore undermines any claim to 
knowledge about the boundaries of our vague terms.   
 Thus, on Williamson’s account, it is meaning instability that explains vagueness-related 
ignorance according to some appropriate margin for error principle.  Is our knowledge of what 
our vague terms mean also undercut by such meaning instability together with margin for error 
principles?  It is, if our meaning beliefs are able to easily deviate from the facts.  Williamson 
insists they do not.  He appeals to a principle of linguistic induction on which induction into the 
appropriate term-using practice suffices for knowledge of its meaning.  In this paper I dispute the 
cogency of that appeal. 
 Section 1 provides a reconstruction of Williamson’s account that margin for error principles 
undercut claims to knowledge of a vague term’s boundaries.  Section 2 formulates the objection 
that these principles also undercut claims to knowledge of a vague term’s meaning.  Section 3 
examines Williamson’s response.  Sections 4 and 5 raise objections to this response.  I first argue 
that a principle of linguistic induction fails to preclude one type of possibility where one’s 
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meaning beliefs deviate from the facts.  I go on to argue that there are independent reasons for 
rejecting the principle itself. 
 
4.1  Knowledge of meaning 
Take the vague predicate ‘bald’.  On epistemicism, this vague predicate has an unknown sharp 
cutoff point: there exists a unique number n such that anyone with n hairs on his scalp is bald but 
anyone with n+1 hairs is not bald, only we are ignorant of what that number is.1  Suppose the 
cutoff for being bald were at 3,000 hairs.  Williamson’s preferred explanation for why we are 
ignorant of this fact is as follows.  I may take 3,000 to be the cutoff point: anyone with 3,000 or 
less hairs is bald and otherwise is not bald.  I may believe for instance that borderline Barry, who 
I know to have 3,000 hairs on his head, is bald.  My belief would as a matter of fact be true.  For 
Barry’s hair count would qualify him to be bald—just barely, but barely enough.  But my belief 
would not constitute knowledge.  For knowledge requires some margin for error.  As Williamson 
has put it: “if one knows in a given case, one does not falsely believe in sufficiently close cases.”2  
If I am to know that Barry is bald, it must be the case that I believe truly in all similar cases.3  Yet 
                                                 
1 Whether someone is bald ordinarily depends on how many hairs he has on his scalp.  In what follows, I 
shall assume that whether one is bald depends solely on the number of hairs on one’s scalp.  To be sure, it 
depends on much more.  Actual linguistic practice demands we recognize that other factors are relevant in 
determining whether one is bald, for instance, the shape and configuration of one’s hair, and that certain 
factors are relevant in determining the appropriate comparison class, for instance, one’s age.  Our 
simplifying assumption is harmless though.  Everything said in what follows can be generalized to more 
complicated accounts on which baldness depends on more than just how many hairs one has on his scalp. 
2 Cf. Williamson 2000: 76. 
3 Belief and knowledge are both sensitive to the way we conceptualize things.  The object of our belief that 
p or of our knowledge that p must be conceptualized as such.  Thus, “I know that Barry is bald” should be 
understood as being elliptical for “I know that Barry is bald under the guise of a sentence of the form 
‘Barry is bald’.”  Similarly, “I believe that Barry is bald” should be understood as being elliptical for “I 
believe that Barry is bald under the guise of a sentence of the form ‘Barry is bald’.”  Crucially, if I am to 
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this is not so.  Had linguistic practice been slightly different, the predicate ‘bald’ could have 
easily meant something slightly different, such that its cutoff were one removed from what it 
actually is, say, at 2,999 hairs instead of 3,000 hairs.  Despite this difference I might nonetheless 
be equally adept at using the term ‘bald’, as manifested by my willingness to apply it to exactly 
the same individuals that I am actually willing to apply it to, for instance, to Barry. Assuming the 
relevant facts are held fixed—that he exists, that he has 3,000 hairs, that I know his hair count, 
that I am just as willing to count Barry as ‘bald’, etc.—the scenario would be sufficiently similar 
to the actual world, only the extension of ‘bald’ has shifted by a hair.  Yet my utterance that 
“Barry is bald” in such a counterfactual scenario would express a false belief about Barry, since 
he would have one hair more than the cutoff at 2,999 hairs.  This violates the relevant margin for 
error constraint: regarding whether Barry satisfies ‘bald’, I wouldn’t believe truly in all similar 
cases; thus I can’t be said to actually know that Barry is bald. 
 And what can be said about borderline Barry can be said about all other cutoff borderline 
cases.  I can’t actually know that anyone with exactly 3,000 hairs is bald.  So I can’t actually 
know that anyone with 3,000 hairs or less is bald and is otherwise not bald.  Nor can anyone else.  
Hence, the actual cutoff point for ‘bald’ is unknowable, even if by sheer accident or chance 
someone somehow hits upon the correct number. 
 Indeed, the same sort of reasoning extends from cutoff borderline cases such as borderline 
Barry to all borderline cases in general.  In this way, our ignorance of where cutoffs for vague 
terms lie is just a special case of our ignorance in borderline cases.  Williamson’s explanation for 
our ignorance is essentially the same across the whole spectrum of borderlineness: for any given 
                                                 
count as believing, and hence knowing, that 3,000 is the cutoff mark for ‘bald’, it is not enough for me to 
believe, for instance, that anyone is bald if he has that greatest number of hairs one can have and still be 
bald. 
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borderline case of F-ness, I cannot know it to be F (or not F) because ‘F’ is unstable in meaning: 
it could have easily meant something slightly different such that it failed to apply (or did apply) to 
the thing in question. 
 Williamson claims such meaning instability is the source of all vagueness-related ignorance.4  
It is this appeal to meaning instability that I find in danger of being incongruent with his claims 
about knowing what our vague expressions mean.  The worry is this: if knowing requires not 
falsely believing in all similar cases, as a margin for error principle would have it, then I do not 
count as knowing what I mean by ‘bald’ if I am mistaken about what ‘bald’ means in some 
nearby counterfactual case.  But that sort of nearby possibility is exactly what is suggested by 
Williamson’s own account when it is said, for instance, that I would be unable to detect slight 
shifts in the meaning of ‘bald’.  Williamson of course is eager to insist that we know perfectly 
well what our vague expressions mean.  However, it is not apparent, the objection goes, whether 
by the lights of his own theory he is entitled to that claim. 
 
4.2  Linguistic deviance 
Suppose that knowledge of what a vague predicate means can be expressed in this kind of way: 
‘bald’ means bald.  Suppose that bald is in fact the concept picked out by ‘bald’ given the way 
the term is actually used in the linguistic community.  Consider another concept in the vicinity, 
bald*, whose cutoff is just one-removed from that of bald.  Williamson agrees that ‘bald’ could 
have easily meant bald*, had the community-wide linguistic practice been slightly different.  The 
                                                 
4 Cf. Williamson 1994: 230-4.  
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question then is whether it is easily possible for me to have false beliefs about what ‘bald’ means, 
even if I currently believe truly that ‘bald’ means bald.   
 It seems it is.  Instead of bald, I could have easily possessed the concept bald*.  The 
possibility intuition in question concerns only my own individual usage of ‘bald’ and not the rest 
of the linguistic community’s usage.  That is, it seems easily possible for the overall community-
wide use patterns of ‘bald’ to be the same as they actually are such that the concept circulating 
throughout is bald, and yet somehow I diverge from the community-wide practice by exercising 
my own “maverick” concept bald*.  Call this a case of counterfactual maverick deviance.  In 
such a case, everyone else might believe truly that ‘bald’ meant bald, whereas I would believe 
falsely that ‘bald’ meant bald*.  But a principle of margin for error would then dictate that I don’t 
count as actually knowing what ‘bald’ means. 
 Thus the claim to knowledge of meaning seems threatened by nearby counterfactual 
possibilities of divergence between the facts of what a vague term means and what I take it to 
mean.   
 And not just in close counterfactual scenarios.  This might be what happens actually.  
Suppose today I believe that ‘bald’ means bald.  Then tomorrow I begin exercising my own 
maverick concept bald*.  In so doing I diverge in my own use of ‘bald’ from the rest of the 
linguistic community which continues to exercise the concept bald* in its use of ‘bald’.  
Accordingly, my belief about what ‘bald’ means also diverges from the community: everyone 
else continues to believe that ‘bald’ means bald whereas I now believe that ‘bald’ means bald*.  
Call this a case of actual maverick deviance.  In such a case, my later belief that ‘bald’ means 
bald* is false, since it still carries its old meaning, despite the new presence of maverick 
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concepts.  As before, a principle of margin for error would then dictate that I don’t count as 
actually knowing what ‘bald’ means. 
 The possibility of divergence also works in the reverse direction.5  The meaning of ‘bald’ 
fixed by community-wide usage could have been bald* rather than bald.  Still, it seems that in 
such a case I could have easily continued to believe it to mean bald.  As we shall see later, 
Williamson denies this possibility on the grounds that the concept I exercise in my use of ‘bald’ 
must align with the rest of the community’s: if everyone else means bald* by ‘bald’, then so must 
I, assuming I am properly inducted into the communal ‘bald’-using practice.  Now, this might 
accurately describe how things are ordinarily, or perhaps (we should like to think) how things are 
actually.  Given that I am as a matter of fact a normal English speaker, what I mean by ‘bald’ is 
just whatever any other English speaker means by ‘bald’; and what I take myself to mean by 
‘bald’ is just whatever any other English speaker takes himself or someone else to mean by 
‘bald’.   
 But all that is contingent on what linguistic practice I happen to be inducted into.  What if I 
were unwittingly inducted—as it were, abducted—into a different linguistic community in which 
‘bald’ meant something different?  Call this a case of counterfactual linguistic abduction.  We 
may imagine in such a case that the change in meaning from bald to bald* is undetectable.  Since 
I wouldn’t be able to detect the difference, it seems I could easily continue exercising the concept 
bald whenever I use ‘bald’ and thus continuing believing that ‘bald’ means bald.  But I would be 
wrong to believe so, for ‘bald’ in the new community carries a different meaning.  Again, a 
principle of margin for error would say that I thereby don’t actually know what ‘bald’ means. 
                                                 
5 Sainsbury (1994:916) already points out that the objection under discussion really entertains two types of 
possibility: cases of (what I am calling) maverick deviance are to be distinguished from cases of (what I am 
calling) linguistic abduction. 
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 The intuition remains if we were to suppose that this were something that actually happens.  
Suppose I have all my life been a part of an English-speaking practice in which ‘bald’ means 
bald.  On Monday I believe that ‘bald’ means bald.  Given my induction into this practice, I can 
be said to believe truly.  On Tuesday however I am abducted, taken out of my current linguistic 
community, and placed in another one.  The swap is done without my knowledge or consent.  I 
am completely unaware of any change.  In particular I am unable to detect the difference between 
the meaning ‘bald’ carries in my new surroundings and the meaning it carried in my old 
surroundings.  In my new environment I continue to be exposed to and actively participate in 
usage of the term ‘bald’; only the difference between bald and bald* is too minute to detect, so I 
do not suspect any difference in the relevant ‘bald’-speaking practice.  Call this a case of actual 
linguistic abduction.  It seems that in such a case I could easily continue believing that ‘bald’ 
meant bald after the abduction, in which case I would believe falsely.  By a principle of margin 
for error, I therefore can’t be said to actually know what ‘bald’ means. 
 In all these cases, the intuition is that it is easily possible for an ordinary English speaker to 
have false beliefs about what ‘bald’ means.  But this is jointly inconsistent with the claim that the 
ordinary English speaker knows what ‘bald’ means together with a margin for error principle that 
one knows what ‘bald’ means only if his belief about what ‘bald’ means is true in all similar 
cases.  Williamson’s contention that knowledge requires a margin for error seems to predict that 
no one in fact knows the meanings of vague expressions.  In fact, matters are made even worse if 
we assume (not implausibly) that metaphysical modality conforms to S5.  If all possibilities are 
necessarily possible, then a principle of margin for error would dictate, not just that no one does 
in fact know the meanings of vague expressions, but that no one could possibly know the 
meanings of vague expressions—clearly, a bad result. 
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 Generalized to any vague predicate ‘F’, the inconsistent triad becomes: 
P1 Anyone who knows what ‘F’ means must have a true belief about what ‘F’ 
means in all similar cases.  
  P2 Ordinary users of ‘F’ know what ‘F’ means. 
P3 It is easily possible for anyone’s belief about what ‘F’ means to be false because 
it diverges from what ‘F’ in fact means. 
How might one reasonably attempt to restore consistency to Williamson’s account?  A seemingly 
promising solution would be to deny its most controversial premise, P3.  This is the solution 
favored and endorsed by Williamson himself (first proposed in Williamson 1994 and later 
defended in Sainsbury 1997).6  Indeed, given his prior commitments to P1 and P2, it is natural to 
conclude that Williamson must deny P3.  If so, he owes an explanation for why cases of 
counterfactual maverick deviance, cases of actual maverick deviance, cases of counterfactual 
linguistic abduction, and cases of actual linguistic abduction are all impossibilities, or at the very 
least why none of these are easily possible.  Attempted explanations of why this should be so 
shall be taken up next.7  
 
                                                 
6 Williamson says the view “is quite consistent with the relevant margin for error principles.  If ‘heap’ had 
meant something slightly different, speakers would have recognized that slightly different meaning.  They 
would not have misidentified it as the present meaning.  Whatever the exact details of their disposition to 
assent and dissent, they would then have been participants in the practice of using ‘heap’ as it would then 
have been.  The identification even of a vague meaning can manifest a disposition to be reliably right.” 
(1994: 237) 
7 Other options include: revising P1 by giving an alternative formulation of margin for error principles, or 
revising P2 by qualifying what “knowledge of meaning” amounts to with respect to vague terms in such a 
way that is jointly consistent with P1 and P3.  I take these up in a longer version of this paper.  My own 
preferred solution, on behalf of Williamson, is the second: to retreat to the weaker claim that we know what 
our vague terms mean, but only inexactly. 
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4.3  Semantic externalism and linguistic induction 
On the envisaged solution, the imagined scenarios where my beliefs about what my vague terms 
mean easily diverge from the facts about what they do mean, are all deemed impossible.  The 
explanation for why they are impossible may be thought to stem from a commitment to a sort of 
semantic externalism, on which in no close world, or scenario similar to how things actually are, 
does an individual’s concept diverge from the community’s.8  
 In order to fully work, however, the reply must embody more than just the semantic 
externalist idea that an individual’s concepts are invariably aligned with the community’s as a 
whole.  It must also assume that our knowledge of those meanings is so invariably aligned.  Thus, 
not only must what I mean by ‘bald’ align with what the community as a whole means by ‘bald’, 
but what I believe ‘bald’ to mean must also align with what the community believes it to mean. 
 What guarantees this?  Some explanation has to be given if we are to be convinced that my 
beliefs about meaning cannot easily go wrong.9  Williamson’s own account appeals to the notion 
of induction into a linguistic practice: 
                                                 
8 As articulated by Mark Sainsbury: 
“I am party to a conceptual and linguistic practice; there are some possible differences in the 
practice which simply entail that my concept or language is different, regardless of how similar 
things may seem to me in the different situations. We cannot say in any detail what such 
differences are like (if we could, we would understand in detail how meaning supervenes on use, 
which we do not); but they are easily possible in that their obtaining would involve only minute 
behavioural shifts in the community, not ones with any significant impact on belief-forming 
mechanisms. The easy possibility is thus a social shift which drags my concept with it. What could 
not so easily happen is that my concept would get out of line with the community's. The difficulty 
is not causal, but issues from the externalist view: what counts as the precise extension of a 
subject’s vague concepts is fixed on a community wide basis, so, in close worlds, idiosyncrasies in 
his usage will not count as manifestation of an idiosyncratic concept.  In close worlds, a subject’s 
concepts co-incide with those of his fellows, whether theirs are the same as or different from their 
(and his) actual ones. (1997: 916-7) 
9 Here is Sainsbury: 
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“To know what a word means is to be completely inducted into a practice that does in fact 
determine a meaning. (1994:211) 
Thus I am guaranteed to know the meaning of an expression, vague or not, simply in virtue of 
being inducted into the practice of using that expression. 
 Unfortunately, Williamson never exactly says what it is to be inducted into the same 
linguistic practice as everyone else.  The most he offers toward any positive account is a 
necessary condition: “rough matching” in my own overall use patterns of ‘bald’ with others’ is 
required if we are to count as being inducted into the same ‘bald’-using practice.10  To be sure, 
requiring that I exhibit exactly the same overall use patterns for ‘bald’ as everyone else in the 
‘bald’-using practice is obviously too strong.  Conversely, similarity in individual use by itself is 
by no means sufficient: two ‘bald’ users in completely separated linguistic communities or worlds 
cannot possibly count as sharing in the same ‘bald’-using practice even if they use ‘bald’ in 
                                                 
“Externalism is the not the only way to attain the structure of this answer (though it seems to be 
the way Williamson would prefer).  Perhaps I have a mechanism which reliably aligns my 
concepts with the ambient ones.  Its reliability ensures that neither of the two possibilities which 
seemed to threaten knowledge of meaning [maverick deviance and linguistic abduction] would be 
easy; so the threat would peter out.  The truth, I presume, requires a combination of both kinds of 
factor.  There will be some externalist, thus constitutive, determinations; but these will be possible 
only if some causal mechanism reliably keeps me in touch with the concepts, language and topics 
of discourse of my fellows, for this mechanism will be relevant to which other speakers and 
objects help constitutively to determine my concepts and meanings.” (1997:917) 
As I understand him, Sainsbury is here drawing attention to the need for an explanation to make good on 
the externalist reply.  The suggestion offered is that “some causal mechanism” or another is what reliably 
keeps me in touch with the meanings of my terms.  The proposal must be worked out in fuller detail, 
however, if it is to actually be convincing and to avoid sounding unsatisfying and hopelessly programmatic.  
More pressing perhaps is the point that reliability is exactly what is at issue here.  Theory aside, why should 
I even believe that my judgments about meaning will be reliable in the first place? 
10 “To be inducted into a practice, it is not necessary to acquire dispositions that exactly match those of 
other insiders.  Of two people who understand the word ‘thin’, one may be willing to apply it in a slightly 
wider range of cases than the other.  Rough matching is enough.  Perhaps no two speakers of English match 
exactly in their dispositions to use ‘thin’.  It does not follow that no two speakers of English mean exactly 
the same by ‘thin’.  For what individual speakers mean by a word can be parasitic on its meaning in a 
public language.  The dispositions of all practitioners collectively determine a sense that is available to 
each.” (1994:211) 
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roughly the same way; presumably, some necessary causal connection is missing.11  Beyond these 
remarks Williamson does not say much more. 
 I remain pessimistic about the prospect of defining linguistic induction as anything more than 
just knowing what the relevant terms mean.  For our purposes, however, I am willing to grant that 
the notion of linguistic induction is one which we have an intuitive grasp on.  Still, I will argue, 
the theory is met with problems.  Let us assume there is such a thing as being inducted into a 
linguistic practice—whatever that may mean.12  The proposal then becomes: 
 (Induction) Necessarily, one knows what a vague term means just in case he 
is inducted into the relevant practice using that term.   
To make good on the externalist reply, Williamson needs the additional assumptions that:  
(i) One can be inducted into only one relevant practice at a time. 
(ii) Each term has only one fixed meaning per given practice that is available to all 
those inducted into that practice.   
Otherwise, if I can be simultaneously inducted into distinct practices yielding different meanings 
for the same term, or if I am inducted into a single practice that simultaneously yields different 
meanings for the same term, then I shall have different candidate meanings to choose from for 
some single term, in which case induction into a practice will hardly guarantee that I know the 
meaning of that term. 
                                                 
11 Perhaps the notion of induction into the relevant practice must ultimately be given in causal terms.  If so, 
it risks being as explanatorily premature as the move considered earlier, namely, of positing the existence 
of a “causal mechanism” to explain how one invariably knows the meanings of his terms.  The burden of 
explanation collapses back onto the task of identifying what that mechanism is. 
12 Williamson speaks of being “completely inducted” into a linguistic practice.  But we can ignore for the 
moment what it is to be completely inducted into a practice, as opposed to being only partially inducted 
into it.  In a longer version of this paper, I argue that Williamson is allowed to admit the notion of partial 
induction into his theory, so long as it corresponds to vague knowledge of meaning, and not inexact 
knowledge of meaning. 
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 Does it follow that I couldn’t easily have false beliefs about what ‘bald’ means?  The 
externalist reply proceeds as follows.  Assume (Induction) together with (i) and (ii).  Applied to 
‘bald’, these imply that knowing the meaning of ‘bald’ is necessarily coextensive with being 
inducted into the relevant ‘bald’-using practice (where “the meaning of ‘bald’” and “the relevant 
‘bald’-using practice” are understood to be unrigidified descriptions). 
 This rules out maverick deviance.  It is impossible that if ‘bald’ had still meant bald, I could 
easily believe that ‘bald’ meant bald*.  For maverick concepts like bald* are not easy to acquire.  
In nearby worlds, if the rest of the community means bald by ‘bald’, then that is what I mean too 
by ‘bald’, assuming I am inducted into the relevant practice.  Indeed, I wouldn’t even possess the 
concept bald* because I wouldn’t be inducted into any practice in which ‘bald’ carried that 
meaning.  So I cannot believe that ‘bald’ means bald* in nearby worlds where it still means bald.  
I cannot take its meaning to be different where its meaning is no different.   
 Actual linguistic practice becomes a mere special case: given that I am actually inducted into 
the ‘bald’-using practice, I know that ‘bald’ means bald, and I can’t believe it means otherwise 
because I don’t actually possess any similar yet distinct concepts such as bald*.  Thus both types 
of possibilities are ruled out: counterfactual and actual maverick deviance. 
 This also appears to rule out linguistic abduction.  It is impossible that if ‘bald’ had meant 
bald*, I could easily believe that ‘bald’ still meant bald.  In nearby worlds where ‘bald’ means 
something different, I am no longer inducted into a practice in which it means bald; thus I no 
longer possess that concept.  So I cannot still believe that ‘bald’ means bald in nearby worlds 
where it means bald*.  I cannot take its meaning to be the same where its meaning is different. 
 The externalist reply exploits the following feature of (Induction) plus (i) and (ii).  It is not 
just deviant concepts that are difficult to come by: deviant beliefs about what concepts one is 
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exercising are also difficult to come by.  It is not just that, in nearby worlds where everyone else 
in the linguistic community means bald* by ‘bald’, that is what I mean too by ‘bald’ in those 
worlds.  It is that in nearby worlds where everyone else takes ‘bald’ to mean bald*, that is what I 
take ‘bald’ to mean too in those worlds (if I take it to mean anything).  This is not to say that the 
envisaged deviance from community-wide meaning is impossible, only that it never occurs in 
close counterfactual circumstances. 
 Of course, the concepts bald and bald* are different meanings of ‘bald’, one actual and one 
counterfactual, precisely insofar as they have different cutoff points.  That so much is given by 
Williamson’s own views on the meaning instability inherently found in vague predicates.  
Williamson would deny however that taking ‘bald’ to have a slightly different extension from that 
which it in fact has is thereby taking it to have a slightly different meaning; a supposed difference 
of extension does not entail a supposed difference of meaning.13  Whenever I attempt or purport 
to envisage a nearby scenario where my beliefs about the meaning of a vague term diverge from 
the facts, I do not succeed: I merely envisage a scenario where I have different beliefs about the 
extension of ‘bald’, not a scenario where I have different beliefs about its meaning; similarly, 
supposed sameness of extension does not entail supposed sameness of meaning.   
                                                 
13 It seems there is at least room for initial worry.  Williamson claims that a difference in use does not 
imply a difference in meaning when the meaning of the term is “stabilized by natural divisions, so that a 
small difference in use would make no difference in meaning.”  This is the case with natural kind terms like 
‘gold’.  But, he adds, slight shifts in our use of vague terms do give way to slight shifts in meaning, because 
unlike natural kind terms, “the meaning of a vague term is not stabilized by natural divisions in this way.  A 
slight shift along one axis of measurement in all our dispositions to use ‘thin’ would slightly shift the 
meaning and extension of ‘thin’.”  Of course, the envisaged shift in use is at the level of the entire linguistic 
community, and not the individual speaker.  But a worry can be raised as to why this pattern of meaning 
shifts being induced by use shifts should not be replicated in the individual case as well.  Cf. Williamson 
1994: 231. 
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 Thus, in envisaging a case of maverick deviance, I am not really envisaging a case where I 
believe ‘bald’ to mean bald* when in fact it means bald.  I merely envisage a case where I believe 
the extension to be different when it is not.  Likewise, in envisaging a case of linguistic 
abduction, it is contested, I am not really envisaging a case where I believe ‘bald’ to mean bald 
when in fact it means bald*.  I merely envisage a case where I believe the extension to be the 
same when it is not.  Both types of possibility show just how unreliable I am when it comes to 
judging where the cutoff for a vague predicate like ‘bald’ is.  But such unreliability in my 
judgment of extension should not be mistaken as unreliability in my judgment of meaning. 
 One might protest in defense of P3: “Aren’t meanings for vague predicates at least in part 
individuated by extension, in which case, a difference in extension beliefs does entail a difference 
in meaning beliefs?” 
 To see why this does not follow, consider how two competent users of the same vague term 
might disagree over whether it applies to a given borderline case, without disagreeing over its 
meaning.  Consider once again borderline Barry.  Suppose that Tim assents to “Barry is bald” 
while Jim dissents from or is unwilling to assent to “Barry is bald”.  Clearly, they disagree.  But 
over what?  First of all, they disagree over whether Barry is bald.  To settle the disagreement 
would be to settle the matter of fact of whether Barry is bald: if it is the case that Barry is bald, 
then only Tim is correct; if not, then only Jim is correct.  Second of all, they disagree over the 
extension of ‘bald’.  Tim believes that Barry falls within the extension of ‘bald’; Jim does not.  It 
does not follow from this however that Tim and Jim disagree over what ‘bald’ means.  Otherwise, 
if their disagreement were (even in part) over the meaning of ‘bald’, then it would be possible to 
settle their disagreement by settling what ‘bald’ in fact meant.  That would imply that Tim and 
Jim meant different things by ‘bald’.  Suppose then for the sake of argument that according to 
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Tim ‘bald’ means bald and that according to Jim ‘bald’ means bald*.  Then Tim’s utterance of 
“Barry is bald” expresses his belief that Barry is bald and Jim’s utterance of “Barry is bald” 
expresses his belief that Barry is bald*.  These two beliefs clearly vary in truth conditions: Tim’s 
belief is true if and only if Barry has 3,000 hairs or less, whereas Jim’s belief is true if and only if 
Barry has 2,999 hairs or less; so, supposing Barry had 3,000 hairs, Tim’s belief would be true but 
Jim’s belief would be false.  Now, it is arguably a trademark feature of disagreement in belief 
that, if the disagreement is mutually recognized, each party must take his own beliefs (relevant to 
the disagreement) to be mutually exclusive with the other party’s beliefs (relevant to the 
disagreement).  Tim and Jim (we may assume) do mutually recognize their disagreement.  So 
Jim, in particular, must take his own belief, as expressed by his own utterance of “Barry is bald”, 
to be mutually exclusive with Tim’s belief, as expressed by Tim’s utterance of “Barry is bald”.  
But this is something he isn’t forced to do in the current situation.  He needn’t believe that if his 
own belief is true then Tim’s belief is false.  For Barry might have 2,999 hairs.  In that case, it 
would be the case both that Barry is bald* and that Barry is bald, making it both true that Barry is 
bald* and true that Barry is bald, making true both Jim’s belief that Barry is bald* and Tim’s 
belief that Barry is bald; so Jim’s belief being true would not exclude Tim’s belief being true—
contrary to the assumption of mutually recognized disagreement.  Thus, we should not suppose 
that in their disagreement, by their respective uses of ‘bald’, Tim means one thing, bald, while 
Jim means another thing, bald*. 
 In general, we should not suppose it is possible that where disagreement occurs over the 
application of a vague predicate to borderline cases, one party means one thing while the other 
means another.  This is not surprising.  Intuitively, the disagreement between Tim and Jim is not 
over the meaning of ‘bald’. (In fact, they might insist that they did mean the same thing by ‘bald’, 
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and that this is what makes it possible for them to agree in the first place!)  It is not even a 
disagreement over the meaning of ‘bald’ plus whether or not Barry is bald.  The disagreement is 
just over whether or not Barry is bald.  Period.  Granted, the disagreement can be rephrased in 
metalinguistic terms, as being over whether the predicate ‘bald’ applies to the individual Barry.  
But this is not to frame the issue as being one over the meaning of ‘bald’.  It is simply to 
recognize it as being an issue which involves disagreement over the extension of ‘bald’.  
Disagreements over borderline cases and cutoff point are disagreements over use and not 
meaning: the point of disagreement is over how a vague predicate is to be applied and not what it 
means. 
 
4.4  Linguistic abduction 
Where does this leave us?  We began by looking at a possible way of saving Williamson’s theory 
from inconsistency with the two claims that we know what our vague terms mean (P2) and that to 
count as knowledge our meaning beliefs must be reliable (P1).  The solution was to reject P3 by 
showing how maverick deviance and linguistic abduction are never possible in close worlds, 
given a certain semantic externalism on which what I mean when I use a vague term, as well as 
what I take myself to mean, is fixed by the linguistic community I am in.  A worry was raised that 
the individuation of meanings by extension gives independent reason to think that maverick 
deviance and linguistic abduction were possible.   The worry was seen to rest on the dubious 
premise that a difference in belief about extension entails a difference in belief about meaning, 
which gave bad predictions about what goes on in cases of disagreement over the application of 
vague predicates to borderline cases.  Now, if this were all there was to our original objection, it 
would be a bad objection indeed.  But our acceptance of P3 in no way rests on that premise, 
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which I agree ought to be rejected.  We have independent reasons to believe that cases of 
maverick deviance and linguistic abduction are possible; hence we have independent reason to 
believe that P3 is true.  In this section, I shall try to show why these reasons are not undercut by 
Williamson’s appeal to semantic externalism. 
 We concluded in the previous section that if knowledge of meaning requires induction into 
the relevant practice, cases of counterfactual maverick deviance, counterfactual linguistic 
abduction, and actual maverick deviance all seem to be rendered impossible.  Does the possibility 
of actual linguistic abduction suffer the same fate?  I suggest that it does not. 
 Suppose that in the actual world the ‘bald’-using practice I am currently inducted into, call it 
p1, is such that ‘bald’ means bald.  I actually know that ‘bald’ means bald.  Now suppose that 
tomorrow I become the victim of a case of linguistic abduction: I am taken out of my current 
linguistic environment and placed in another, one in which the ‘bald’-using practice p2 is such 
that ‘bald’ means bald*.  The abduction is carried out swiftly and surreptitiously, without my 
consent or knowledge.  Suppose enough time then passes for me to interact with the members of 
my new linguistic community; enough, let us say, so that I have become inducted into p2 by a 
certain time t.  But ‘bald’ means bald* in p2.  So I know that ‘bald’ means bald* at t.   
 Question: can I also believe that ‘bald’ means bald at time t?  Nothing seems to prevent us 
from saying so.  By (i), p2 is the only ‘bald’-using practice I am inducted into at t; so I am no 
longer actually a part of p1 by t.  And by (ii), since ‘bald’ means bald* in p2 at t, ‘bald’ does not 
mean bald in p2 at t.  So I am not at t inducted into any linguistic practice in which ‘bald’ means 
bald.  It does not follow from any of this however that I lack the concept bald at t.  For all that 
has been said, it may still be within my possession at t.  For our only constraints were put on how 
concepts may be acquired; nothing was said about how concepts are lost or what is required to 
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retain them.  I possess the concept bald when I am still a part of and inducted into p1.  Nothing 
said so far implies that by t I must no longer be in possession of that concept.  If so, then nothing 
keeps me from believing at t that ‘bald’ means bald.  But then, I am able to have a false belief 
about the meaning of ‘bald’ at t, for ‘bald’ does not mean bald within p2 at t.  Hence, the 
attempted externalist reply fails to rule out the possibility of actual linguistic abduction.  So P3 of 
our inconsistent triad remains. 
 This supports the pretheoretic intuition we had that actual linguistic abduction is indeed a real 
possibility.  If I am abducted by those from another linguistic community—linguistic aliens, so to 
speak—I could be wrong about what I took ‘bald’ to mean in my new surroundings, even after 
talking with plenty of ‘bald’-users in my new surroundings.   
 The intuition is strengthened if we draw out the case a bit.  Suppose that on Monday I am still 
within my old linguistic community in which ‘bald’ means bald.  That day I judge Mary to be 
bald.  My utterance “Mary is bald” expresses my belief that Mary is bald.  Then on Tuesday I am 
abducted into a new linguistic community, one in which ‘bald’ means bald*.  Enough time passes 
for me to enjoy plenty of interactions with other ‘bald’-users in my new surroundings.  Suppose 
that by the end of the week at time t, I have been inducted into the new ‘bald’-using practice.  It 
seems that I can recall truly at t: “I believed on Monday that Mary is bald.”14  On the externalist 
reply, any utterance of ‘bald’ made by me at t will express bald*, so my utterance “I believed on 
Monday that Mary is bald” at t will express that I believed on Monday that Mary is bald*.  Yet 
this is false: what I believed on Monday was not that Mary is bald* but that Mary is bald.  So I 
cannot make true reports about past beliefs I held when I was part of a different linguistic 
                                                 
14 Granted, such “memory” objections to externalism are not uncontroversial.  Cf. Tye & Heal 1998. 
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practice.  That is a bizarre and unattractive consequence of the assumption (ii) made by the 
externalist reply. 
 
4.5  Ignorant induction 
There is also independent reason to doubt (Induction) itself.  Suppose that actual linguistic 
practice has it that ‘bald’ means bald and that the cutoff for ‘bald’ is at n hairs, so that 
supervenience of bald facts on hair facts entails that being bald and having n hairs or less are 
necessarily coextensive.  A consequence of (Induction) is that my induction into the relevant 
‘bald’-using practice guarantees that I know the meaning of ‘bald’.  The following considerations 
are meant to challenge this sufficiency claim. 
 Scenario 1: zero hairs.  It is possible that I might have believed that ‘bald’ means having 
exactly zero hairs on one’s head.  I might do so because I have had it explained to me on 
numerous occasions that “To be bald is to have no hair,” and I have always understood this quite 
literally.  Whenever others have described individuals who are not entirely hairless as being 
‘bald’, I have always taken them to be speaking figuratively or in exaggerating jest.  Only when 
entirely hairless individuals are labeled as ‘bald’ do I take the speaker to be speaking literally.  
Likewise, I take myself to speak literally only when applying ‘bald’ in the presence of hairless 
scalps; when applying it to non-completely hairless individuals, I expect others to understand me 
as speaking figuratively.  My misunderstanding is understandable, but it would nevertheless be 
the case that I failed to understand what ‘bald’ meant.  In this scenario it seems I would not count 
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as knowing the meaning of ‘bald’.15  But intuitively, it also seems that I would count as being 
inducted into the relevant ‘bald’-using practice.  After all, I have interacted with plenty ‘bald’-
users in the practice.  Moreover, the misconception I have that being bald is having exactly no 
hairs could be something that lasts for years as I continue to interact with those in the practice, 
until by good fortune I come across someone who disillusions me.  But if I do count as being 
inducted into the relevant practice, then by (Induction), I also count as knowing the meaning of 
‘bald’, which I do not. 
 Scenario 2: caps.  It is possible that I might have believed that ‘bald’ meant wearing a cap.  I 
might do so because the only individuals I have had pointed out to me as being ‘bald’ are those 
who wish to hide (as we would describe it) their baldness.  It is not an unlikely mistake to be 
made, say, by a child when he sees aged hatted men walking around or someone storming out of a 
barbershop with his baseball cap, and is told that these individuals are ‘bald’.  But if I were to 
make it, I would hardly count as knowing the meaning of ‘bald’.  Definite cases of baldness 
abound who do not wear any caps.  But intuitively, it seems I could still count as being inducted 
into the relevant ‘bald’-using practice.  Perhaps it is a rather impoverished form of being a part of 
the practice.  But (Induction) nonetheless would imply that I thereby know the meaning of ‘bald’, 
which I do not. 
 Scenario 3: lucky guess.  It is possible that I might have believed that the cutoff for the vague 
term ‘bald’ was at n hairs.  It would be a lucky accident that in so believing I hit upon the truth, 
since it is in fact true (we are supposing) that anyone is bald just in case he has n hairs or less.  On 
Williamson’s account, I do not count as knowing this because the cutoff could have easily been 
                                                 
15 One may reply that, although it is uncontroversial that I am mistaken in my use of ‘bald’, it is 
nonetheless unclear whether I thereby fail to know what ‘bald’ means.  After all, it may be said, 
Burge’s Alfred still understands the term ‘arthritis’; he merely misapplies it. 
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one or two hairs removed.  Indeed, on anyone’s account, I should not count as knowing where the 
cutoff of ‘bald’ is, if there is a cutoff.  That so much is clear.  But do I count as knowing what the 
meaning of ‘bald’ is?  That much is not so clear.  On the one hand, if I believe that vague 
predicates have sharp cutoffs (supposing I am an epistemicist), it seems perfectly felicitous for 
me to try and guess where those cutoff points are.  On the other hand, the moment I begin 
insisting, for instance, that the cutoff for ‘bald’ is at some specific number of hairs and not 
anywhere else—as I might if I am a fervent believer that ‘bald’ means having n or fewer hairs—it 
seems I have failed to understand something about the vague nature of ‘bald’, namely, that its 
cutoff point (if it exists) resists any attempt to be located.  In general, it seems essential to any 
vague predicate that, not only is it impossible to know where its cutoff is, but one also cannot 
possibly reasonably believe to have located its cutoff point; cutoffs are things that frustrate not 
just knowledge but even reasonable belief.16  If knowledge of the meaning of vague predicates 
requires appreciating this point, then in particular I will not count as knowing the meaning of 
‘bald’.  But intuitively, it seems I could still count as being (at least partially) inducted in the 
relevant ‘bald’-using practice, in which case (Induction) would imply that I know the meaning of 
‘bald’, which I do not. 
 Scenario 4: disregarded vagueness.  It is possible that I might have believed that the cutoff 
for ‘bald’ was at n hairs but have had significantly different beliefs about how ‘bald’ is used.  
Suppose I believe that ‘bald’ was introduced into the linguistic community as having a stipulated 
cutoff point at n hairs and that it continues to be used in this way; and that the only reason why 
                                                 
16 Williamson provides an account for this intuition, rather unsurprisingly, in terms of margin for error: 
variants of the margin for error constraints that held in the case knowledge are said to hold also in the case 
of reasonable belief.  The key adjustment is to require (for the latter case) that one’s belief be true in most 
similar scenarios, instead of in all similar scenarios (as in the former case).  Cf. Williamson 1994 §8.7. 
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people hedge their judgments about baldness is that they lack complete perceptual information 
about the relevant hair facts.  If people had the time, patience and means to count the number of 
hairs on someone’s scalp at a given time, I believe, we would be able to partition all individuals 
as either ‘bald’ or ‘not bald’; it would simply be a matter of identifying every individual at a 
given time who has n hairs or less on his head.  Again, it seems I should not count as knowing the 
meaning of ‘bald’, because I have misunderstood the vague nature of the term.  In fact, it is 
arguable that in such a scenario I have ceased to believe that ‘bald’ is vague altogether; my 
conception of how it is used has by this point radically departed from the normal conception of 
how vague expressions are actually used.  But intuitively, it seems I could still count as being (at 
least partially) inducted in the relevant ‘bald’-using practice, in which case (Induction) would 
imply that I know the meaning of ‘bald’, which I do not. 
 The four scenarios above purport to show that, contrary to Williamson’s account, induction 
into the relevant practice does not suffice for knowledge of meaning.  In each scenario, it seems I 
can still be inducted into the relevant ‘bald’-using practice, given ample interaction with other 
‘bald’-users in community.  Perhaps it is a rather impoverished form of being a part of the 
practice.  But (Induction) nonetheless would imply that I thereby know the meaning of ‘bald’.  
Yet in each scenario I do not count as knowing what ‘bald’ means because of my deviant beliefs 
about how ‘bald’ is used.  I may have false beliefs about its extension, locating the cutoff either at 
a far different number of hairs than it actually is (zero hairs scenario) or on the entirely wrong 
continuum (caps scenario).  Or I may accidentally be right about the extension, but misunderstand 
the vagueness of ‘bald’, because my belief that the cutoff is at n hairs is either based on no good 
reason at all (lucky guess scenario) or based on the entirely wrong sort of reason (disregarded 
vagueness scenario). 
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 Thus, there is in each case the intuition that linguistic induction is possible without 
knowledge of meaning.  The intuition merely relies on our having a pretheoretic grip on the 
notion of induction into a practice, which I am willing to grant we do have.  Taken seriously, it is 
further evidence that the sort of externalist reply envisaged by Williamson is unworkable. 
 
4.6  Margins for error 
The previous section was meant to show that P3 cannot easily be denied.  One who thinks P1 and 
P2 are in comparable standing may draw the conclusion that the outright denial of any of these 
three statements would be unwise and ultimately untenable.  Another option open to him would 
be to be revisionist about one of the claims.  We start with P1.   
 The idea behind margin for error principles is that knowledge precludes untrue belief in 
sufficiently close cases.  Consider the claim that I know what ‘bald’ means.  What are the 
relevant beliefs in question whose falsity is precluded by my knowing this?  And what makes a 
case sufficiently close?  Since the latter is obviously the more difficult question, let us first 
address the former.  I have stated the margin for error principle governing knowledge of our 
vague expressions as P1.  When applied to my knowledge of meaning with respect to the vague 
term ‘bald’, this yields M1. 
M1 If I know what ‘bald’ means, then in all similar cases, I have a true belief about 
what ‘bald’ means. 
The most obvious shortcoming with this formulation is that what I know and what I believe are 
not given by ‘that’-clauses.  To avoid this, we might reformulate the relevant margin for error 
principle as M2. 
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M2 If I know that ‘bald’ means bald, then in all similar cases, I have a true belief of 
the form: ‘bald’ means F.17 
Here, the object of my knowledge is specified: I know the meaning of ‘bald’ to be bald.  
However, the object of my belief must remain unspecified, for the belief content may vary from 
case to case.  Williamson allows for the possibility that in one similar case I believe truly that 
‘bald’ means bald and in another similar case I believe truly that ‘bald means bald*.  That my 
beliefs about what ‘bald’ means would shift from one similar case to another does not 
automatically violate the relevant margin for error constraint; so long as each belief is true in its 
own respective world, I may still be said to know that ‘bald’ in fact means bald. 
 I am assuming that beliefs are individuated by their contents, although nothing essential rests 
on this.  With some minor adjustments, we could have chosen to speak of the same belief as 
having a different content in different circumstances, but with the same result: truth evaluation 
would still be relative to the world in question; in this case, it would depend on what content the 
belief had in that world. 
 Another way to achieve the same effect would be to formulate things metalinguistically, as in 
M3. 
  M3 If I know that ‘bald’ means bald, then in all similar cases, my uttering a sentence 
 of the form “‘Bald’ means bald” would express a true belief. 
Two features are noteworthy.  First, the metalinguistic formulation allows for variation in belief 
across similar cases, because the belief that would be expressed by my uttering a sentence of the 
                                                 
17 It deserves pointing out that the relevant belief of mine is to be understood as a true de re belief about the 
concept F to the effect that it is the meaning of ‘bald’.  Thus, merely asserting the disquotational principle 
“‘Bald’ means bald” doesn’t suffice to express a belief that would satisfy the margin for error condition.  
For instance, I might lack the concept bald, in which case the assertion might express a de dicto belief of 
the form ‘bald’ means F, but not a de re belief about the concept bald to the effect that ‘bald’ means it. 
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form “‘Bald’ means bald” might vary from case to case.18  Second, the subjunctive form of the 
consequent is merely meant to account for the possibility that, although it may not be true that in 
every similar case I utter the relevant words, it would nevertheless be true that in any similar case 
were I to utter the relevant words I would thereby be expressing a true belief.  These two features 
assure that what is required for knowledge, as specified in the consequent, is that I believe truly 
about what ‘bald’ means in all similar cases—exactly as predicted by M2.  For our purposes then, 
M3 is essentially no different from M2: it is just a torturously and unnecessarily complicated 
rephrasing.  For ease of exposition, let us stick with M2. 
 Our problem can now be recast in terms of M2 (or equally M3).  It seems jointly inconsistent 
with two claims entailed respectively by P2 and P3: first, that I do know (say) that ‘bald’ means 
bald; second, that there exist similar cases in which I would lack any true belief of the form: 
‘bald’ means F.  The first claim follows from my status as an ordinary English speaker who is 
competent in using the vague predicate ‘bald’.  The second claim follows if we accept that either 
of the following are easily possible: cases of maverick deviance, in which I believe that ‘bald’ 
means bald*, or cases of linguistic abduction, in which I believe that ‘bald’ means bald; in either 
case, my belief of the form ‘bald’ means F would be false. 
 Is there another way of capturing the thought that knowledge requires a margin for error that 
does not run into this difficulty?  
 Williamson has proposed other formulations for margin for error principles.  In one place, he 
considers: “If x is similar enough to y, and x is known to be F, then y is F.”19  Call this the 
similar-objects formula.  Notice here that the mention of world- or case-similarity in M2 has been 
                                                 
18 Assuming we understand “the belief …” as an unrigidified definite description. 
19 Cf. Williamson 2002: 53. 
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dropped in favor of the notion of object-similarity.  A natural way of applying this principle to the 
issue at hand is to allow ‘x’ and ‘y’ to range over concepts such as bald and bald* and then 
interpret ‘F’ as “being the meaning of ‘bald’”.  This yields M4. 
M4 If I know that bald is the meaning of ‘bald’, and bald is similar enough to bald*, 
then bald* is the meaning of ‘bald’. 
The problem with M4 is that it is obviously false.  On any measure of similarity, it should come 
out true that bald and bald* are “similar enough”; for they are after all indiscriminable concepts. 
It follows on M4 that in order for me to know that bald is the meaning of ‘bald’, bald* must also 
be the meaning of ‘bald’.  But surely, it is impossible that bald and bald* are both at once the 
meaning of ‘bald’.  To endorse M4 would be to rule out knowledge of meaning in an obviously 
incorrect way. 
 Suppose we instead understood the similar-objects formula differently.  We allow ‘x’ and ‘y’ 
to range over predicates and interpret ‘F’ as “meaning bald”.  This yields M5. 
M5 If I know that ‘bald’ means bald, and ‘bald’ is similar enough to some term T, 
then T means bald. 
The problem with M5 is that it too looks false.  It seems there could be a predicate whose overall 
patterns of use closely resembles (but not exactly) those of ‘bald’ as it is actually used, whose 
meaning hence closely resembles (but not exactly) that which ‘bald’ actually carries, and whose 
extension hence closely resembles (but not exactly) that which ‘bald’ actually has.  On any 
measure of similarity, it should come out true that two terms are “similar enough” if they closely 
resemble each other with respect to these three things: use, meaning and extension.  A predicate 
that was similar enough in all these respects to ‘bald’ might come close to meaning the same as 
‘bald’, but would not in fact mean the same; in particular it would not mean bald. 
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 Perhaps we ought to turn to Williamson’s preferred, original formulation of margin for error 
principles: “A is true in all similar cases where ‘A’ is known.”20  Call this the counterfactive 
formula.  This version of a margin for error principle easily delivers the result that knowledge is 
factive, for among the cases similar to that where A is known is the (actual) case where A is 
known.  The same thought is merely extended to all other similar cases.  Applied to our case at 
hand, the formula yields M6. 
M6 If I know that ‘bald’ means bald, then ‘bald’ means bald in all similar cases. 
The problem with M6 is that it is falsified by Williamson’s own theory.  It is essential to his 
account that a vague term such as ‘bald’ could have easily meant something other than what it in 
fact means.  Such meaning instability is exactly what underlies his employment of margin for 
error principles to explain our vagueness-related ignorance in the first place.  Whatever his 
standards of similarity, it should therefore come out true that there are “similar enough” 
counterfactual scenarios in which ‘bald’ means something different, in which case ‘bald’ does not 
mean bald in all similar cases. 
 Another problem with the counterfactive formulation is that it isn’t enough to rule out 
unstable judgments from counting as knowledge.  Suppose I judge borderline Barry to be bald.  
Suppose moreover that this judgment is true: despite his borderline status Barry has few enough 
hairs to be bald.  Still, I could have easily judged differently.  My skill at assessing baldness and 
my competence in applying the predicate ‘bald’ surely preclude no such move.  Thus, my 
judgment that borderline Barry is bald is unstable.  In general, my use of ‘bald’ begins to exhibit 
judgment instability when it encounters borderline cases.  Even if the facts about baldness are 
                                                 
20 Cf. Williamson 1994 §8.3. 
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stable, my judgments about baldness may not be.  Yet according to the counterfactive formula, 
my judgment that borderline Barry is bald comes out as satisfying the relevant margin for error 
principle.  For all the formula requires for me to know that Barry is bald is that Barry is bald in all 
similar cases—which he is, assuming he has the same number of hairs in all similar cases.  In fact 
it is necessarily true that anyone with that same number of hairs is bald.  Hence it is true in all 
similar cases that anyone with that same number of hairs is bald.21 
 What makes the counterfactive formula inadequate is its failure to place any appropriate 
constraints on the subject’s beliefs in similar cases.  Unlike M1 and M2, for instance, M6 does 
not say what beliefs of mine about the meaning of ‘bald’ must be true in the relevant cases.  In 
fact, the consequent makes no reference to beliefs at all. 
 Williamson recognizes that such instability in judgment exists and is endemic in our use of 
vague predicates.  He denies however that this explains our ignorance in borderline cases.  It is 
instability in meaning and not instability in judgment that explains why we can’t know whether a 
vague predicate applies to a borderline case.22  It may be said in Williamson’s defense that 
                                                 
21 Williamson is well aware of this worry.  Necessary truths such as that expressed by ‘Everyone with 
physical measurements m is thin’ (his example), he says, “seem trivially to satisfy the necessary condition 
for being known imposed by a margin for error principle.  A necessary truth is true in all cases; a fortiori, it 
is true in all cases similar to the case in which it is a candidate for being known.  How then can a margin for 
error principle explain our ignorance of a necessary truth?”  He goes on to offer a solution: “Someone who 
asserts ‘Everyone with physical measurements m is thin’ is asserting a necessary truth, but he is still lucky 
to be speaking the truth.  He does not know the truth of what he says.  Although he could not have asserted 
the proposition he actually asserted without speaking truly, he could very easily have asserted a different 
and necessarily false proposition with the same words.”  Peculiarly, however, Williamson does not go on to 
explicitly revise his formulation of the relevant margin for error principle.  It is left as it is, in its inadequate 
form, as given by the counterfactive formula.  Cf. Williamson 1994: 230. 
22 The rationale can be reconstructed as follows.  Perhaps in cases of phenomenal sorites, instability in 
judgment looks to be a promising way of explaining vagueness-related ignorance.  That is because we 
know where to locate the source of the judgment instability: the inaccuracy of our perceptual faculties is to 
blame.  But where our faculties of perception, memory, etc. are not at issue, as in a non-phenomenal 
sorites, the appeal to instability in judgment looks less convincing.  Our inability to decide on a borderline 
case of tallness is not due to any defect in our discriminatory capacities, especially if we know all the 
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because judgment instability, although itself a feature of vagueness-related ignorance, is not the 
cause of vagueness-related ignorance, a margin for error principle which explains vagueness-
related ignorance thereby need not also explain judgment instability.  This would not however 
address the worry that M6 is already falsified by the meaning instability of ‘bald’.   
 I am forced to conclude that although alternative versions of the relevant margin for error 
principles are available, those alternatives are either defective in their own right or just as much, 
if not even more, ill-suited for reconciling P2 and P3. 
 
4.7  Supervenience and skepticism 
In the rest of the paper I present what I believe to be the best solution for saving Williamson’s 
theory from incoherence, which is to revise P1.  On the proposal, Williamson should not commit 
himself to the claim that we know the meanings of our vague terms exactly; rather he ought to say 
that our knowledge of vague meanings is a form of inexact knowledge. 
 First, I wish to point to a puzzling feature about Williamson’s account.  Williamson accepts 
the pair of supervenience claims: (a) meaning supervenes on use, in the sense that holding fixed 
the overall community-wide patterns of use for a given predicate thereby fixes its meaning; and 
(b) extension supervenes on meaning, in the sense that holding fixed the meaning of a predicate 
thereby fixes its satisfaction conditions, and where certain facts about the environment are held 
                                                 
relevant physical measurements, i.e. the man’s exact height.  The connection between vagueness and 
instability in judgment in such cases is not clear.  In cases where reliance upon perception is entirely 
absent, such as Wang’s Paradox, it seems even less so.  It is more plausible that meaning instability, and 
not judgment instability, is what explains our ignorance regarding borderline cases and cutoff points in 
non-phenomenal sorites cases.  If good, this point should not be restricted to non-phenomenal sorites, but 
should extend to phenomenal sorites, on pains of failing to deliver a unified treatment of vagueness in both 
phenomenal and non-phenomenal sorites cases. 
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fixed, thereby fixes the extension of term.  The supervenience claims hold for vague predicates 
too, like ‘bald’: the overall use patterns for ‘bald’ as used in a certain practice determine its 
meaning within that practice, and the meaning of ‘bald’ within a practice in turn determine its 
cutoff point, and thus together with the relevant hair facts, determines its exact extension.  What 
is our epistemic status with respect to the facts about use which determine meaning and to the 
facts about extension which are in part determined by meaning?  Williamson claims that we lack 
any exact knowledge of such facts.  We have no way of knowing exactly what the overall use 
patterns for a vague term are in our linguistic community.23  Nor can ever know exactly what the 
extension of a vague term is, as shown by the unknowable status of borderline cases.  Yet, surely 
Williamson would concede that we have knowledge of some sort of such facts, however rough or 
inexact.  Competent users of ‘bald’ know a good deal about how the term is used and which 
individuals it definitely applies to or definitely doesn’t apply to.  Perhaps we can be said to have 
with respect to a vague term, inexact knowledge of its use and of its extension. 
 When it comes to knowledge of meaning, however, Williamson insists that our knowledge of 
this is exact: I know exactly what ‘bald’ means.  But how can this be?  How can I know only 
inexactly how ‘bald’ is used overall and what ‘bald’ applies to and yet somehow know exactly 
what ‘bald’ means, when the use facts fix the meaning facts and the meaning facts (together with 
the hair facts) fix the extension facts?  Given that the A-facts supervene on the B-facts and the B-
facts supervene on the C-facts, if I know the A-facts and C-facts only inexactly, should I not also 
know the B-facts only inexactly?  It is a strange feature of the view that it gives us an inexplicable 
privileged epistemic status with respect to the middle link in this chain of supervenience claims.  
This doesn’t automatically make the view incoherent, but it certainly calls for explanation. 
                                                 
23 Cf. Williamson 1994 §8.4. 
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 In certain places though, Williamson does appear to suggest that sometimes our knowledge of 
what a vague term means falls short of full understanding.  For instance: 
“On the epistemic view, our understanding of vague terms is not partial … When I have heard a 
word used only once or twice, my understanding is partial because there is more to the 
community’s use of it than I yet know.  I have not got fully inside the practice; I am to some 
extent still an outsider.  Indeed, I probably think of myself as an outsider, knowing that there is 
more to the practice than I yet know; my use of the term will be correspondingly tentative and 
deferential … To know what a word means is to be completely inducted into a practice that does 




“… one can think of actual meanings as located on a continuum of possible meanings: but it does 
not follow that to recognize a meaning one must locate it on that continuum.  It is enough to know 
which of the actual meanings it is.  To do that, it is enough to use the term within the appropriate 
practice.” (1994:236-7) 
All the talk about ‘partial understanding’ and ‘complete induction’ suggests the following idea.  
The typical English speaker knows fully well what the meaning of ‘bald’ is.  Yet on the rare 
occasion someone may understand it only partially.  Knowledge of meaning is had by induction 
into the relevant practice.  Whether that knowledge makes for complete or partial understanding 
depends on whether the induction is complete or partial.  Partial induction is characterized by a 
number of things such as: insufficient exposure to others’ usage of ‘bald’ (“…heard a word used 
only once or twice…”), insufficient experience in one’s own usage of ‘bald’ (“…it is enough to 
use the term…”), and insufficient confidence in one’s own usage of ‘bald’ (“…tentative and 
deferential…”).  In contrast, complete induction is presumably had when one’s exposure, 
experience and confidence meet a certain threshold. 
 Induction into the relevant practice now looks to be vague notion.  For it exhibits many of the 
standard features belonging to vague expressions.  It admits of borderline cases.  It is susceptible 
to Sorites constructions by varying the above parameters.  And so on.  On the epistemicist theory, 
there must then be a tripartite division: one is inducted either fully or partially or not at all.  A 
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corresponding division holds for understanding: I understand ‘bald’ either fully or partially or not 
at all. 
 What about knowledge?  It is tempting to think that a parallel treatment awaits knowledge of 
meaning: I know what ‘bald’ means either exactly or inexactly or not at all.  However, the 
thought is mistaken.  Where understanding is either full or nonexistent, the subject either 
definitely knows the meaning of the term or definitely does not know it, respectively.  But where 
understanding is partial, it is vague whether the subject knows the meaning of the term.  Cases of 
partial understanding are just borderline cases of knowledge.  On the epistemicist theory, there is 
always a fact of the matter in such cases of whether one knows the meaning in question or not—it 
is simply unknowable which it is.  For instance, I can perhaps understand ‘bald’ partially while 
knowing exactly what it means, or I may understand it partially without knowing what it means at 
all; just that no one could know if I knew it or not.  Hence, inexact knowledge is not the same as 
partial understanding. (As we shall soon see, it is rather knowledge that something of a certain 
sort falls within a certain range.)  To say that our knowledge of our vague terms mean is made 
inexact because their meanings are unstable forces one to say that all our knowledge of meaning 
for vague terms is inexact, because meaning instability pervades all of our vague discourse.  That 
is to deny that we have any exact knowledge of what our vague words mean.  Whereas 
Williamson insists that exact knowledge is the norm.  That is because for him, induction into the 
relevant practice guarantees exact knowledge of meaning, and linguistic induction is the norm.  
Moreover, the denial of exact knowledge weakens the need for a tripartite division among 
knowledge being exact or inexact or entirely absent, for it renders it altogether irrelevant to the 
question of vague meaning.  These points, I should add, are not made explicitly in Williamson 
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1994.  But they are nonetheless, as I understand him, what he probably would say to fend off any 
such misunderstanding of the view. 
 What is Williamson’s motivation for insisting that we know exactly the meanings of our 
vague terms?  He seems to think that it is to be preferred over its alternative, which is to say that 
we know the meanings of our vague terms only inexactly.  He says: 
“One might react to the phenomenon of indiscriminable semantic differences by concluding that 
speakers only roughly know what their utterances mean; they cannot uniquely identify their 
meanings.  If this reaction is open to anyone, it is open to the epistemic theorist.  However, a less 
sceptical line of thought deserves to be explored.” (1994:236) 
I fail to see why the fallback position of inexact knowledge should deserve to be called a 
“sceptical line of thought” in any but the most superficial sense.  Since skepticism questions what 
we purport to know, presumably Williamson means to say that the fallback position contradicts 
what we purport to know.  As he puts it: “There is a sense in which we often know exactly what 
an utterance means.” (1994:236)  But do we purport to know this?  I do not see how.  One might 
purport to know exactly what he means by ‘bald’, but I doubt anyone would seriously purport to 
know that he knew exactly what he means by ‘bald’.  Having knowledge of meaning does not 
entail having knowledge of one’s own knowledge of meaning.  Thus, even if, as a matter of fact, 
we had exact knowledge of what our vague terms mean, it would not follow that to say we had 
only inexact knowledge of what they mean is to challenge our claim to know this fact.  In that 
case, the accusation that the alternative is somehow skeptical is ungrounded.  It is surprising that 
this point escapes Williamson’s attention, given his own rejection of the KK principle. 
 Hence, I do not share the worry that saying we have only inexact knowledge of what our 
vague terms mean is a skeptical position to hold.  In fact, I believe it is the right thing to say.  
More to the point, I believe it is the right thing for Williamson to say on his theory.  I shall say 
why later (§11).  For now, let us concentrate on the alternative: the claim that we have exact 
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knowledge of what our vague terms mean.  I agree with Williamson that this claim “deserves to 
be explored” (as much as I disagree with his reasons for why he thinks it is worth exploring).  Let 
us then explore it.  In particular, let us examine two objections to the claim and Williamson’s 
responses to those objections.  I shall argue that the responses do not mitigate the objections. 
 
4.8  Indiscriminable meanings 
Does the indiscriminability of bald* from bald not undercut my claim to knowing exactly that 
‘bald’ means bald?  Williamson’s reply to this objection is as follows.24  Knowledge of what a 
vague term means is constituted by an ability to recognize its meaning in different linguistic 
contexts.  It is to be likened to knowledge of who someone is based on what she looks like, which 
is constituted by an ability to, say, recognize that person upon seeing her face.  I may possess 
such recognitional knowledge of who someone is even if, should a lookalike be present, I would 
be unable to discriminate the two.  Similarly, I should still count as knowing the actual meaning 
of ‘bald’, even if I would be unable to discriminate it from counterfactual meanings.  Exact 
knowledge of what something is is not undercut by the mere possibility of indiscriminably 
different things.  If this is true for persons, it is true for meanings.   
 Mark Sainsbury has suggested (in conversation) that the point can be further developed given 
a distinction between comparative knowledge and non-comparative knowledge.  The distinction 
is most easily seen with respect to phenomenal looks, so it will be best to begin there. 
 Say that things look comparatively the same when they are compared simultaneously and 
look to have the same appearance, as when two identical twins Shawn and Shane are standing 
                                                 
24 Cf. Williamson 1994 §8.5. 
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before me side by side and look the same.  Things look comparatively different to me when they 
are compared simultaneously and look to have different appearances, as when two fraternal twins 
Shania and Bob stand before me side by side and look entirely different.  I can be said to have 
comparative knowledge that two things look the same or different if my knowledge is based on 
such comparative looks.  Thus, I know in the comparative sense that Shawn and Shane look the 
same, and that Shania and Bob look different.   
 Say that things look non-comparatively the same when I experience them individually, as 
when I have an experience of a rose at one second and another experience (distinct from the first) 
of a different rose the next second, and the two roses look the same way.  They would look non-
comparatively different if, upon being experienced individually, they looked to have different 
colors.  Or it may be two experiences of one and the same rose, where either it looks the same in 
both instances (as when seen from the same vantage point) or it does not (as when seen from 
different vantage points).  Or it may be one single rose which looks the same or different to 
distinct subjects.  Whatever the case, knowledge gained in this way of things looking the same or 
different is said to be non-comparative knowledge. 
 The distinction can arguably be extended from looks to meanings.  I may be said to know 
comparatively that two concepts F and F* are distinct when I come to know this upon direct 
comparison of F and F*, say, by entertaining them simultaneously before my mind.  Non-
comparative knowledge of concept difference is that gained in ways other than direct comparison, 
say, by inference or memory.  For instance, when a listener badly misinterprets something you 
said and goes on to voice his misunderstanding, you might insist, “No, that is not what I meant,” 
thus voicing your non-comparative knowledge that what he took you to be saying was very 
different from what you actually said. 
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 The point then would be this.  Discriminating counterfactual from actual meanings of 
predicates, such as bald* and bald, involves comparative knowledge.  Knowing the actual 
meaning of ‘bald’ does not.  I know that ‘bald’ means bald.  So I have non-comparative 
knowledge of the actual meaning of ‘bald’.  Had ‘bald’ meant bald*, I would have known that 
‘bald’ meant bald* instead.  So if bald had meant something different, I would have non-
comparative knowledge of that counterfactual meaning of ‘bald’.  It doesn’t follow however that I 
could know that counterfactual meaning bald* to be the same as or different from the actual 
meaning bald.  I might lack comparative knowledge of whether these meanings are the same.  
Williamson’s analogy of facial recognition not being undermined by the mere possibility of 
lookalikes may be seen as illustrating this general point that non-comparative knowledge needn’t 
imply comparative knowledge of difference. 
 But why should I have non-comparative knowledge of the meaning of ‘bald’ in all similar 
scenarios?  The same problem reemerges of how we can know the meanings of our vague terms 
when knowledge requires reliability and our judgments about meaning are not always reliable 
enough to constitute knowledge.  Only now, it reemerges under a new guise: it is now the 
problem of how we can non-comparatively know the meanings of our vague terms when non-
comparative knowledge requires reliability and our judgments about meaning are not always 
reliable enough to constitute non-comparative knowledge.  But a problem under a new guise is 
still a problem.  And as we saw earlier, the externalist reply Williamson desires does not offer a 
suitable solution to the problem. 
 
4.9  Knowledge of non-meaning 
A related problem is how I can know that a vague expression means one thing, to the exclusion of 
other things, if this requires knowing also that it doesn’t mean those other things.  Knowing the 
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latter would seem impossible, given that vague expressions are unstable in meaning: there are 
many candidate meanings I cannot know to be ruled out, for there are many things my expression 
could easily have meant. 
 Against this objection Williamson responds basically as follows.25  Suppose the vague term T 
has actual meaning F and counterfactual meaning F*: as things actually are, T means F, although 
it could have easily meant F*.  I know that T means F.  But I don’t know that T doesn’t mean F*.  
So I know what my vague words mean, just not what they don’t mean.  How can that be?  
Meaning one thing excludes meaning something else.  So: if T means F, then T doesn’t mean F*.  
But if I know the antecedent of this conditional, should I not also know its consequent?  Only if I 
knew the entire conditional, since knowledge is closed not under entailment, but under known 
entailment.  But I can’t be said to know the conditional: if T means F, then T doesn’t mean F*.  
The reason why is because I can’t discriminate what T actually means from what it 
counterfactually means, that is, I can’t discriminate F from F*.   
 The thought is, there are certain counterfactual meanings of any vague term which, because 
of their close similarity to its actual meaning, we cannot know to be counterfactual.  Perhaps our 
being unable to know that our vague terms don’t mean certain things is partly why Williamson 
insists on our knowing exactly what they do mean.  But why does he think that we must be unable 
to know the non-meanings of our vague terms?  Williamson’s underlying concern seems to be 
that the claim to knowledge of non-meaning violates margin for error principles. 
 To be sure, there are violations on at least one way of formulating margin for error principles.  
Recall that on the counterfactive formulation, these principles say: if A is known, then A is true in 
all similar cases.  Thus, if I know that T doesn’t mean F*, then T doesn’t mean F* in all similar 
                                                 
25 Cf. Williamson 1994: 235. 
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cases.  But T is unstable in meaning.  Even though it in fact means F, it could have easily meant 
F*.  So T does mean F* in at least some similar cases.  So it is not the case that T doesn’t mean 
F* in all similar cases.  So I don’t know that T doesn’t mean F*. 
 However, we saw that the counterfactive formulation faced various problems, including its 
failure to rule out unstable judgments from counting as knowledge, as well as its incompatibility 
with our vague expressions being unstable in meaning. 
 There are better ways to formulate principles of margin for error.  For instance, the general 
formula corresponding to M1 and M2: if one knows, then one believes truly in all similar cases.  
Thus, if I know that T doesn’t mean F*, then I believe truly in all similar cases. 
 But believe what truly?  The relevant belief might vary from world to world.  The problem 
case, though, as we just saw, is the counterfactual scenario where T does mean F*.  Therefore, let 
us consider some similar case w* in which T means F*.  Let us suppose for the sake of argument 
that Williamson is right in saying I would know the counterfactual meanings of an expression 
should they obtain.  So in w*, I know that T means F*. 
 What then is the relevant belief in w*?  It cannot be a belief that T does not mean F*.  For in 
w*, I know that T means F*; so I believe that T means F* (since knowledge entails belief); so I 
do not believe that T does not mean F* (on pain of holding contradictory beliefs).  If the relevant 
belief in w* is a belief that T means F*, then that belief is true.  For in w*, I know that T means 
F*; so I believe truly that T means F* (since knowledge entails true belief).  If the relevant belief 
in w* is something else, for instance, a belief that T does not mean F, then that belief is true, for T 
does not mean F; and likewise for all other candidate meanings other than F*.  
 Therefore, whatever the relevant belief is in w*, it is true in w*.  But w* was our problem 
case.  Hence, nothing has been shown to violate the relevant margin for error principle for the 
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claim that I know that T doesn’t mean F*.  Generalizing to other close counterfactual meanings, 
nothing has shown that a margin for error principle is incompatible with my claim to knowing 
that T doesn’t mean those things. 
 Given that knowledge of non-meaning does appear to leave an appropriate margin for error, 
the threat of inconsistency disappears.  For that reason, I fail to see why Williamson denies it on 
his theory.  I must admit that Williamson’s motivations here entirely elude my understanding.  
 
4.10  Inexact knowledge 
Regardless, I wish to draw attention to a peculiar fact.  Far from providing an alternative to the 
view that our knowledge of the meanings of our vague terms is inexact, the account seems to 
necessitate this very conclusion.  To see this we must first consider what is inexact knowledge. 
 To use Williamson’s own example: I may know on the basis of sight roughly how many 
people there are in a stadium.26  My knowledge would be inexact because there is no n for which 
I know that there are exactly n people.  Yet I would be able to place lower and upper bounds on 
my estimate.  Whatever the exact number of people in the stadium is, I know that it is not 200, for 
I know that there are more than 200 people; I also know that it is not 2,000, for I know that there 
are fewer than 2,000 people.  The range within which n falls lies somewhere between 200 and 
2,000.  Let ‘S(m)’ stand for “there are exactly m people in the stadium” and ‘K’ stand for “I know 
that”.  The set of natural numbers such that I do not know that there are not exactly that many 
people, {x: ¬K¬S(x)}, is finite and nonempty.  But every finite and nonempty set of natural 
numbers has both a least member and a greatest member.  So the set has a least member L and a 
                                                 
26 Cf. Williamson 1994 §8.2. 
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greatest member U.  Hence I know that the exact number of people in the stadium lies somewhere 
in a range [L, U] where 200 < L and U < 2,000 (of course, I should not be said to know exactly 
what those numbers L and U are). 
 We have here a prototypical kind of inexact knowledge: knowledge that something of a 
certain sort falls within a certain range.27  My inexact knowledge of how many people are in the 
stadium is knowledge that the exact number of people in the stadium falls within a certain range.  
That range consists in all and only those numbers n for which I don’t know that there aren’t 
exactly n people.  It is reasonable to conclude: I know the number of people there are in the 
stadium only inexactly just in case there exists a range such that for no number n in that range do 
I know that there aren’t exactly n people, even though the exact number of people does in fact fall 
within that range.  More generally: I know what m is only inexactly just in case there exists L and 
U such that for no n within [L, U] do I know that m ≠ n, even though m does in fact fall within 
[L, U]. 
 Knowledge of meaning, if inexact, would share much of the same structure.  I am able to 
place bounds on the range of possible meanings for ‘bald’.  Whatever the exact meaning of ‘bald’ 
is, I know that it is not having 30 hairs or less, for I know that the cutoff for ‘bald’ is more than 
30 hairs; I also know that it is not having 30,000 hairs or less, for I know that the cutoff for ‘bald’ 
is less than 30,000 hairs.  The range within which the cutoff falls lies somewhere between 30 and 
30,000.  Let ‘C(m)’ stand for “anyone is bald just in case he has exactly m hairs or less”, or 
                                                 
27 An older example perhaps is Aristotle’s question of how many good friends one should have: “But as 
regards good friends, should we have as many as possible, or is there a limit to the number of one’s friends, 
as there is to the size of a city?  You cannot make a city of ten men, and if there are a hundred thousand it is 
a city no longer. But the proper number is presumably not a single number, but anything that falls between 
certain fixed points. So for friends too there is a fixed number perhaps the largest number with whom one 
can live together…” (Nichomachean Ethics IX.10) 
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equivalently, “the exact cutoff for ‘bald’ is at m hairs”.  The set of natural numbers such that I 
don’t know that anyone is bald just in case he has exactly that many hairs or less, {x: ¬K¬C(x)}, 
is finite and nonempty.  By a least number principle, it has a least member L.  By a greatest 
number principle, it has a greatest member U.  Hence I know that the exact meaning of ‘bald’ lies 
on a naturally ordered range of possible meanings all of the form having n hairs or less such that 
its exact cutoff falls somewhere in a range [L, U] for unknown L > 30 and U < 30,000. 
 It seems that Williamson must accept this as an accurate picture of how we use ‘bald’.  For he 
claims that there are many candidate meanings within the vicinity.  Indeed, there is a whole range 
of meanings surrounding the actual meaning of ‘bald’ on the continuum of hair numbers, each of 
which I cannot know to not be the meaning of ‘bald’.  On the picture being considered, this is to 
accept that there is a finite nonempty set {x: ¬K¬C(x)} bounded by L and U.  So for all n 
between L and U, I do not know that n is the exact cutoff for ‘bald’.  Hence there is no n between 
L and U for which I know that n is not the exact cutoff for ‘bald’.  Hence there is no n between L 
and U for which I know that the exact meaning of ‘bald’ is not having n hairs or less.  Hence 
there exists some L and U such that for no n within [L, U] do I know that the meaning of ‘bald’ is 
not having n hairs or less.  Yet the meaning of ‘bald’ does in fact fall within [L, U].  By our 
definition of inexact knowledge, I must count as knowing what the meaning of ‘bald’ is only 
inexactly—contrary to Williamson’s claim that we know it exactly. 
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Chapter 5: Ignorance and Open Texture1 
 
5.1  Preliminary: vagueness, promises, obligations 
Epistemicism is the view that there is an unknowable fact of the matter for every vague matter.2  
Stewart Shapiro (2006) offers the following case against epistemicism.3  A father promises his 
children they will go to the ballgame if it is sunny, or the movies if it is not.  Assuming his 
promises are obligation-generating, he seems to have the following conditional obligations: 
(1) If it is sunny, we ought to go to the ballgame 
(2) If it is not sunny, we ought to go to the movies 
However, it turns out to be borderline sunny that day: not quite sunny, not quite not sunny either.  
What should he do?  His obligations depend on the weather, which is vague.  But, according to 
the epistemicist, there is a fact of the matter about the weather: 
(3) Either it is sunny or it is not 
despite the fact that  
(4) It is vague whether it is sunny 
                                                     
1 An earlier version was previously published as “Epistemicism, Paradox, and Conditional Obligation”, 
Philosophical Studies (in press). 
2 Defenders of epistemicism include Williamson (1994), Sorensen (2001), Hawthorne & McGonigal 
(2008).  Deniers include just about everyone else. 
3 Shapiro’s main target is supervaluationism, though he targets epistemicism too.  In this paper, I shall be 
concerned only with the potential threat to epistemicism.  See Shapiro 2006:82-86 (ch.3 §6); see also §2. 
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It is simply unknowable which it is, sunny or not, since the matter is vague.  It follows, given the 
conditionality of his promises, that there is a fact of the matter about what is required: 
(5) Either we ought to go to the ballgame or we ought to go to the movies 
It is simply unknowable which he should do, ballgame or movies, since the only basis or source 
of evidence for believing one way or the other—the weather—is itself unknown.4  This is already 
objectionable, insofar as one finds the idea of unknowable obligations objectionable (at least in 
such ordinary circumstances as these).  Here is Shapiro: 
“According to epistemicism [...] vague expressions have sharp, but unknowable boundaries.  So if 
the weather on Sunday is borderline nice (i.e. near the sharp boundary), then either it is [sunny] or 
it is not [sunny], but neither the father nor the children have any way of knowing which.  Thus, the 
family will not know what they have to do in order to fulfil the father’s promise. For example, if 
they go to a ball game and the weather is, in fact, not [sunny], then the father has broken his 
second promise (given that they do not also go to the movie).  And if they go to a movie and the 
weather is, in fact, [sunny], then he has broken his first promise.  I conclude that according to 
epistemicism, no one should make a promise that has a potentially vague antecedent and a sharp 
consequent, since if the antecedent falls near the border, she will not know what to do (since she 
cannot know if the antecedent is true).” (Shapiro 2006: 85-86) 
The problem is one of permission. Intuitively, it is entirely up to the father’s own discretion to 
choose either the ballgame or the movies; he is not at fault for choosing either, perhaps so long as 
he chooses one.  In other words, neither option is individually mandated, since each is 
permissible: 
(6) It is not the case that we ought to go to the ballgame and it is not the case that we 
ought to go to the movies 
Yet (5) and (6) are inconsistent.  Hence, epistemicism denies our permissibility intuitions. 
                                                     
4 Otherwise, if it is knowable that (e.g.) the ballgame option (or movies) is mandated, this can only be 
because it is knowable that it is sunny (not sunny), as given by the terms of his first (second) promise; so 
the state of the weather turns out to be knowable after all—contrary to assumption. 
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 Or so one might claim.  In this paper I dispute that claim.  I contend that the epistemicist need 
not endorse the troubling conclusion of unknowable obligations.  Better yet, fuller reflection on 
the information-sensitive nature of conditional obligation shows that epistemicism—far from 
rejecting the permissibilist conclusion of no obligated choice, as Shapiro thinks it must—actually 
predicts it.  In this way, the epistemicist theory is able to accommodate the very permissibility 
phenomena its critics say it shuns. 
 I first argue that Shapiro’s own presentation of the example is unconvincing, if it is meant to 
cause trouble for epistemicism.  Stronger arguments are available.  I reconstruct two such 
arguments.  However, I show why there is independent reason to reject these lines of reasoning, 
given the failure of analogous paradoxical reasoning in the Miners Paradox.  In particular, we 
have independent reason to think the underlying inference forms fail for deontic conditionals—
namely, constructive dilemma and contraposition.  I argue that the epistemicist has special reason 
to think these inferences fail, provided a certain understanding of deontic ought on which the 
deontic facts exhibit sensitivity to one’s epistemic situation.  This suggests that permissibilist 
objections to epistemicism of the sort inspired by Shapiro’s considerations overlook the 
information-sensitive nature of conditional obligation.  In doing so, they presuppose an erroneous 
logic for deontic conditionals.  Finally, I suggest where the true difference lies between 
epistemicist and semantic treatments of vagueness regarding permissibility intuitions: instead of 
yielding rival predictions, they should be thought of as offering rival explanations for the same 
phenomena. 
 Alternatively, an epistemicist could give an error theory about our permissibilist intuitions or 
defend the possibility of vague (and hence unknowable) obligations.  My discussion ignores these 
alternative responses.  Against the first, I will simply assume that our permissibility intuitions like 
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(6) are robust enough to warrant accommodation on any plausible theory of vagueness—
including epistemicism.5  Against the second, I treat the existence of vague obligations as an 
orthogonal issue, to be addressed elsewhere.6  All I intend to show here is that epistemicists need 
not affirm or deny their possibility in order to circumvent Shapiro-style objections. 
 
5.2  Presentation: Shapiro 
First, a quick exegetical detour.  In Shapiro’s own presentation of the case, the father keeps his 
promises only by acting so as to make both future-tensed conditionals turn out true: 
(7) If it is sunny, we will go to the ballgame 
(8) If it is not sunny, we will go to the movies 
In the case of vague weather, the father won’t know what to do, because he won’t know which 
antecedent is true (and hence which conditional to act upon).  He is not in a position to rule out 
either sunny or non-sunny weather though because, assuming epistemicism, exactly one of these 
must obtain; therefore he runs the risk of breaking one of his promises.  By going to the movies, 
he risks breaking his promise to verify (7), since it might after all be sunny—in which case they 
should, as promised, go to the ballgame instead.  By going to the ballgame, he risks breaking his 
promise to verify (8), since it might after all not be sunny—in which case they should, as 
promised, go to the movies instead.  By doing nothing, he is guaranteed to break at least one 
                                                     
5 This assumption, and hence the reply on offer, is not available to epistemicists whose—strictly optional—
commitment to a knowledge norm of assertion forces them to say that the unknowability of vague matters 
forbids, rather than permits, judgment (see Williamson 1994, 2000).  The reply is meant for the more 
permissive epistemicist who does not take vagueness-induced ignorance as having this sort of silencing 
effect on conversationalists. 
6 Deniers of vague obligations include epistemicists like Sorensen (2001).  Defenders include Sider (1995). 
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promise (corresponding to whichever conditional turns out to have the true antecedent, though he 
won’t know which).  And (we may assume) he cannot do both.  Either action incurs a risk. 
 This alone poses no threat to the epistemicist theory.  For epistemicism correctly prescribes 
doing one activity rather than none, since doing nothing guarantees that both (7) and (8) will be 
false, whereas doing something at least has a nonzero chance of making both conditionals true.  It 
merely predicts that people can place themselves in ethically risky situations by making promises 
with vague conditions—a surprising consequence, maybe, but not fatal for the theory. 
 The real worry, it appears, lies elsewhere.  Should making a set of conditional promises 
indeed generate certain unknowable, hidden obligations, then this means the father is not free to 
pursue either option after all.  What is problematic is this apparent denial of free choice.  The 
issue does not concern the riskiness of violating hidden requirements incurred by promising to 
make certain conditionals true; the issue is whether there exist any such requirements at all.  
Epistemicists who wish to accommodate our free choice permissibility intuitions face a puzzle 
about conditional promises, not promised conditionals.  Shapiro’s presentation, in attending 
exclusively to the truth-valuation of the conditionals themselves while avoiding all use of deontic 
language, appears unable to capture this fact.7  Reformulating the objection with deontic 
conditionals, as in (1)-(6), rather than bare indicatives, I submit, does better. 
                                                     
7 The father’s freedom cannot, for instance, consist in the fact that his promises remain unbroken whatever 
he chooses to do, where this is understood as requiring the truth of both conditionals (7) and (8).  For in 
choosing one option, he must forgo the other; so at least one of the two conditionals (corresponding to 
whichever he fails to do), under some possible circumstance of action (i.e. not picking that option), will 
have a false consequent.  This is enough to make the entire conditional untrue, on any standard analysis of 
the indicative, assuming its antecedent is not guaranteed to be false either—which it can’t be, since it either 
is indeterminate in truth-value (on either a Weak or Strong Kleene logic), has intermediate truth-value (on a 
many-valued logic), has no truth-value, i.e. no fixed truth-value across all admissible precisifications (on a 
supervaluationist logic), or is potentially false in truth-value (on a bivalent logic; see above remarks).  Thus 
there is no guarantee that both (7) and (8) will be true no matter what he does. 
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 Presumably, this denial of permissibility is what, crucially, sets apart Shapiro’s argument 
from the following variant argument (which Shapiro himself doesn’t advance). Assuming we 
swear to speak truthfully when describing the weather: 
(1*) If it is sunny, we ought to call the weather ‘sunny’ 
(2*) If it is not sunny, we ought to call the weather as ‘not sunny’ 
(3*) Either it is sunny or it is not sunny 
(4*) Either we ought to call the weather ‘sunny’ or we ought to call it ‘not sunny’ 
Here, the epistemicist’s commitment to (3*) appears to force an objectionable either-or choice in 
usage for ‘sunny’ in cases of vague weather.  Now, most semantic treatments of vagueness will 
surely reject (4*), since according to these accounts it is part of the meaning of any vague 
predicate ‘F’ that polar judgments—of the form ‘F’ or ‘not-F’—are either permitted but purely 
optional (and hence not mandated) or simply inappropriate (hence, again, not mandated) for 
borderline cases.  But to object to the epistemicist theory on these grounds is obviously question-
begging, if such semantic assumptions are already thought to be incompatible with epistemicism.8  
In contrast, the permissibility intuitions backing (6), as against (5), in Shapiro’s argument are 
theory-neutral: denying the father any freedom of choice in activity—unlike the sanction or 
licence of certain semantic choices regarding word use—is implausible independently of any 
controversial claims about the semantic nature of vague expressions.9 
                                                     
8 This should be unsurprising, since the argument in (1*)–(4*) is essentially an elaboration of the common 
“incredulous stare” objection against epistemicism—which, however convincing, is itself question-
begging.  Although see §8 below.  Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this alternative 
argument. 
9 Another difference is: the fact that hedging (“It’s sort of F”) is an appropriate response when presented 
with a borderline case makes it easier to read “ought…” in (4*) as denoting some deflationary notion (e.g. 
speaking in a truth-apt way or what an idealized speaker would say), which would make (4*) true but 
unproblematic. (The idea would be: hedging allows us to approximate these truth-aiming ideals as best we 
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 Thus, while Shapiro’s own presentation of the case is unthreatening, the case itself genuinely 
poses a non-question-begging objection to epistemicism, and therefore deserves addressing. 
 
5.3  Paradox: The Miners 
As a first pass, one might extract the following argument from Shapiro’s case.  In abbreviated 
notation:10 
The Forced Oughts Argument 
(1) If SUNNY, Ought(BALLGAME) 
(2) If ¬SUNNY, Ought(MOVIES) 
(3) SUNNY ∨ ¬SUNNY 
(5) Ought(BALLGAME) ∨ Ought(MOVIES) 
Forced Oughts reasoning contends that the epistemicist commitment to bivalence about the 
weather forces one option to be required.11  Yet comparison with the Miners Paradox quickly 
casts doubt on this claim.   
 The Miners case goes as follows.12  Ten miners are trapped either in shaft A or in shaft B, but 
we do not know where.  Water threatens to flood the shafts.  We have enough sandbags to block 
                                                     
can, however imperfectly.)  In contrast, there is no optional choice in Shapiro’s case analogous to hedging 
(what would it be to only sort of go to the ballgame?); hence no easy deflationary response is available. 
10 A general note about terminology.  Throughout the paper I shall use the following notions 
interchangeably: should / ought / required / obligated / mandated and vague / borderline / unclear. 
11 Here, the difference in choice of presentation seems to me unobjectionable, since Shapiro nevertheless 
appears to think the epistemicist is committed to the soundness of the Forced Oughts argument (see quote 
above). 
12 The example is from Derek Parfit (unpublished), who credits Donald Regan (1980: 265 n.1). 
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one shaft but not both.  If one shaft is blocked, the other will be completely flooded, killing every 
miner inside.  If neither shaft is blocked, both will be partially flooded, killing one miner. 
   Action   If miners in A  If miners in B  
   Block shaft A  All saved  All drowned 
   Block shaft B  All drowned  All saved 
   Block neither shaft One drowned  One drowned  
Lacking knowledge of the miners’ exact whereabouts, it seems right to say 
(9) We ought to block neither shaft 
However, we accept both 
(10) If the miners are in shaft A, we ought to block shaft A 
(11) If the miners are in shaft B, we ought to block shaft B 
And we know 
(12) Either the miners are in shaft A or they are in shaft B 
But (10)-(12) seem to entail 
(13) Either we ought to block shaft A or we ought to block shaft B 
which contradicts (9).  Paradox ensues. 
 A detailed discussion of the various solutions to the Miners Paradox is unnecessary here.  I 
limit myself to two observations.  First, arguably the most viable strategy for dissolving the 
paradox is to show why premises (10)-(12) are not jointly sufficient to derive the paradoxical 
conclusion (13) (see Kolodny & MacFarlane 2010, Willer 2012).13  The inference is invalid 
                                                     
13 Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane (2010) reject modus ponens to block the inference.  Malte Willer 
(2012) blames disjunction elimination (or what I call constructive dilemma).   
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despite initial appearances.  Second, the paradoxical inference in the miners case (reproduced 
below) shares the same logical form as the derivation of unknowable obligations in Shapiro’s 
weather case.  Both arguments are instances of constructive dilemma featuring statements of 
conditional obligation as premises. 
  The Miners Argument   
  (10) If IN A, Ought(BLOCK A) 
 (11) If IN B, Ought(BLOCK B)  
 (12) IN A ∨ IN B     
(13) Ought(BLOCK A) ∨ Ought(BLOCK B)  
Critics like Shapiro accuse epistemicism for licensing the Forced Oughts argument.  Yet this is 
structurally identical to the Miners argument, whose failure we should already anticipate.  Thus 
there is strong reason to believe the Forced Oughts argument fails too.  Its conclusion—contrary 
to criticism—cannot follow simply from the epistemicist’s commitment to (1)-(3). 
 What blocks the inference?  Is an epistemicist committed to additional premises that would 
license it, or something equally bad, after all?  I take up these questions in the next two sections. 
 
5.4  Permissibility: epistemic explanations 
I propose that failure of Forced Oughts reasoning is to be explained in epistemic terms.  Again, 
comparison with the Miners Paradox is instructive.   
 The miners case demonstrates how deontic facts exhibit sensitivity to one’s epistemic 
situation.  Ignorance can be obligation-defeating in the following sense.  If we knew which shaft 
the miners were in, we would be obligated to block that shaft.  But as it is, we do not know, so no 
such requirement is in place; rather, our ignorance mandates blocking neither shaft. 
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 The Miners premises capture this situation.  Conditional obligation statements (10)-(11) 
merely express what would be required of us if we came to know the information given by the 
antecedent.  Learning that information, either by being told of the miners’ exact whereabouts or 
perhaps discovering it ourselves, would cause one of those obligations to become actual.  But 
what is required of us now in our current state of ignorance is to block neither, as given by (9).14  
Our ignorance concerning the antecedent conditions of (10)-(11) serves to explain why neither 
action is mandated: we should not act as if we knew when we don’t.  Such ignorance is consistent 
with knowing (12): although we know that they are in one place or the other, we nevertheless do 
not know which. 
 This is why we know that the Miners argument fails well in advance of arriving at any 
particular solution to the Miners Paradox.  We already find its conclusion (13) to be paradoxical 
prior to any substantive theorizing, because it contradicts (9) in the initial setup of the problem. 
 A parallel explanation awaits the Forced Oughts argument.  Clarity in the weather would 
dictate which family outing is required, ballgame or movies.  But when the skies are unclear, 
permission prevails: the father is not obligated to choose one over the other.  This is because it is 
only borderline sunny outside, and the consequences of his promises are contingent upon the 
weather.   
 Here too, ignorance is obligation-defeating.  Knowing the state of the weather would allow 
the family to know what they should do.  But as it is, the weather is vague and, according to the 
epistemicist account, therefore unknowable.  This ignorance serves to explain why neither 
                                                     
14 Nothing significant turns on the fact that (9) is stated in the first person.  Any omniscient third-party 
observer who does know the whereabouts of the miners (but does not communicate this information), when 
reporting on the situation, would agree that the agent should endorse (9), so long as he remains in the same 
epistemic situation. 
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activity is mandated.  On this picture, the deontic facts still exhibit sensitivity to one’s epistemic 
situation—epistemicism merely predicts that one’s epistemic situation is worse off due to the 
vague state of one’s environment. 
 The Forced Oughts premises capture this situation.  Conditional obligation statements (1)-(2) 
merely express what the father should do if the antecedent were known to be true.  But his 
ignorance of the facts—a consequence of the vague weather—prevents the relevant requirements 
from taking effect.  What is required of him at present (if anything) is to simply choose one—
even though neither activity is individually mandated, as stated by (6).  Such ignorance is 
consistent with (3): there may be a fact of the matter about the weather, it simply remains 
unknowable.  Thus the epistemicist commitment to bivalence—there being a truth or fact of the 
matter—is innocuous here. 
  In this way, we are able to recognize that the Forced Oughts argument, although apparently 
compelling, must ultimately fail.  For we recognize that its conclusion (5) contradicts the 
permissibilist claim (6).15 
                                                     
15 Other diagnoses of the Miners Paradox are available for appropriation.  An obvious alternative is to deny 
the joint truth of the conditional premises (10)-(11) in the Miners argument, on grounds that neither shaft 
should be blocked, wherever the miners are (i.e. given (9) and (12), exactly one of the conditionals must be 
false—corresponding to whichever shaft the miners are in).  One can likewise deny the joint truth of the 
conditional Forced Oughts premises (1)-(2), on grounds that neither action is mandated, whatever the 
weather is.   
 Another strategy is to deny that obligation must always be information-sensitive: perhaps the oughts in 
(10)-(11) express an “objective” notion (e.g. being the overall best course of action), in which case the 
conclusion of the Miners argument is unparadoxical.  One can likewise insist that the Forced Oughts 
argument employs an information-insensitive notion of ought (e.g. acting in accordance with one’s 
promises); failure of epistemic transparency will then be unproblematic.   
 I leave aside other solutions to the Miners (see Kolodny and MacFarlane 2010 for details).  I expect 
that, whatever one ends up saying about the Miners situation, a similar response may be made about 
Shapiro’s case, given the structural similarity of the two.  The present paper details merely one such 
response. 
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 The epistemicist is entitled to deny (5) too.  At least nothing in the epistemicist account 
considered so far suggests otherwise.  Better yet, he can affirm (6).  He simply needs to give an 
epistemic explanation, roughly of the form above, of how ignorance of the relevant facts defeats 
the relevant obligations.  Fortunately for him, his very theory entitles him to that explanation by 
securing the link between vagueness and ignorance.  It seems that epistemicists can make room 
for permissibilist intuitions after all.  The situation is essentially the same as with the Miners: 
ignorance is obligation-defeating.    
 Although not entirely the same.  One disanalogy is worth flagging.  In the miners case, the 
agent should perform neither action, whereas in the weather case, the father should perform one.16  
Fair enough.  But the point of the present analogy is simply to highlight one key similarity 
between the two cases: ignorance has the deontic consequence of defeating obligations that would 
otherwise obtain under different epistemic circumstances.  Why ignorance should have other 
deontic consequences beyond that requires further substantive moral theorizing. 
 
5.5  Proof: unknowable obligations 
One may suspect the epistemicist of being secretly committed to principles that ultimately 
commit him to (5).   
                                                     
16 Does the requirement to do something, rather than nothing, not mean that some thing—a single option—
is required after all?  No.  Obligation can fail to distribute over disjunction, as when one must decide 
between choices, neither of which is mandated.  Charlie is told to eat his vegetables, and given a choice 
between peas or carrots.  Neither is individually required.  Nevertheless he must choose one.  At any rate, 
such worries properly concern the permissibilist claim that “Either is okay, but he must do one”, rather than 
the epistemicist’s commitment to bivalence.  
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 To illustrate, here are some principles it seems an epistemicist may happily endorse:17 
  CLOSURE  If Φ entails Ψ, then: if clearly Φ then clearly Ψ  
  CONTRAPOSITION ‘If ϕ, ψ’ entails ‘If ¬ψ, ¬ϕ’ 
where what is clear is definite, not vague (in the relevant epistemicist sense).  If vagueness and 
clarity are to be understood in epistemic terms of ignorance and knowledge, as epistemicists 
would have it, then those who have no qualms about epistemic closure will readily accept 
CLOSURE.  The epistemicist’s commitment to classical logic also commits him to 
CONTRAPOSITION, assuming a material conditional reading of if.   
 Yet these principles, together with some of the original premises in Shapiro’s weather case, 
spell trouble.  To see why, let us reconsider the conditional obligation expressed by the father’s 
first conditional promise: 
 (1) If it is sunny, we ought to go to the ballgame 
This seems not just true but clearly true.  For, although the antecedent admits of borderline cases 
(and perhaps the consequent as well, as we shall see), the statement as a whole should hardly 
count as vague.  After all, nothing in how the father makes the promise is vague; he speaks quite 
clearly and unambiguously when asserting it, without hedging or hesitation.  At least it does not 
hurt to assume this.  But then we may reason by way of closure and contraposition: 
(14) a. Clearly(If SUNNY, Ought(BALLGAME))  by the clear truth of (1) 
b. Clearly(If ¬Ought(BALLGAME), ¬SUNNY) by CLOSURE, CONTRAPOSITION 
c. If Clearly(¬Ought(BALLGAME)), Clearly(¬SUNNY) by CLOSURE 
                                                     
17 Williamson himself accepts modified versions of these two principles.  See Williamson 1994: esp. §§5.3, 
8.2, 8.5. 
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d. If ¬Clearly(¬SUNNY), ¬Clearly(¬Ought(BALLGAME))   by CONTRAPOSITION 
Now consider the converse of (1): 
 (1&) If we ought to go to the ballgame, it is sunny 
This seems true, since if his obligation really is to bring his kids to the game, this can only be 
because things are in accordance with his first promise, and it is sunny outside.  Nothing vague 
lurks here, so we may safely assume (1&) is not just true but clearly true.  Then reasoning by way 
of closure and contraposition gives us: 
(15) a. Clearly(If Ought(BALLGAME), SUNNY)   by the clear truth of (1!) 
b. If Clearly(Ought(BALLGAME)), Clearly(SUNNY)  by CLOSURE 
c. If ¬Clearly(SUNNY), ¬Clearly(Ought(BALLGAME)) by CONTRAPOSITION 
The antecedents of (15c) and (14d) say that it is neither clearly sunny nor clearly not sunny—or 
simply, it is borderline sunny.  The consequents of (15c) and (14d) say that the ballgame option is 
neither clearly mandated nor clearly not mandated—or simply, it is borderline mandated.   
Consolidating (14)-(15), a second argument for unknowable obligations emerges from 
Shapiro’s case. 
(16) The Vague Oughts Argument 
a. Clearly(If SUNNY, Ought(BALLGAME)) 
b. Clearly(If Ought(BALLGAME), SUNNY) 
c. Vague(SUNNY)      
d. Vague(Ought(BALLGAME)) 
A parallel argument begins with the clear truth of (2) and its converse, and proceeds to derive the 
result that the movie option is also borderline mandated.   
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 Vague Oughts reasoning contends that vagueness about the weather makes each option 
vaguely required, such that one cannot know what is required, on the epistemicist assumption that 
vagueness entails ignorance.18  The father is in a sort of double bind.  He is vaguely obligated to 
take his kids to the ballgame, because it is vaguely sunny.  But he is also vaguely obligated to 
take his kids to the movies, because it is vaguely not sunny.  On the epistemicist account, since 
bivalence is preserved, there is a fact of the matter what he is obligated to do—it is simply 
unknowable.19   
 Poor man—to be potentially stuck with contrary obligations, each vague!  One cannot do 
everything at once.  Yet it appears that vagueness in the weather has somehow made the deontic 
situation vague too—all a result of making a couple of careless promises, though through no fault 
of his own (the weather is rather to blame).  Such vagueness, uncontained, threatens to spread to 
the very keeping or shirking of those obligations (should any exist).  This poses unsettling 
consequences.  Suppose the father does not do what he should.  Then whichever he fails to do, he 
will only count either as flouting an obligation which was vague to begin with or as vaguely 
breaking his promise—hardly an excuse for neglected duties.  Alternatively, suppose he acts as he 
should.  Then whichever he succeeds in doing, he only counts either as fulfilling an obligation 
which was vague to begin with or as vaguely keeping his promise—hardly a vindication of dutiful 
action.  Both these possibilities fly in the face of the permissibilist intuition that neither option—
                                                     
18 By the locution x is vaguely F, I mean it is vague whether x is F, which is consistent with x is not F.  
Hence it does not follow from something’s being vaguely obligated that it is obligated, but only vaguely. 
19 Perhaps neither is mandated, though this fact would be vague and hence unknowable.  This possibility 
differentiates the current argument from the original weather argument, according to which (on one reading 
of the example) it is mandatory to do at least one of the two options, ballgame or movies.  See also n.20. 
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ballgame or movies—is mandated, not even vaguely.20  What has gone wrong?  The next section 
describes a way out for the epistemicist. 
 
5.6  Proposal: non-classical norms 
Taking seriously the analogy with the miners case again offers a solution.  Arguably, any viable 
solution to the Miners Paradox must reject modus tollens.  This can be seen by considering a 
simpler paradoxical argument which Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) present about the miners: 
(17) The Simple Miners Argument 
a. If the miners are in shaft A, we ought to block shaft A 
b. It is not the case that we ought to block shaft A 
c. The miners are not in shaft A 
where (17a) is simply premise (10) in the original miners argument and (17b) is entailed by our 
original premise (9).  Yet concluding (17c) is unjustified: assessment of our deontic situation 
should not allow us to deduce the miners’ location.  Rejecting modus tollens is required to block 
the simple miners argument.  Theorists who accept the premises of the original miners argument 
thereby incur the responsibility of explaining why modus tollens fails.  It should be unsurprising 
                                                     
20 Granted, being vaguely obligated to do one thing is (we may concede) compatible with being allowed to 
do otherwise (see n.18).  For it is arguably fallacious to think vagueness precludes truth or falsity (see 
Wright 2003).  If so, the presence of vague obligations is strictly speaking compatible with the 
permissibilist assumption (6).  Such a combination of claims nonetheless remains unattractive to all.  The 
epistemicist would be forced to conclude, implausibly, that although the father is free to do either, this itself 
is unknowable.  Otherwise, knowing this would entail knowing that neither option is individually mandated 
(assuming epistemic closure and the duality of permission and obligation)—contrary to its being vague and 
hence unknowable of each whether it is obligated.  Nor can the semantic permissibilist (see §7) accept the 
Vague Oughts conclusion (16d), since this would allow the relevant requirements to be arbitrarily settled—
contrary to our assumption (6) that the matter is already settled since neither option is mandated.  I presume 
our permissibility intuitions are strong enough to warrant strengthening (6) to be not just true but clearly 
true.  Thanks to Jeff Snapper for pressing this point. 
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that failure of modus tollens should translate into failure for the closely related inference rule of 
contraposition.  Indeed, both rules fail on the semantics proposed by Kolodny and MacFarlane 
(2010) and Willer (2012) in their solutions to the Miners Paradox.21 
 This leaves us with a conditional that does not contrapose or license modus tollens.  Such is 
the nature of statements expressing conditional obligations.  This is at least an alleged lesson of 
the Miners Paradox.  We have, I am suggesting, equal reason to believe this about cases like 
Shapiro’s involving conditional obligations with vague antecedents.22   
                                                     
21 Willer (2012) and Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) give competing explanations of why modus tollens 
fails.  And although contraposition goes unmentioned in their discussions, they would agree this fails too, 
though disagree in the details.  Consider the canonical proof for contraposition. 
1 |  If φ, ψ     
2 |    |  ¬(If ¬ψ, ¬φ)    assume for reductio 
3 |    |    ¬ψ   E, 2 
4 |    |     ¬¬φ   E, 2 
5 |    |     φ   ¬¬E, 4 
6 |    |     ψ   MP, 1, 5 
7 |    |     ⊥   ⊥I, 1, 5 
8 |  If ¬ψ, ¬φ   reductio, 2-7 
Both accounts would object to line 6, but for different reasons.  Kolodny and MacFarlane would object to 
the use of modus ponens—presumably because modus ponens only delivers information about what 
happens in φ-shifted information states; it fails to say what follows given the current unshifted information 
state.  Whereas Willer would object to importing line 1 within the subproof—presumably for reasons of 
nonmonotonicity: the truth of ‘if φ, ψ’ fails to be preserved under the additional assumption of ¬(if 
¬ψ,¬φ). 
22 Whether the epistemicist must surrender classical logic and semantics depends on the details of the 
analysis for if.  It is at any rate not obvious why this should be so bad a result.  Efforts to relax traditional 
epistemicist assumptions are not unprecedented, however much these are in the minority.  Hybrid 
epistemicist accounts that combine epistemic and semantic approaches have been proposed by Goguen 
(1969), Koons (1994), Graff (2000), Barker (2002), Raffman (2005), MacFarlane (2010), Akerman & 
Greenough (2010). 
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 Rejecting contraposition blocks the derivation of vague obligations.23  More exactly: the use 
of CONTRAPOSITION in (14b) is dubious. (I shall set aside the occurrences of contraposition 
elsewhere, as I think the problem can be isolated here.24)  That is because (1) does not entail its 
contrapositive.  Although it is true that sunny weather mandates going to the game, it is not true 
that the absence of that mandate means the weather is not sunny.  After all, the father is not 
required to take his kids to the game, but recognizing that fact does not somehow enable us to 
deduce facts about the weather.  
 Rejecting modus tollens invalidates the analogue of the simple miners argument: 
(18) The Simple Weather Argument 
a. If it is sunny, we ought to go to the ballgame 
b. It is not the case that we ought to go to the ballgame 
c. It is not sunny 
where (18a) is simply premise (1) in the original weather argument and (18b) is entailed by the 
original permissibilist claim (6).  The argument is unacceptable.  Surely, concluding (18c) is 
unjustified: acknowledging the father’s free choice should not allow us to deduce facts about the 
                                                     
23 An alternative derivation applies modus tollens to (14c) and (15b), together with (3), to deliver the 
paradoxical result of vague obligations.  However, this fails to show that contraposition is inessential to the 
proof.  For it is hard to see how to get (14c)—which, considered alone, is already implausible—without 
first deriving it from (14b), which is in turn gotten from the objectionable rule of contraposition (or so I 
complain). 
24 The other occurrences of contraposition in (14d) and (15c) appear unproblematic for the following 
reasons. 
 If clearly neither option is mandated (as I claim; see n.20), then the ballgame option is clearly not 
mandated; so the antecedent of (14c) is true and the consequent of (14d) is false.  But since the weather is 
vague (in particular, it is not clear that it is not sunny), the consequent of (14c) is false and the antecedent 
of (14d) is true.  Hence (14c) and (14d) are both classically false.  This makes the inference from (14c) to 
(14d) unproblematic, even if valid. 
 Similarly, since neither option (including going to the ballgame) is clearly mandated, the antecedent of 
(15b) is false and the consequent of (15c) is true.  And since the weather is vague (in particular, it is not 
clear that it is sunny), the consequent of (15b) is false and the antecedent of (15c) is true.  Hence (15b) and 
(15c) are both classically true.  This makes the inference from (15b) to (15c) unproblematic, even if valid.   
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weather.  It appears that both simple miners-type reasoning and simple weather-type reasoning 
rely solely upon modus tollens, so the culprit is obvious: it is modus tollens we should get rid of 
(or otherwise restrict). 
 
5.7  Parity: semantic vs. epistemic permissibilism  
We have seen how the epistemicist can make room for permissibility intuitions, provided an 
appropriate, independently motivated logic for deontic conditionals.  Freed of inference rules like 
constructive dilemma and contraposition, he can avoid commitments to the otherwise troubling 
results of forced or vague obligations.   
 This undercuts Shapiro’s motivation for moving away from traditional theories of vagueness 
like epistemicism.25  The alternative he favors is a kind of semantic permissibilism on which, as a 
constitutive feature of their vagueness, the meanings of vague terms exhibit an element of “open 
texture”: competent speakers are generally free to judge either way in vague matters.26  Such 
semantic permissibilism about vagueness is not the only way to secure “no forced choice” 
predictions like (6).  Epistemicism can too.  It would seem the two sorts of theories are on par 
                                                     
25 “Traditional” in the sense of old (in contrast e.g. with the more recent upsurge of contextualist 
approaches).  One may worry the reply undercuts traditional motivations for epistemicism too—namely, 
the preservation of classical logic and semantics in their entirety, including the classically valid inferences 
of constructive dilemma, modus tollens, and contraposition.  This is worrisome insofar as one follows 
Williamson—whose own defense of bivalence employs these very such rules—in taking this to be the 
driving motivation for epistemicism.  But Williamson’s way of motivating epistemicism is not the only 
way.  Realist intuitions in vague matters (“there is a fact of the matter, whether we know it or not”) are 
enough to offer direct support for the view, without detouring through classical inferences.  Nor is 
Williamson’s version of epistemicism the only version (see n.22).  As pointed out earlier, the reply 
developed here is meant for the epistemicist who does not already subscribe to Williamson’s other views 
on assertion (see n.5).  I wish to explore these points in a future paper. 
26 Defenders include Waisman (1968), Kamp (1981), Sainsbury (1990), Soames (1999), Kyburg & 
Morreau (2000), Wright (2001), Shapiro (2006), Akerman & Greenough (2009), Gaifman (2010). 
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with regard to predictive power.  Their differences, I suggest, nevertheless lie in competing 
explanations for this fact. 
 The epistemicist, I have argued, should say that the father’s ignorance allows him to do either 
without fault.  In deciding, however, he does not thereby come to fulfill either of his original 
conditional promises.  For which would it be?  He would not know which has been satisfied, 
since the weather remains unknowable.  Rather, what gets fulfilled, if anything, is the further, 
tacitly implied (or perhaps implicated) promise that he and the children will do one or the other.27   
 The semantic permissibilist, I suspect, will offer a competing line of thought.28  The father is 
free to choose, but only by arbitrarily settling upon a decision about the weather: sunny or not?  
Recall that the semantic permissibilist’s claim of free choice applies to the weather, not to the 
promised action—for it is the weather, not his obligations, that are vague.  Upon choosing, he 
thereby decides which of the two original conditional promises gets to be kept.  Saying it is sunny 
means they must go to the ballgame; saying otherwise means the movies.  Either way, a decision 
has the effect of reimposing one of the conditional obligations.  Otherwise, the father could 
legitimately say, for instance, “We’ll say it’s sunny, but let’s go to the movies anyways”—which 
is to go back on his first promise. 
                                                     
27 Stewart Shapiro (in private communication) has clarified that the intended reading of his example did not 
involve any such promise.  Nothing in the setup, however, is essentially altered by including it.  Filling in 
the details of the example makes this salient.  The father might, for instance, explicitly say they’ll do one or 
the other, where the weather is simply a useful heuristic to help them randomly decide.  Alternatively, he 
might promise a ballgame outing as a first option in case of sunny weather, then promise a movie as a 
backup option in case of non-sunny weather.  Regardless, there seems at least to be an implicature that they 
will do something fun, where this is limited to two options.  This would explain why the father is at fault 
should he fail to do anything fun, and why he remains at fault (perhaps to a lesser degree) should he pursue 
some fun activity other than a ballgame or movie, in the case of vague weather. (Although nothing 
substantial should rest on this.) 
28 Notably, Shapiro’s own line of thought (2006:82-3). 
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 What better explains (6)?  Is the father exempt from mandated choice because it is unknown 
which conditions of his promises have been satisfied, or because these are easily and arbitrarily 
decided?  The epistemicist’s explanation seems to win out on the score of plausibility.29  To claim 
that the father and his children cannot simply choose an outing and leave the weather undecided, 
but must rather first settle on a decision about the weather—sunny or not—in order to remain 
faultless in their quest for family fun, is nothing short of incredible.  One decides what to do by 
deciding to do it, not by deciding the weather. 
 
5.8  Pairings: epistemic open texture 
My partial defense of epistemicism is non-committal about any “open texture” thesis about the 
alleged flexibility of vague words.  The present point is simply that no such assumption of open 
texture needs to be made in order to make sense of Shapiro’s case.  Indeed, the semantic 
permissibilist’s insistence that the father, in order to remain blameless, must exploit the open 
texture of ‘sunny’ by first declaring the state of the weather before acting is objectionable.   
 That said, nothing said so far precludes the epistemicist from endorsing limited claims of 
open texture, while denying that these are constitutively characteristic of vagueness (which for 
him is fundamentally epistemic, not semantic, in nature).  He may allow for the possibility of 
reimposing one of the conditional obligations, either by settling the facts about the weather (by 
fiat, as in “Let’s say it’s sunny”) or by repositioning one’s own epistemic situation with respect to 
                                                     
29 On other scores too—such as explaining why weather-type cases of conditional obligation are often best 
solved through compromise (taking the kids to a movie about baseball, like Angels in the Outfield) or 
explaining why vague matters of serious moral importance (not aborting a fetus if it is e.g. a person or past 
the point of viability) strongly appear not to admit of arbitrary decisions in settling the matter.  I wish to 
elaborate on these issues in a future paper. 
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the facts (perhaps by consulting weather experts who are better at judging whether the skies are 
sunny—if any such division of epistemic labor exists).30  In that case, stipulating or coming to 
know that it is sunny (or not sunny) would mandate choosing the ballgame (or movies) after all.  
Normative considerations of obligation and liability, previously rendered inert by ignorance, are 
reintroduced once the relevant obstacles to knowledge are removed.  Yet the nature of the 
explanations underlying these normative facts remains thoroughly epistemic throughout: it is 
ignorance that acquits and knowledge that commits. 
 One might dispute any such epistemicist endorsement of open texture, on grounds that 
committing to speak truthfully about vague matters would, according to epistemicism, require one 
to give a polar verdict of ‘F’ or ‘not F’ even in borderline cases—contrary to any open texture 
permission to judge borderline cases either way.  Recall argument (1*)–(4*) from §2 (reproduced 
below).  Assuming we promise to speak the truth when describing the weather: 
(19) The Modified Weather Argument 
a. If it is sunny, we ought to call the weather ‘sunny’ 
b. If it is not sunny, we ought to call the weather ‘not sunny’ 
c. Either it is sunny or it is not sunny 
d. Either we ought to call the weather ‘sunny’ or we ought to call it ‘not sunny’ 
                                                     
30 One might resist the idea of giving any such local resolutions, or “precisifications” as it were, to 
borderline cases, should he already believe the (however unfairly) strong thesis that any vagueness-related 
ignorance is impossible to remove, even partially, by making further stipulations or gaining more evidence. 
This, however—like so many other features unique to Williamson’s own peculiar brand of epistemicism—
is just another purely optional commitment for the epistemicist.  Although it is worth noting that 
Williamson himself admits a kind of open texture for partially defined predicates: stipulative completions 
of their meanings, he claims, are able to reverse the old truth-values of borderline cases, and thereby make 
precise what was formerly imprecise.  See Williamson 1997: 226. 
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The falsity of (19d) in the case of borderline sunny weather, given open texture, would appear to 
serve as a reductio of the epistemicist premise (19c), demonstrating that this unusual pairing of 
views—epistemicism with open texture—is incoherent after all. 
 Such reasoning, however, is invalid.  The diagnosis should be obvious, given the general line 
of argument I have pursued so far.  The conditional obligation to call an F ‘F’ (or to call a non-F 
‘not F’) is defeated by one’s ignorance of its Fness (or its non-Fness) when it is a borderline case.  
As with the weather and the miners arguments, (19) exemplifies invalid reasoning by constructive 
dilemma.31  Reasoning by modus tollens in (20) fails for analogous reasons:32 
(20) The Simple Modified Weather Argument 
a. If it is sunny, we ought to call the weather ‘sunny’ 
b. It is not the case that we ought to call the weather ‘sunny’ 
c. It is not sunny 
 In this way, epistemicism leaves room for individual discretion when applying vague 
predicates to borderline cases and acting accordingly.33  Epistemicism does predict that there are 
facts of the matter underlying all vague matters, but these facts, I hope to have shown, are (at 
least oftentimes) normatively inert.  Whether they must remain so is an open question.  Just as the 
presence of vagueness is not without normative consequences, neither should the removal of 
                                                     
31 Disanalogies persist.  Unlike the miners case, one needn’t (given open texture) refrain from either choice.  
Unlike Shapiro’s case, one also needn’t call it one or the other (unless forced to, as in a “forced march” 
Sorites). 
32 Alternatively, an epistemicist unsympathetic to open texture, like Williamson, may dismiss (19) and (20) 
as question-beggingly assuming the truth of something (i.e. open texture) already incompatible with the 
target view.  
33 Soames (2012) in effect disputes this claim within legal contexts, on grounds that epistemicism leaves no 
room for individual judiciary discretion over interpreting vague statutes of the law when deciding the legal 
status of borderline cases.  I leave it an open question as to whether epistemicism is objectionable on these 
other grounds. 
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vagueness be automatically regarded as normatively inconsequential: removing epistemic 
obstacles deriving from vagueness can alter one’s normative situation.  That someone might 
achieve this effect by exploiting the “open texture” nature of vague terms is, for all that has been 
said, compatible with the epistemicist account. 
 In the following chapter, I develop a theory of vagueness-related reasoning with deontic 
conditionals, according to which the Forced Oughts, Vague Oughts, Simple Weather, Modified 
Weather, and Simple Modified Weather arguments are all deductively invalid but nonetheless 
defeasibly valid. The resulting account will exploit certain features of normative reasoning about 
vagueness already explored here, including the epistemic construal of open texture, in order to 
provide a proper diagnosis of the sorites paradox. This will demonstrate just how much a 
permissibilist version of epistemicism can achieve. 
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Chapter 6: Defeasible Tolerance and the Sorites 
 
6.1  Worries for contextualism 
Consider a series of 1,000 men, each with just slightly more hair on his head than the man before 
him, the first of which is Patrick Stewart who is completely bald, the last of which is Howard 
Stern who is completely hairy.  Standard sorites reasoning attempts to take us from the reasonable 
judgment that Patrick Stewart is bald to the unreasonable conclusion that Howard Stern is also 
bald, by way of the inductive principle: 
(1) For each n < 1,000: if #n is bald, then #n+1 is bald 
or, alternatively, by way of a “step-by-step” sorites argument that does not invoke a single 
inductive premise but rather lists out its individual instances: 
(2) #1 is bald 
If #1 is bald, #2 is bald 
If #2 is bald, #3 is bald 
Etc. 
If #999 is bald, #1,000 is bald 
#1,000 is bald 
Both (1) and its instances in (2) are independently motivated by the alleged tolerance of vague 
predicates like ‘bald’: comparing any two adjacent #n and #n+1 in our series, if I judge that #n is 
bald, I cannot go on to judge that #n+1 is not bald, given that the two differ only slightly in hair 
number. 
 Contextualists maintain that sorites contradiction can be avoided without jettisoning our 
tolerance intuitions.  Instances of the inductive premise can be true when relativized to 
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appropriate contexts.  Sorites reasoning then relies crucially upon deploying each conditional in a 
context in which it is true—be this the shared conversational scoreboard (Shapiro 2006), a 
relevant set of speaker-relative interests (Fara 2000), mutual agreements or stipulations (Soames 
1999), an individual’s internal psychological state (Raffman 1994), or salient background 
information (Kamp 1981).  There is no way, however, of fixing or otherwise coordinating the 
contexts of evaluation to make this possible; vagueness removes any guarantee for stability of 
context.  Contextual variation thus prevents us from carrying such reasoning all the way through 
to absurdity.  Sorites reasoning must ultimately fail, however compelling each step of it may be.1   
 Contextualist solutions face the following worry.  They all seem to predict failure of sorites 
reasoning relatively late in the sorites series, toward the last few borderline cases of baldness 
where people start to definitely not look bald—presumably, because this is where the subject’s 
judgments are clearly mistaken, should he continue to extend his use of ‘bald’ as required by 
tolerance and begin applying it to those who count as not being bald in any context.  But 
intuitively, sorites reasoning starts to look suspicious well before the end of the borderline range.  
Yet no existing contextualist account ventures to explain why.   
 I shall lay out and develop an alternative view—really, an instance of an alternative kind of 
view—which I shall argue better accounts for our unease when reasoning through a sorites series.  
Doing so involves formulating sorites conditionals in a way that properly expresses the deontic 
content of tolerance principles—something left out of formulations like (1) and (2), which, as we 
shall see, fail to adequately capture the sort of reasoning actually deployed when deliberating how 
far to extend a vague predicate through a sorites series.  This makes room for more than one type 
                                                     
1 Even in a “forced march” scenario (see §6), where one is forced to make a judgment about each #n—bald 
or not—sorites reasoning must give out: one will “jump” and start calling things not-bald before the end of 
the series.  
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of tolerance.  Properly accounting for the failure of sorites reasoning, in turn, requires 
differentiating among these options.   
 This undercuts the chief motivation behind contextualist theories, whose preservation of 
tolerance is an alleged major advantage over competitor theories, including standard 
supervaluationist treatments.  Even if contextualists succeed in this respect, this achievement is 
not unique to contextualism: viable alternatives exist.  Indeed, existing contextualist theories are 
to be found wanting in two critical respects concerning the very phenomena they purport to 
explain: one, they leave certain facts about the phenomenology of sorites reasoning unaccounted 
for, and two, they fail to distinguish between different types of tolerance.  My account, I propose, 
does better on both scores, by fitting sorites reasoning within the framework of a nonmonotonic 
deontic logic, without appeal to any contextual relativization of evaluation.  The general lesson 
that will emerge, if I am correct, is that contextualist accounts are generally right in maintaining 
that sorites reasoning should be rejected without faulting tolerance, but wrong in how they 
implement this idea. 
 
6.2  Tolerance principles 
Various constraints guide our use of vague predicates.  Among the relatively uncontested are: 
recognizing clear cases for what they are (Patrick Stewart counts as ‘bald’ by anyone’s lights), 
and not what they aren’t (by nobody’s lights does Howard Stern count as ‘bald’ or Patrick 
Stewart as ‘hairy’); maintaining consistency in one’s judgments, either about a single case (not 
calling someone both ‘bald’ and ‘not bald’) or across cases (whatever standard is in place for 
‘bald’, anyone in the same hair situation as or balder than someone who meets the standard 
himself meets the standard); coordinating one’s standards of evaluation when using related 
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predicates (whatever the standards are for ‘bald’ and ‘hairy’, nothing can meet both, although 
quite plausibly some things also meet neither).  Applied to our series for ‘bald’, the relevant 
constraints entail, for 0 < n < 1,000:2 
CLEAR CASES For some k, #k is clearly bald (not-bald, hairy) 
CLEAR CALL If #n is clearly bald (not-bald), one should call #n bald (not-bald) 
CLEAR SANCTION If #n is clearly bald (not-bald), one should not call #n not-bald 
(bald)3 
 CONTRAST  If one calls #n bald (hairy), he should call #n not-hairy (not-bald) 
 MONOTONICITY For n ≥ k, if one calls #n bald, he should call #k bald 
More controversial are so-called constraints of tolerance.  The alleged tolerance of vague 
predicates is generally understood to be a feature of our judgments: a constraint on the way those 
predicates may be used.  Take Crispin Wright’s classic definition: 
“F is tolerant with respect to φ if there is also some positive degree of change in respect of φ 
insufficient ever to affect the justice with which F is applied to a particular case.” (Wright 
1975:334, my emphasis) 
On one widespread understanding, tolerance is the constraint that marginal differences between 
two cases in the relevant parameter of application never allow for differential verdicts.  Suppose a 
subject is led through our sorites series.  For any pair of adjacent men in the series he is presented 
                                                     
2 These are left stated in their ordinary English formulations, open to further refinement on each individual 
theory (e.g. by adding contextual parameters).  Given that these principles, properly understood, are 
supposed to be exceptionless, I see no reason to analyze them as making generic conditional claims, but 
shall save the notion of exception-allowing generic implication for more controversial constraints, such as 
tolerance, below.  Here, I shall simply assume that the standard material conditional reading of if in these 
principles is unproblematic. 
3 This is redundant and follows from CLEAR CALL, on the assumption that Op and O¬p are contradictory 
(see §3). 
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with, if he judges that one is bald, he is thereby committed to judging that the next one is bald 
too. 
 Many have followed Wright in tying vagueness to the initial plausibility of tolerance.4  This 
includes nearly all contextualists about vagueness.  They maintain that tolerance principles 
govern our use of vague predicates, but contend that these principles are free of sorites-related 
contradictions, so long as the relevant judgments are relativized to appropriate contexts: 
contextual variation then explains how a subject who is led through a sorites series can retain 
consistency in his judgments without ever violating the relevant tolerance principles (Kamp 1981, 
Raffman 1994, Soames 1999, Fara 2000, Shapiro 2006).5  There may be circumstances in which 
                                                     
4 “Initial plausibility”, since Wright in fact disavows their tolerance, given the threat of contradiction—and 
with it, classical logic and a rule-based conception of meaning—though he thinks any adequate account 
should explain the allure of these things (see Wright 1987:§4).  In contrast, the current proposal (as well as 
most contextualist theories) promises to salvage all three features of vague predicates—their tolerance, 
coherence, and rule-based meaning—through less radical revision of classical logic and semantics. 
5 “[…] we must recognize an object as falling within the positive or negative extension of such a predicate 
if it is indistinguishable (in the relevant respect) from an object which has already been accepted as 
belonging there.” (Kamp 1981:243) 
 “There is […] no sharp division between objects that are clearly red and objects that aren’t (clearly red), 
people who are clearly rich and people who aren’t.  The vagueness of these predicates goes hand in hand 
with what Crispin Wright has aptly called their “tolerance”: they tolerate marginal changes in the 
parameters decisive of their application.” (Raffman 1994:41) 
“For any two patches of color x and y that are perceptually indistinguishable to competent speakers under 
normal conditions, if someone who is presented with x characterizes the predicate looks green as applying 
to it, then that person is thereby committed to a standard that counts the predicate as applying to y as well.” 
(Soames 1999:215)  
“[If] two men are pretty much the same height—one is just noticeably shorter than the other—then the 
option is not available to me to say that one is tall but the other is not.  Because the similarity of their 
heights is so perceptually salient—and now that you’ve asked me whether they’re tall, also 
conversationally somewhat salient—I may not choose a standard that one meets but the other doesn’t.” 
(Fara 2000:59) 
“Suppose that two objects a, a" in the field of P differ only marginally in the relevant respect (on which P is 
tolerant).  Then if one competently judges a to have P, then she cannot competently judge a" in any other 
manner.” (Shapiro 2006:14) 
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tolerance is no longer in force—as with Sainsbury’s paint shop owner who, in order to divide the 
reds from the oranges along a chromatically ordered line of paint jars, must choose an arbitrary 
cutoff point and label at least one pair of adjacent paints “red” and “orange”, though these are 
indistinguishable in color (Sainsbury 1990).  However, such examples notwithstanding, 
contextualists agree that tolerance remains in force in most circumstances of use for a good many 
paradigm cases of vague predicates, like “red”, “tall”, “bald” (see Shapiro 2006:9). 
 Tolerance is widely understood to be a semantic feature of vague predicates.  Tolerance 
principles embody semantic norms.  Compliance with these principles is part and parcel of 
semantic competence.  To flout tolerance is somehow to sin against language, betray semantic 
incompetence, violate linguistic convention, or use words in ways that offend against their 
meaning.  Alternatively, tolerance principles may be seen as encoding a type of epistemic rather 
than semantic norm, and their deontic content properly understood in epistemic or broadly 
psychological terms (Fara 2000; Raffman 1994, 1996).6  Regardless, tolerance principles are 
upheld by many, even by those who affirm its contradictory consequences.7 
                                                     
6 Alternative views prescribe treating tolerance as arising from both distinctively epistemic and 
distinctively semantic phenomena (Koons 1994); as involving both epistemic and semantic components, 
where these are inseparable features of the general psychology of vague language (Sorensen 2001); or as 
not reducing to any combination of epistemic or semantic factors, since vagueness is to be understood as 
sui generis (Barnett 2010). 
7 Incoherentists about tolerance claim that they commit us to sorites-type inconsistencies: full compliance 
with tolerance would issue in contradictory judgments (Sorensen 2001, Eklund 2002).  Nihilists about 
vagueness take this as grounds for denying the very coherence of vague predicates themselves, and not just 
their rules for use: either vague predicates are entirely empty in their application (Dummett 1975) or 
vagueness as traditionally conceived is simply impossible (Horgan 1994).  Both camps claim, nonetheless, 
that semantic competence requires being disposed to judge things in accordance with tolerance principles.  
Of course, plenty of perfectly competent speakers when led through a sorites series, in order to avoid 
contradiction, do not fully comply with tolerance, yet their semantic competence remains (on the face of it) 
fully intact.  If anything, a willingness to obey tolerance and make the contradictory judgments would show 
them to be semantic incompetent.  Thus the incoherentist must conclude that semantic competence requires 
both that certain judgment dispositions be in place and that those same dispositions never be completely 
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 Indeed, much of the language employed in articulating these principles is blatantly deontic.  It 
is said, for example, that when comparing two things that are indistinguishable or marginally 
different in the relevant respect, one who judges one to be F is constrained in how he may judge 
the other insofar as he: 
• “must recognize [it] as falling within the positive or negative extension” (Kamp 
1981:243) 
• “is thereby committed to a standard that counts the predicate as applying to [it] as well” 
(Soames 1999:215) 
• “may not choose a standard that one meets but the other doesn’t” (Fara 2000:59) 
• “cannot competently judge [it] in any other manner” (Shapiro 2006:14) 
Such uses of deontic concepts as these (italicized for emphasis) proliferate in glosses of tolerance. 
 Whatever their nature, the requirements of tolerance are conditional in form: they prescribe 
how one should judge the next thing if he has already judged the first of a pair of things that are 
only marginally different. 
 All this strongly suggests that the prescriptions given by tolerance, when properly articulated, 
take the general form of deontic conditionals.  An appropriate tolerance principle for, say, ‘bald’ 
should entail:8 
(3) For each n < 1,000: If one calls #n bald, then one should call #n+1 bald 
                                                     
given into.  Linguistic competence is on this view a sort of self-control: one must have, but never follow, 
his inclinations.  My view avoids this odd consequence by freeing tolerance of contradiction. 
8 Properly formulated, ‘bald’ should be encompassed in quotes, to indicate that tolerance directly concerns 
e.g. our use of the predicate ‘bald’, rather than facts about baldness.  For simplicity of exposition, however, 
I shall ignore conventions of mention vs. use and drop the quotes in what follows. 
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Thus an adequate semantics for ifs and oughts is desired if we are to express properly the 
requirements of tolerance in the object language.  Granted, the deontic content of tolerance 
conditionals rarely if ever gets explicitly expressed.  Standard formulations of tolerance principles 
tend to suppress any mention of “obligation”, “norm”, “competence” and the like—a regrettable 
if not odd fact, given that such deontic talk is liberally used to motivate these principles in the 
first place. 
 Against this trend, the view on offer makes explicit the deontic content of tolerance 
principles, in a way that properly captures their conditional form while rendering them free of 
sorites-type contradiction. Against contextualist approaches, I claim this can be done without 
relying upon contextual relativization of judgments.  The presentation shall remain neutral on 
whether the obligations in question are epistemic or semantic in nature, though I shall later offer 
some reasons for favoring the epistemic interpretation. 
 
6.3  Generic ifs and oughts 
I contend that a theory of conditional obligation, in which the underlying logic is nonmonotonic, 
can explain both the appeal and the paradox-free nature of tolerance principles governing our use 
of vague predicates that have motivated contextualist views.  The view I shall develop renders our 
tolerance intuitions intact and unproblematic, provided a notion of defeasible entailment that 
allows for conclusions to be overridden by further information.  Tolerance principles license 
inferences in the absence of contradictory information.  The failure of sorites arguments is then 
easily attributed to the failure of reasoning by tolerance, which, although defeasibly valid, cannot 
be sustained throughout the entire series.  Resolving the sorites in this way removes a core 
motivation behind contextualist theories—that of preserving tolerance by the relativization of 
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judgments to contexts.  The resulting account, I hope to show, does not face the problems 
suffered by competing contextualist accounts. 
 Classical deductive logic is monotonic in the sense that conclusions, once established, stay 
established.  Adding premises to a valid argument always produces another valid argument.  In 
nonmonotonic logic, however, adding a premise may make a valid argument an invalid one.  
Conclusions drawn in a nonmonotonic system are defeasible—licensed in ordinary circumstances 
but possibly surrendered in light of further information.  To make good on this idea, one needs a 
variable, decentered conditional.  There are a variety of ways to make this precise.  Here, I shall 
adopt Asher and Morreau’s (1991) nonmonotonic system of commonsense entailment (see also 
Morreau 1997).  They introduce a generic conditional, symbolized as >, with truth conditions 
  p > q is true at a world w iff q holds in all p-normal worlds relative to w 
and constraints 
 FACTICITY  p is true in all p-normal worlds 
 DISJUNCTION  (p∨q)-normal worlds are either p-normal or q-normal 
FACTICITY guarantees the truth of p > p.  DISJUNCTION secures ((p > r) & (q > r) → ((p ∨ q) > 
r).  The absence of any centering constraint allows for the possibility that w is not a p-normal 
world relative to itself.  This makes the generic weaker than the Lewis counterfactual, since the p-
normal worlds relative to w need not be the closest p-worlds to w.   
 How can we make precise the idea that some conclusions are reasonable even though their 
truth is not guaranteed?  The key idea (from Morreau 1997) is that some worlds are more regular 
than others, in the sense that they involve fewer exceptions to principles, or conflicts between 
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principles, than others.9  Here is Morreau’s definition.  Say that a world w is irregular with 
respect to p iff for some q, (p > q) ⊃ (p ⊃ q) is false at w (i.e. p > q and p are true, but q is false, 
so there is a modus ponens failure with respect to p). A world is regular with respect to p if it is 
not irregular with respect to p.  Notions of absolute, equal and comparative (ir)regularity are then 
defined in terms of relative irregularity. 
• world w is irregular simpliciter iff w is irregular with respect to some p 
• world w is as regular as w% with respect to p iff whenever w is irregular with respect to p, 
so is w% 
• world w is more regular (or less irregular) than w% with respect to p iff w is as regular as 
w% but not vice versa 
A counterexample to an argument is a world where the premises are true and the conclusion is 
false.  Say that a counterexample to an argument is unnecessarily irregular or gratuitous if it 
contains irregularities not required by the truth of the argument’s premises—that is, if there are 
worlds more regular than it in which the premises and conclusion are all true.  We shall call an 
argument deductively valid or valid if it has no counterexamples, and allowed or defeasibly valid 
if all counterexamples to it are gratuitous.  Defeasible validity is the weaker notion: all valid 
arguments are (vacuously) allowed, but not all allowed arguments are valid.  For any defeasibly 
valid argument, we say that its premises defeasibly imply or defeasibly entail its conclusion (or 
that the latter is a defeasible consequence of the former). 
                                                     
9 The account of defeasible entailment outlined below is informally presented in Morreau (1997) and 
developed by Bonevac (forthcoming). An alternative (though more complicated) treatment of defeasible 
validity may be found in Asher & Morreau’s (1991) original presentation of their theory of commensense 
entailment. This is summarized in Bonevac (1998:44); see also Asher & Bonevac (1996:§2). 
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 With these notions in place, let us now comment on several key features of the generic 
conditional.  
 I.  Default Detachment.  The generic > does not support modus ponens: p, (p > q) |/= q.  This 
is because p and p > q can fail to entail q, so long as the world of evaluation w is not p-normal 
relative to itself.  Nevertheless, modus ponens on > is defeasibly valid: p, (p > q) |≈ q, where ‘|≈’ 
represents defeasible entailment.  The reason is that any counterexample to the argument p, (p > 
q) ⇒ q would have to be unnecessarily irregular.  That is because for any counterexample 
demonstrating a failure of modus ponens on p > q, there will be a world where modus ponens 
survives, such that {p, p > q, q} are all true and moreover every generic consequence of p is true 
(i.e. any r is true if p > r is true). The model world will thus be more regular than any 
counterexample world, thereby making all counterexamples gratuitous. 
 II.  Defeated Detachment.  Detachment fails in particular when information incompatible 
with the conclusion is added to one’s starting premises: p, (p > q), ¬q |/= q.  The argument is not 
even defeasibly valid.  This is because no counterexample to the argument is gratuitous, since 
there can be no worlds that are more regular (indeed, no worlds at all) that make both its premises 
and conclusion true. 
 III.  Nixon Diamond.  Given the defeasibility of detachment, conclusions that would 
otherwise follow are suspended in Nixon Diamond situations, where conditional principles 
conflict but neither is stronger than the other.  It is generally true that Quakers are pacifists and 
that Republicans are not pacifists. Yet this is insufficient information to conclude anything about 
Nixon, who is both Quaker and Republican. Symbolically: {p > r, q > ¬r, p, q} entails neither r 
nor ¬r, not even defeasibly.  Consider the two arguments p > r, q > ¬r, p, q ⇒ r and p > r, q > ¬r, 
p, q ⇒ ¬r.  Any model for one (making all its premises and conclusion true) will be a 
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counterexample for the other, where neither is more regular than the other; so neither r nor ¬r is a 
defeasible consequence. 
 IV.  Generic Specificity.  We also want specific conditionals to take default precedence over 
less specific ones, so that {p > r, (p & q) > ¬r, p, q} |≈ ¬r, in order to validate Penguin Principle 
inferences:  
(4) Tweety is a bird   b  
Birds fly   b > f  
Penguins are birds  p  b  
Penguins don’t fly  p > ¬f  
Tweety is a penguin  p     
Tweety doesn’t fly  ¬f  
First observe that FACTICITY and DISJUNCTION allow more specific defaults to take precedence 
over less specific ones, which effectively allows us to derive the conclusion that birds aren’t 
normally penguins (b > ¬p).10  Now consider a counterexample to the Penguin Principle where 
{b, b > f, p  b, p > ¬f, p, f} are true.  This will exhibit a modus ponens failure on p.  By contrast, 
any model making both premises and conclusion true (i.e. all of {b, b > f, p  b, p > ¬f, p, ¬f}) 
will exhibit a modus ponens failure on b.  Yet this does not share the symmetry of the Nixon 
Diamond setup, because the counterexample involves an additional modus ponens failure on b—
                                                     
10 Proof.  Let p: Tweety is a penguin, b: Tweety is a bird, f: Tweety flies.  Assume FACTICITY and 
DISJUNCTION.  Further assume that p ⊆ b and *(w, p) ∩ *(w, b) = ∅, where *(w, ϕ) is the set of ϕ-normal 
worlds relative to w.  Since p ⊆ b, p ∩ b = p.  So b = p ∪ (b – p).  By DISJUNCTION, *(w, b) ⊆ *(w, p) ∪ 
*(w, b – p).  Because we have *(w, p) ∩ *(w, b) = ∅, we get *(w, b) ⊆ *(w, b – p).  But by FACTICITY, 
*(w, b – p) ⊆ b – p ⊆ ¬p.  It follows that *(w, b) ∩ p = ∅ (i.e. b > ¬p is true in w).  Hence, no penguins 
are normal birds; so it can’t be inferred that Tweety flies, since Tweety, being a penguin, counts as an 
abnormal bird.  It can be defeasibly inferred, however, that Tweety doesn’t fly, given *(w, p) ⊆ ¬f, on the 
assumption that Tweety is a normal penguin (see below). (Note: the symbolization, which should properly 
contain quantifiers, is simplified here.  I postpone the introduction of quantifiers for later; see note 25.) 
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since the premises already entail b > ¬p, provided FACTICITY and DISJUNCTION.  Both model 
and counterexample are therefore irregular with respect to b, but only the counterexample is 
irregular with respect to p as well.  The counterexample is thus gratuitous, and the argument is 
defeasibly valid. 
 For the purposes of formulating tolerance principles in a way that makes explicit their deontic 
content, I shall adopt the system of deontic logic developed in Asher and Bonevac (1996) and 
Bonevac (1998).  Building off Asher and Morreau’s system of commonsense entailment, their 
account represents obligation and weak permission with dual unary deontic operators O, P 
where11 
  Oφ is true at world w iff φ is true in all w’s ideal worlds 
  Pφ is true at world w iff φ is true in some of w’s ideal worlds 
The logic of O is classical in that true conflicts of obligation cannot arise: Op and O¬p are 
contradictory.  Asher and Bonevac have proposed analyzing statements of conditional obligation 
(Bonevac 1998) as well as certain species of prima facie obligation (Asher and Bonevac 1996) in 
terms of deontic generics.  These have the form p > Oq, with truth conditions 
  p > Oq is true at world w iff q holds in all ideals of p-normal worlds relative to w 
So analyzed, conditional obligation and prima facie obligation inherit all the nonmonotonic 
features of >. 
 V.  Duty Detachment.  Modus ponens on p > Oq is a special case of default detachment, and 
is therefore defeasible: if p is true, then q is normally obligatory; from p we can infer Oq in the 
                                                     
11 Weak permission, or the absence of obligation, licenses &E inferences (i.e. P(φ&ψ)∴P(φ))—but not ∨E 
inferences (i.e. P(φ∨ψ) ∴P(φ)).  Strong permission licenses ∨E but not &E.  See Asher & Bonevac (2005). 
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absence of intervening moral rules or considerations.  Additional contradictory information may 
require withdrawing that conclusion, as in the following situations. 
 VI.  Moral Exceptions.  Cases of moral exception block inferences made on otherwise 
reasonable moral principles: p, p > Oq, ¬q |/= q. 
 VII.  Deontic Conflict.  It follows from the defeasibility of deontic detachment that, in cases 
of moral conflict (or deontic conflict more generally) where p, p > Oq, r and r > O¬q all hold, we 
can infer neither Oq nor O¬q.  Equally strong but conflicting moral requirements are susceptible 
to the same effect of suspended conclusions as in the Nixon Diamond setup.  If keeping one 
promise means breaking another, figuring out which to keep requires substantive moral 
reasoning; logic itself will not resolve one’s moral dilemmas. 
 VIII.  Deontic Specificity.  More specific requirements outweigh less specific ones.  Like 
Penguin Principles, rules of exception take precedence over general moral rules.  The logic 
defaults to the more specific of any two deontic requirements: {p > Or, (p & q) > O¬r, p, q} 
defeasibly entails O¬r.  You should generally keep your promises, but if keeping a certain 
promise means you will die, you should not keep it. 
 
6.4  Obligation-based sorites 
I propose extending the Asher-Bonevac analysis beyond moral obligation, to other kinds of 
oughts—in particular, as a way of capturing the deontic content of tolerance principles for vague 
predicates.  That analysis was designed to provide solutions to various deontic paradoxes.  I claim 
it can do more—namely, explain away the paradoxical nature of tolerance.  Viewing the sorites 
paradox as a species of deontic paradox in this way, I shall argue, serves to advance our 
understanding of vagueness. 
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 Introducing a generic conditional and deontic operator lets us formulate new expressions of 
sorites arguments.  I shall first consider two.  These give different scope readings for the deontic 
conditional. 
 Suppose a subject is led through our series of decreasingly bald men, and is asked in 
sequential order whether each man is bald.  For each man #n, given that he and the next man 
differ only marginally, tolerance requires that calling #n bald commits one to calling #n+1 bald 
too.  This is to reason using inference by detachment: 
(5) If one calls #n bald, one should call #n+1 bald  Fan > OFan+1 
  One calls #n bald      Fan    
  One should call #n+1 bald     OFan+1 
The deontic conclusion in (5) defeasibly follows from the argument premises, since this is just a 
special instance of modus ponens, which on our semantics is defeasibly (though not fully) valid.  
Aggregating enough of these conditional commitments threatens sorites contradiction in the 
familiar way. 
(6) One should call #1 bald      
If one calls #1 bald, one should call #2 bald    
If one calls #2 bald, one should call #3 bald    
Etc.        
If one calls #999 bald, one should call #1000 bald 
One should call #1000 bald     
Although, stated as such, (6) is not valid, not even defeasibly, since what detaches from each 
conditional is a deontic claim, whereas each antecedent is a non-deontic claim.  What is required 
to chain together these multiple detachment inferences is a way of getting back Fan+1 from each 
detached OFan+1, so as to license the next instance of detachment.  But in general it is not true that 
Op implies p.  To fix this, we’ll add that the subject generally makes each judgment he ought to 
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make, i.e. OFan > Fan for all n.  The argument then relies upon the validity of inference by deontic 
chaining: 
(7) One calls #n bald      Fan  
If one calls #n bald, one should call #n+1 bald  Fan > OFan+1 
If one should call #n+1 bald, one calls #n+1 bald  OFan+1 > Fan+1  
One calls #n+1 bald      Fan+1 
This is defeasibly valid, since (7) exemplifies the defeasibly valid argument pattern of generic 
chaining: p, p > q, q > r ⇒ r.  Consider any counterexample that makes true {p, p > q, q > r, ¬r}.  
There will be a model that makes true {p, p > q, q > r, r}, which will be more regular than it, 
because the model contains no irregularities, while the counterexample must be irregular with 
respect to either p or q. 
 In this way, multiple deontic conditionals may be chained together in order to defeasibly 
license detaching the very last consequent.  Therefore, supplementing the premises in (6) with 
OFan > Fan for each n renders the argument defeasibly valid.   
 Crucially, arguing in this manner does not appeal to any inference of deontic transitivity: 
(8) If one calls #n bald, one should call #n+1 bald  Fan > OFan+1 
If one should call #n+1 bald, one calls #n+1 bald  OFan+1 > Fan+1  
If one calls #n bald, one calls #n+1 bald   Fan > Fan+1 
If (8) were defeasibly valid, then together with deontic chaining, that would license defeasibly 
concluding Fa1 > OFa1000 on the basis of Fa1, Fa1 > OFa2, OFa2 > Fa2,…, Fa999 > OFa1000.  
Fortunately, inference by transitivity is in general not allowed: p > q, q > r |/≈ p > r.  Any 
counterexample w must make true p > q, q > r, and ¬(p > r)—that is, all p-normal worlds relative 
to w make q true and all q-normal worlds relative to w make r true, but not all p-normal worlds 
make r true.  So there is a w% such that w% is a p-normal world relative to w, and thus makes true 
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both p (by FACTICITY) and q, but not r, and so is not a q-normal world.  This means that at worst 
there is an irregularity with respect to q in w% (provided q > r is true in w%).  But this is not an 
irregularity with respect to q in w.  So there is no way to show that a world where {p > q, q > r, p 
> r} are all true is more regular than w.  Therefore, transitivity is not defeasibly valid. 
 We have seen how sorites reasoning can exploit modus ponens on deontic conditionals of the 
form Fan > OFan+1.  Alternatively, a wide scope reading of the deontic conditional instead makes 
deontic detachment the key inference: 
(9) It ought to be that: if one calls #n bald, one calls #n+1 bald O(Fan > Fan+1) 
One should call #n bald     OFan    
One should call #n+1 bald     OFan+1 
Here, there is no need to assume that obligatory judgments are made, i.e. OFan > Fan, since (9) 
alone would license concluding OFa1000 on the basis of OFa1, O(Fa1 > Fa2),…, O(Fa999 > Fa1000).12 
 Unrestricted license of modus ponens, as in classical logic, would validate both forms of 
detachment, regular and deontic, in which case the sorites argument (6) is valid on either reading 
of the deontic conditional.  A nonmonotonic system, however, avoids this result.  For (5) is 
merely an instance of defeasible modus ponens; detached conclusions must be retracted in light of 
additional contradictory information.  Similarly for (9): oughts distribute across generics only 
defeasibly.  This makes (5) and (9) both defeasibly valid; they must fail somewhere, but where?  
One might suppose, along with the contextualist, that this occurs relatively late in the series once 
the subject encounters cases who are clearly not bald, and he can no longer competently call them 
                                                     
12 Following Thomason (1981), we may say that (7), because it makes assumptions about what the subject 
says, represents reasoning by tolerance within the context of deliberation, in which one takes the facts as 
given and must decide what to do in light of them (i.e. figure out what to say next in light of previous 
judgments); whereas an argument like (9), given its more “hypothetical” flavor, is made within the context 
of judgment, where nothing is assumed about what is actually said, only about what should be said. 
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‘bald’.  This would indeed yield contradictory information, OFak and O¬Fak for some k, given 
our assumption that O is classical and allows for no moral dilemmas.  We saw that this strategy, 
however, leaves it unexplained why the subject feels uneasy about extending the concept well 
before that “jumping” point.  In contrast, the present account is able to explain why failure of 
detachment occurs much earlier. 
 I propose that we understand tolerance principles as providing general but defeasible rules for 
using vague predicates, thus imposing the following constraint for 0 < n < 1,000: 
  O-TOLERANCE If one calls #n bald, then one normally should call #n+1 bald 
Two different interpretations are made available when uncovering the logical form of O-
TOLERANCE: a narrow reading as Fan > OFan+1 and a wide reading as O(Fan > Fan+1).  Either 
way, O-TOLERANCE delivers a series of conditional obligations, by which one obligation leads 
to the next.  How far these obligations accrue across the entire series depends on how far 
reasoning by detachment can be sustained; unrestricted, it threatens to carry these obligations to 
the last man #1,000.  Before proceeding though, one other constraint needs mentioning. 
 A certain tradition, dating back to Waisman (1951), takes the notion of permissibility as 
central to vagueness and claims that borderline cases exhibit open-texture: in at least some 
situations concerning a borderline F, a speaker is free to call it F and free to call it not-F.  In step 
with such permissibility-based treatments, I shall assume that free permission over the status of 
borderline cases generally holds. 
  PERMISSION If #n is borderline (not-)bald, then one normally may call #n 
(not-)bald 
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Although controversial, this assumption is nonetheless, for our purposes, dialectically neutral, 
since stronger claims of permissibility are endorsed by both contextualists (Soames 1999:ch.7, 
Shapiro 2006: §1.2) and their critics (Wright 1987:244, Sainsbury 1990:§9) alike.13   
 The key observation is that O-TOLERANCE and PERMISSION clash over whether to count as 
‘not-bald’ the first #k that is borderline not-bald, given that one has just called #k-1 bald.  
PERMISSION says it is okay; O-TOLERANCE says to extend one’s application of ‘bald’ from #k-
1 to #k.  Hence a conflict of requirement: it cannot be that one who must call #k bald is also free 
to call it otherwise.  Because neither principle is stronger, neither wins out, absent further 
information.  This is the same situation as the Nixon Diamond setup, except now with {Fak-1 > 
                                                     
13 Attempts to define borderlineness have notoriously eluded consensus (see Greenough 2003:§§4-6).  The 
issue is highly disputed.  For that reason, I wish not to commit myself to any particular definition.  It is 
worth pointing out, nonetheless, that PERMISSION is compatible with a number of definitions given by 
contextualists.  I mention three. 
 1.  Shapiro (2006 ch.1), following McGee and McLaughlin (1997), defines a borderline case of F as an 
object x such that the thoughts and linguistic practices of speakers of the language, together with “external” 
contextual factors (comparison class, paradigm cases, contrast cases and categories), and relevant non-
linguistic facts (for ‘bald’, one’s total hair situation—including hair count, head shape, hair length, hair 
follicle distribution, hair thickness, etc.), neither determine that x is F nor determine that x is not F.  The 
status of individual borderline cases is then left up to particular conversationalists to decide or leave 
unsettled; the extension and anti-extension of F vary over the course of the conversation as items pertaining 
to those cases—assumptions, presuppositions, or other propositions implicitly or explicitly agreed to—get 
added to or taken off the conversational scoreboard.  Borderline cases can be settled one way or the other 
so long as this does not contradict judgments that are kept on record or otherwise violate constraints 
governing the use of F.   
 2.  Soames (1999:210), in a similar vein, describes the borderline F-range as a realm of discretion, 
containing individuals about whom the semantic rules governing F issue no verdict, but whom the 
conversational participants are (provided they agree) free to characterize in either way.  See also Dorr 
2003:§3. 
 3.  Raffman (1994:53, 1996:178-80)—when she was still a contextualist—claimed that borderline 
cases of color predicates undergo category shifts under different psychological states.  A borderline red-
orange patch can look either red or orange—it undergoes a Gestalt-like shift between looking red at one 
time and looking orange at another—and can be truly judged accordingly each time; these judgments are 
merely relativized to different internal psychological contexts. 
 That said, PERMISSION is not compatible with many other conceptions of borderlineness—including 
those on traditional supervaluationism (Fine 1975, Keefe 2007), epistemicism (Williamson 1994), degree 
theory (Edgington 1992), and incompatibilism (Raffman 2005a).  These accounts all deny PERMISSION by 
treating borderlineness as a status that precludes freedom of verdict.  See Shapiro 2006:11 for discussion.  
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OFak, Indet(ak) > P¬Fak, Fak-1, Indet(ak)}, where this defeasibly entails neither OFak nor P¬Fak.  
So the conclusion in (5), that #n+1 must count as bald, gets withdrawn when #n+1 is considered 
to be borderline non-bald, even if #n has just been called bald.  Similarly for (9).  This reflects 
how strengthening of the antecedent is not generally allowed for deontic conditionals, or generic 
conditional claims more generally (as shown by deontic and generic specificity).14 
 The proposal carries psychological merit.  Confronted with vagueness, one finds himself in a 
state of not knowing what to say.  Wright (2001, 2003) calls this a state of “quandary”.  
Borderlineness brings an onset of uncertainty.15  This is predicted by the account, on which 
anyone faced with the conflicting requirements of O-TOLERANCE and PERMISSION is, barring 
further information, left at an impasse as to what to call #k.   
 Such is the phenomenology of borderlineness.  Exactly where this uncertainty begins for any 
given subject is hard to say, given higher-order vagueness.  Locating the first borderline not-bald 
#k may prove an unreasonable request, given that where the borderline cases begin is, arguably, 
itself a vague matter.16  This too is allowed for on the account: a subject may find it hard to say 
exactly where he ceases to be obligated in extending his use of ‘bald’ in accord with tolerance.  
The reason for this, according to PERMISSION, will be because he finds it hard to say exactly 
where the borderline non-balds begin. 
                                                     
14 We have Indet(ak) > PFak from PERMISSION; so Fak-1 > OFak does not entail (Fak-1 & Indet(ak)) > OFak, 
not even defeasibly.  Nonetheless, defeasible strengthening of the antecedent still holds: ψ > χ |≈ φ > χ 
where |- φ → ψ. 
15 This is often taken to roughly characterize or indicate something’s having borderline status (Sainsbury 
1995:64).  Epistemicists insist more strongly that this just is what borderlineness consists in (Williamson 
1994:2, 202). 
16 Defenders of higher-order vagueness include Greenough (2003), Williamson (1994).  Deniers include 
Wright (1987, 1992).  Doubters include Tye (1994), Koons (1994). 
 192 
 Note that these are claims about how borderline cases are experienced, not how they are 
conceptualized.  To experience #k as borderline non-bald, the subject need not conceptualize #k 
as having its borderline status.  The proposition that #k is borderline not-bald need not enter the 
contents of one’s thoughts.  Nor must this be articulated in words.  One’s experience of 
something as a borderline case requires only thinking of it in a certain way that is responsive to its 
borderline status, not thinking of it as being a borderline case. 
 Identifying the exact point of one’s first encounter with a borderline non-F may be a difficult, 
if not impossible, even pointless, task.  What matters is that this happens before one encounters 
any clear non-Fs.  For the borderline non-bald individuals precede those who are clearly not-
bald.17  The account predicts that reasoning by O-TOLERANCE fails on account of the former 
rather than the latter.   
 In this way, the compulsory force of sorites reasoning is seen to fail well before reaching the 
end of the borderline range.  This distinguishes the present account from contextualist treatments 
that attempt to situate the breakdown of sorites reasoning instead at the end of the borderline 
region.18  In contrast, the present interpretation of tolerance predicts that its requirements run out 
                                                     
17 Just how far before is debatable.  The first borderline not-bald case may in fact be the first borderline 
bald case, on the standard assumption that borderlineness is (strongly) symmetric in the sense that anything 
borderline F is borderline not-F (and vice versa).  That assumption is available to the present account, but 
inessential.  One may drop this assumption in favor of an asymmetric conception of borderlineness, on 
which the borderline Fs and borderline non-Fs may overlap slightly, but never entirely (or never at all; see 
Raffman 2005a).  On such a non-standard account, the borderline non-Fs will come slightly before the first 
clear non-Fs.  Otherwise, on standard accounts, the borderline non-Fs will come well before the first clear 
non-Fs, toward the beginning of the borderline range (the range encompassing all borderline Fs and 
borderline non-Fs, which, given symmetry, overlap entirely).  Either way, sorites reasoning is seen to fail 
before reaching the end of the borderline range. 
18 More precisely: Call a conditional premise If #n is bald, #n+1 is bald in our original sorites argument (2) 
confirmable if a speaker can competently judge both antecedent and consequent to hold.  On pain of sorites 
contradiction, not every premise of (2) is confirmable; there must be a last confirmable premise (or a 
narrow range of candidates, if competently judge is vague).  Insofar as each step of sorites reasoning 
consists in a speaker’s accepting #n+1 is bald after accepting #n is bald, the point of failure or breakdown 
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in the borderline region.  The norms of O-TOLERANCE and PERMISSION cancel each other out, 
since both are merely defeasible principles.19  Contrary to many contextualizers of tolerance, I 
claim that tolerance does not remain in force throughout the entirety of one’s reasoning through a 
sorites series: once in the borderline range, there really is no requirement to call the next thing F.  
                                                     
of sorites reasoning occurs where a speaker can no longer competently do this.  Idealizing away from 
higher-order vagueness, this will be the pair <#k-1, #k> corresponding to the last confirmable premise.  
Admitting higher-order vagueness, this will be somewhere in the range of pairs corresponding to the range 
of candidates for being the last confirmable premise—exactly where is not important, since the range of 
candidates will presumably be relatively narrow.  Every contextualist theory in print—ever since Kamp’s 
(1981) original contextualist proposal—seems to predict that this pair (or range of pairs) occurs somewhere 
toward the end of the borderline range. 
 1.  For Shapiro (2006), #k is the last item whose status is underdetermined by linguistic practice, 
external contextual factors, and relevant non-linguistic facts.  Thus #k+1 is the first definite non-F, i.e. the 
first item that is determined by these things to be not-F.  Conversationalists accordingly cannot judge #k+1 
to be anything other than not-F.  One is forced to jump at #k+1, calling it not-F, and thereby retract his 
previous judgment that #k is F (on pain of violating tolerance).  This forced change in conversational score 
marks the limits of sorites reasoning: extended application of F via tolerance cannot go beyond #k. 
 2.  For Soames (1999), #k is the last individual whom conversationalists are free to agree, in line with 
tolerance, to characterize as F, after which the semantic rules dictate that #k+1 is not F.  Discretion ends 
where rules begin. 
 3.  For Raffman (1994, 1996), #k can appear to be either F or not-F when pairwise compared with #k-
1, depending on one’s internal psychological state.  Given their indiscriminability, #k-1 and #k will both 
appear to be F while viewed in one psychological state, or both appear to be not-F while viewed in another 
psychological state.  However, the first state is no longer available when comparing #k pairwise with #k+1, 
if the latter looks not-F, in which case pairwise comparison compels one instead to judge both #k and #k+1 
as not-F.  No retraction of previous judgments is necessary to retain consistency (contra Shapiro), given 
that the ensuing judgment that #k is not-F and one’s previous judgment that #k is F get relativized to 
different contexts, now understood as different internal psychological states.  This forced shift in 
psychological state marks a limit of sorites reasoning: one cannot indefinitely remain in the sort of 
psychological state required for tolerant application of F.   
 Raffman (1994, 1996) is an outlier among her contextualist peers insofar as she hypothesizes that such 
a shift occurs for ordinary subjects somewhere in the middle of the borderline range, rather than toward the 
end; her later empirical studies (2005a:ch.5) appear to confirm this point.  Yet the general criticism still 
stands: relativization to a single psychological context appears unable to capture the dual nature of 
tolerance (see §5, n.23). 
 4.  For Kamp (1981), #k is the last individual one can judge to be F on the basis of tolerance, while 
remaining in a coherent context of judgment.  Attempting to incorporate the information that #k is F into 
the background information of the context, in order to conclude that #k+1 is F via tolerance, renders the 
overall context incoherent—because by this point people start to look clearly not F.  The status of #k+1 as 
not-F is, presumably, also part of one’s contextually salient background information.  This blocks one from 
updating the context by confirming (and hence inferring the consequent of) the conditional If #k is F, #k+1 
is F, on pain of adding contradictory information to the overall context. 
19 Contrary to incoherentists about tolerance and nihilists about vagueness (see n.7), such conflicts among 
constraints need not reflect any inherent incoherence in vague predicates. 
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Contrary to deniers of tolerance, however, the view does not jettison our tolerance intuitions: 
requirements of tolerance are never violated, only suspended. 
 The cancelation of O-TOLERANCE with PERMISSION only reflects the suspension of 
epistemic norms.  The felt force of such norms may very well persist, despite their suspension.  
The subject may continue to experience the pull of tolerance and feel compelled to extend the 
predicate to #k, despite recognizing its borderline status; hence, the onset of uncertainty in how to 
proceed.  In this way, the felt effects of tolerance do not just suddenly disappear.  There is still a 
felt conflict, just no conflict in what, all things considered, what the subject ought to say. 
 This explains away the compulsory appearance of sorites reasoning, but what of its 
allowance?  Granting that the first #k who is borderline not-bald is also borderline bald, 
PERMISSION says it is defeasibly okay to call #k bald.20  Importantly, this does not conflict with 
O-TOLERANCE.21  Although it does not reinstate the requirement to comply with tolerance, it 
makes doing so permissible: one need not extend his application of ‘bald’ from #k-1 to #k, 
though he may if he wishes to.  At the first sign of borderlineness, judgments of tolerance are 
neither mandated nor sanctioned, only permitted.  But surely only up to a point: the permissive 
nature of sorites reasoning cannot continue indefinitely.  This threatens yet another variety of 
sorites argument that must be addressed. 
 
 
                                                     
20 For presumably, the borderline Fs are (or just are, barring intuitionism) the borderline non-Fs (see n.17). 
21 Nor does it, for that matter, conflict with calling #k borderline.  One may call #k bald despite 
acknowledging its borderline status (“He’s bald, but only borderline bald”).  Such judgments seem 
perfectly compatible.  Nor is it a feature of PERMISSION that we never have to call anything borderline—
that is, unless borderline status already precludes truth and falsity (although such a suggestion is 
independently implausible; see Wright 2003). 
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6.5  Permission-based sorites 
A weaker interpretation of tolerance constrains what judgments are allowed rather than what is 
required: 
  P-TOLERANCE  If one may call #n bald, then one normally may call #n+1 bald 
The deontic conditionals delivered by P-TOLERANCE come in the form of conditional 
permissions.  These threaten sorites contradiction in their own right: 
(10) One may call #1 bald     
If one may call #1 bald, one may call #2 bald   
If one may call #2 bald, one may call #3 bald   
Etc.       
If one may call #999 bald, one may call #1000 bald 
One may call #1000 bald     
If one allowance led to another without end, one could count Howard Stern (#1000) as ‘bald’ 
without fault—reductio ad absurdum.  So (10) is not valid.  The inference to blame here is 
conditional allowance: 
(11) If one may call #n bald, one may call #n+1 bald PFan > PFan+1 
One may call #n bald    PFan    
One may call #n+1 bald    PFan+1 
This is yet another instance of detachment, and hence defeasibly valid.  Detaching PFan+1 fails in 
light of the additional information that ¬PFan+1, as when #n+1 is definitely not-bald—that is, too 
hairy to acceptably count as ‘bald’.  Beyond the borderline range, any permission to call things 
bald gets overridden by the stricter constraint CLEAR SANCTION.  This prohibits extending 
‘bald’ to any case that clearly does not satisfy it, even if one has just applied it to a previous 
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borderline case without fault.  Thus CLEAR SANCTION defeats inferences like (11) otherwise 
licensed by P-TOLERANCE. 
 Allowance failure occurs at the end of the borderline region, sometime after encountering the 
last borderline non-bald man.  Higher-order vagueness in the transition from the borderline non-
balds back to the definite non-balds may prevent us from being able to say exactly where this is 
for any given subject.  Nevertheless, we may reasonably suppose that the first definitely not-bald 
man #h comes well after the first borderline non-bald man #k.22   
 Unlike any borderline case, no uncertainty or feeling of quandary shrouds the status of man 
#h when considered alone.  We know what to call him: he is definitely not bald.  In contrast, we 
experience unease when reasoning through the borderline range.  This difference in 
phenomenology is captured by the present account.  Within the borderline region, O-
TOLERANCE and PERMISSION offer competing, mutually cancelling directives.  The resulting 
lack of directive makes one unsure whether to continue applying the concept; one feels uneasy 
doing so, even if allowed.  Whereas past the borderline region, a clear winner does emerge 
between competing constraints, for CLEAR SANCTION takes precedence over P-TOLERANCE.  
This explains why one feels compelled to “jump” at <#h-1, #h> and switch from calling #h-1 bald 
to calling #h not-bald.  To be sure, one feels uneasy about extending the concept any further—
                                                     
22 Given PERMISSION, #h cannot be borderline bald (otherwise it would be okay to call him bald, contrary to 
stipulation).  Given STRONG SYMMETRY (x is borderline F iff x is borderline not-F), #h therefore cannot be 
borderline not-bald.  Given MONOTONICITY, h > r for any borderline not-bald #r (otherwise, since #r is 
borderline bald given STRONG SYMMETRY and so able to count as bald given PERMISSION, #h would have to 
count as bald too if h ≤ r).  In particular, #h comes after the first borderline not-bald man #k—or well after, 
assuming there are plenty of borderline non-balds.  This will be true no matter exactly where the borderline 
(non-bald) cases begin or end; so higher-order vagueness is not at issue here.  Even if the boundaries of the 
borderline region are admittedly vague, the point stands: #h appears near the end, not the beginning.   
 Given a suitable constraint like ADJACENT (x is not bald iff x is hairy), these results project onto a 
contrast predicate such as ‘hairy’ for a bald-hairy sorites series: #h cannot be borderline hairy and, 
moreover, must come well after the first borderline hairy man, notwithstanding higher-order vagueness. 
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that is, after all, what drives him to switch judgments.  One may even feel uneasy about making 
the jump, given that he just called #h-1 bald.  But jump, he must—about this, there is no feeling 
of uncertainty.  Nor is there any doubt about #h’s non-bald status after making the jump.  This 
contrasts with the lingering unease that persists even after deciding to settle a borderline-bald case 
as ‘bald’.  No such lingering unease plagues one’s decision to jump, which brings relief in its 
wake rather than more doubt. 
 These observations mark several key general differences between forms of permissibility-
based sorites reasoning (or may-type sorites), as guided by P-TOLERANCE, and forms of 
obligation-based sorites reasoning (or must-type sorites), as guided by O-TOLERANCE.   
 I.  Location of failure.  Whereas must-sorites reasoning fails near the beginning or middle of 
the borderline region, may-sorites reasoning fails toward the end of the borderline region. 
 II.  Source of failure.  Whereas must-sorites reasoning breaks down at the first signs of 
borderline non-Fness, may-sorites reasoning breaks down at the first signs of definite non-Fness. 
 III.  Feel of failure.  Failures of different types of sorites reasoning are experienced 
differently—felt uncertainty over continued application of F when must-type sorites reasoning 
fails, as opposed to felt compulsion to discontinue application of F when may-type sorites 
reasoning fails. 
 IV.  Effects of failure.  Different psychological accompaniments follow the failures—
lingering unease after continued application of F when must-type sorites reasoning fails, as 
opposed to relief after discontinued application of F when may-type sorites reasoning fails.  
 No surprises lurk here.  How far one must extend a concept and how far one may extend it are 
distinct issues.  Normal presentations of the sorites paradox neglect this difference and conflate 
the two by suppressing the deontic content of tolerance principles.  Expressing tolerance solely in 
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terms of conditionals, defeasible or otherwise, leaves this deontic content ambiguous.  
Formulating tolerance in terms of deontic conditionals forces one to resolve any ambiguity over 
which deontic notion is at issue. 
 In this way, the contextualist’s prediction is partly right—tolerance in continuing to call 
things F really does stop beyond the borderlines.  But what stops that far down is the allowance 
of continued usage, not its requirement.  Contextualists wrongly identify this as a failure in 
obligation-based tolerance when it is rather permission-based tolerance that is at issue.  They 
may be right about where things fail, just wrong about what fails.  Indeed, it is hard to see how to 
recover the distinctions between must-type and may-type sorites reasoning, given that on every 
existing contextualist proposal, the operative notion of a context seems to have the must-
interpretation of tolerance simply built into it.23 
 
6.6  Defeasible sorites reasoning 
So far, the defeasibility of sorites reasoning has been attributed to the local failure of tolerance 
inferences: consequences of deontic detachment and distribution are surrendered when around 
borderline non-Fs; and those of conditional allowance, when around clear non-Fs.  This disarms 
sorites arguments (6) and (10) of the “listed conditionals” sort, whose form mirrors how one is 
actually led through sorites-style reasoning step by step.  Notoriously, not all presentations of the 
                                                     
23 Standard contextualism has it that: one who judges an is F in one context must (if asked whether the 
marginally different an+1 is F) judge an+1 is F if he is to remain in that same context, or switch contexts if he 
judges otherwise.  Introducing deontic operators and relativizing the deontic facts to individual contexts, as 
a fallback strategy, holds little promise of recovering the may-interpretation, given that there is only one 
notion of context to relativize to. 
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sorites are so upfront.  Variants of (6) and (10) compact their listed conditionals instead into a 
single inductive premise.24 
(12) One calls #1 bald      Fa1 
For n < 1000: if one calls #n bald, one should call #n+1 bald ∀n<1000 (Fan > OFan+1) 
For n < 1000: if one should call #n bald, one calls #n+1 bald ∀n<1000 (OFan > Fan)   
One should call #1000 bald     OFa1000 
(13) One should call #1 bald     OFa1 
For n < 1000: if one calls #n bald, one should call #n+1 bald ∀n<1000 O(Fan > Fan+1)  
One should call #1000 bald     OFa1000 
(14) One may call #1 bald     PFa1 
For n < 1000: if one may call #n bald, one may call #n+1 bald ∀n<1000 (PFan > PFan+1)  
One may call #1000 bald     PFa1000 
Each inductive premise in (12)-(14) is a universally quantified generic conditional.  To evaluate 
such statements, we define ∀ in the usual way by adding assignments to points of evaluation for 
truth:25  
∀xΦ is true at world w under assignment α iff Φ is true at world w under any assignment 
differing from α at most in its assignment to x.   
Consider the inductive premise in (12): ∀n<1000(Fan > OFan+1) is true at <w, α> iff Fan > OFan+1 is 
true at <w, α%> for any α% differing from α in what it assigns to n—i.e. OFan+1 holds in all Fan-
                                                     
24 A further variant combines may with the wide-scope reading of the deontic conditional: 
(12*) One may call #1 bald      PFa1 
For n < 1000: if one calls #n bald, one should call #n+1 bald ∀n<1000 O(Fan > Fan+1)  
One may call #1000 bald     PFa1000 
where permissions accrue over a series of wide-scoped conditional obligations via the defeasible inference 
of forced allowance: O(Fan > Fan+1), PFan |≈ PFan+1.  (12*) is handled in much the same way as the others. 
25 For more details on how quantification iteracts with deontic conditionals, see Asher & Bonevac 
(1996:§1.2). 
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normal worlds, for any value of n < 1000.  But this is satisfied by assumption.  So it makes no 
truth-conditional difference if we use a single inductive premise or list out each individual 
tolerance conditional.  In that case, argument (12), like its original “step-by-step” formulation, is 
invalid but defeasibly valid.  Likewise for (13)-(14). 
 A unified picture emerges on which logic, argument and reasoning all neatly converge in the 
sorites.  The inductive premises of (12)-(14) are justified by their respective tolerance principle, 
O-TOLERANCE (narrow or wide) or P-TOLERANCE.  The rules of inference underlying these 
arguments are chaining, deontic detachment, and conditional obligation, respectively.  As before, 
these are all defeasible. 
 On this construal, sorites reasoning is not to be seen as inherently defective or never worth 
utilizing, but as unproblematic in many instances, so long as it is not carried out too far down a 
sorites series.26  Such reasoning no doubt incurs the risk of overextending a vague predicate 
beyond its proper or permitted bounds, though its built-in defeasibility is meant to countervail this 
effect.  Tolerance crucially admits of exceptions.27  To count (12)-(14) as invalid marks not so 
much an outright rejection of sorites reasoning as an acknowledgement of its limits.  Their 
                                                     
26 Sorites reasoning may hold little utility in considering clear cases, whose status is settled by independent 
means other than comparison with similar or adjacent cases.  However, it may prove potentially useful 
particularly when sorting through and deciding the status of borderline cases. 
27 To think this claim of defeasibility amounts to stating a sort of triviality, like “sorites reasoning fails 
when it fails” or “tolerance holds, except when it doesn’t”, is clearly mistaken.  The account offers an 
explanation for the failure of sorites reasoning in terms of a conflict of norms—a diagnosis that is far from 
trivial or inconsequential.  For I claim that the normative consequences of tolerance and borderlineness are 
not compatible.  That runs contrary to the standard line of argument (e.g. in Greenough 2003) that these are 
perfectly compatible features of vague predicates. 
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defeasible validity reflects failure of sorites reasoning on a global level; locally, it remains 
unproblematic.28  
 Consider two definitely bald individuals, one slightly balder than the other by just a single 
hair.  Tolerance of either sort, must and may, would justify calling the man with the extra hair 
‘bald’ on the basis of his being just slightly less bald than the other, even though he himself is 
already definitely bald.  Such conclusions are harmless.29  Reasoning by tolerance merely gives 
another—albeit superfluous—reason to call him ‘bald’, on top of looks alone (without 
comparison to anything else), since CLEAR CALL already requires calling Baldy3 bald; hence, the 
overdetermination of obligation.30 
 Alternatively, consider extending ‘bald’ to borderline cases on the basis of comparison to 
people who are definitely bald.  This too is harmless.  Although must-type tolerance gets 
suspended in light of PERMISSION, may-type tolerance remains operative, offering another extra 
                                                     
28 The defeasibility of must/may sorites reasoning may, in turn, derive from more general generic epistemic 
principles, such as “You normally shouldn’t (can) treat or call things differentially unless (if) they have 
some relevant detectable difference.” Should these general principles be defeasible for reasons independent 
of contextual variability, this would reinforce the thought that vagueness is not essentially tied to contextual 
variation. 
29 One may balk.  But the burden of proof is on my opponent to show: why such a case of sorites reasoning 
should somehow be bad, why its conclusion should somehow be unacceptable or infelicitous, and why the 
reasoner should somehow be unreasonable or at fault.  To say that a reasoner using such methods could 
arrive at contradictory conclusions is a non-starter.  The risk of bad consequences is no guarantee of actual 
badness.  At any rate, this is all question-begging from a nonmonotonic perspective, the whole point of 
which is to dispense with the idea that things, once true (or valid), are guaranteed to remain true (or valid) 
as more information gets added.  What is to keep good reasoning from being, like truth and validity, 
nonmonotonic in nature?  We should expect no guarantee that methods of reasoning, though good when 
applied to a few cases, would remain so, as more cases are considered. 
30 Note: this is a claim about overdetermination of obligation (a single obligation arising from multiple 
conditions), and not overdetermination in obligation (multiple obligations arising from a single condition).  
More precisely expressed in the logic: p > Oq, r > Oq |- (p∨r) > Oq.  This is guaranteed by DISJUNCTION. 
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(albeit defeasible) reason to count borderline individuals as ‘bald’.  Only now, it is the allowance 
of continued use, rather than its requirement, that gets overdetermined, given PERMISSION.31 
 The defeasibility perspective sheds light on two problem cases that have puzzled 
philosophers of vagueness.  One is Horgan’s (1994) “forced march” sorites, in which a subject 
led through a sorites series is forced to make a judgment about each #n—F or not-F.  
Contextualists often employ this as a litmus test for a given theory’s ability to uphold tolerance 
principles.  Contextualism, they argue, rightly predicts that subjects of forced march trials are 
required to continue calling things F via tolerance until one can no longer do so, at which point 
tolerance applies in the reverse direction and they are required to start calling things not-F; 
whatever direction, tolerance remains in force throughout.   
 The other is Sainsbury’s (1990) paint shop owner, who must pick an arbitrary division point 
along an arrangement of red and orange paint jars in order to separate the “red” and “orange” 
shelves.  Critics of contextualism argue that the permissibility of drawing such a cutoff, where the 
last jar on the “red” shelf is only marginally different in color from the first jar on the “orange” 
shelf, shows that the requirements of tolerance need not always be observed.  Alternatively, 
consider a perhaps more familiar scenario: the task of assigning end-of-term letter grades to 
students typically requires, and therefore permits, drawing arbitrary cutoffs along a (possibly 
curved) numerical grade scale. 
 The defeasibility approach easily accommodates both tolerance-enforcing and cutoff-
permitting intuitions simultaneously.  How strict the requirements of tolerance are may vary 
according to circumstance.  In forced march cases, the demands of tolerance are presumably 
reinforced over other defeasible principles, such that one should not stop calling things F unless 
                                                     
31 In other words: p > Pq, r > Pq |- (p∨r) > Pq—again, guaranteed by DISJUNCTION. 
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absolutely necessary.  In that case, O-TOLERANCE would supersede, rather than mutually cancel 
out with, PERMISSION—until past the borderlines, when it is itself overridden by the stronger 
rule of CLEAR SANCTION.  Whereas in paint shop cases, it is the requirement to obey tolerance 
at every point that gets overridden by the need to violate it at some point, for purposes of 
organizing one’s shelves by color or sorting one’s students by grade.  Such fairly commonplace 
situations, in which lifting regular or otherwise enforced norms of tolerance allows arbitrary 
boundaries to be drawn without fault, demonstrate the defeasibility of tolerance. 
 
6.7  Metaphysics vs. epistemology 
What remains of the classical sorites?  Traditional presentations of the paradox make use of 
neither ordinary language generics nor deontic modals.  
(15) #1 is bald     
#1 is bald ⊃ #2 is bald   
#2 is bald ⊃ #3 is bald   
Etc.       
#999 is bald ⊃ #1000 is bald 
#1000 is bald     
A story about the defeasible nature of the ordinary English generic, however persuasive, does not 
erase the fact that the material conditional of classical logic is modus ponens-supporting, and 
unequivocally so.  One may complain this leaves the paradoxical nature of (15) unaddressed.  




(16) #1 is bald 
Not: #1 is bald and #2 is not bald 
Not: #2 is bald and #3 is not bald 
Etc.     
Not: #999 is bald and #1000 is not bald 
#1000 is bald 
(17) #1 is bald 
Either #1 is not bald or #2 is bald 
Either #2 is not bald or #3 is bald 
Etc.    
Either #999 is not bald or #1000 is bald 
#1000 is bald 
(Quantified versions of these use a single inductive premise rather than a string of premises.32  
Similar remarks will apply below.)  Concerning these, the account, admittedly, remains silent.  It 
fails to speak to the proper evaluation of the original sorites argument, expressed either in the 
material mode, as in (15), or some classical equivalent, as in (16) or (17).  For classical logic is 
stripped of all epistemic modals and other normative notions that abound in ordinary idioms.  Yet 
this is a problem (if at all) facing every account that produces a revisionist or otherwise non-
classical reading for tolerance conditionals.  Contextualists are no exception: they too must 
answer to the original sorites stated in classical terms, which, it would appear, contains no 
contextually relativized premises and admits of no contextual variation in the evaluation of its 
premises.33 
                                                     
32 These employ a principle of induction.  On why not to question this principle, see Kamp (1981:§§1–2). 
33 The contextualist may insist that the very act of evaluating the argument inevitably produces a change in 
context.  But this is to sidestep the question of what truth-values sorites premises possess independently of 
any attempt to evaluate them—an odd question, perhaps, of genuine concern only to classical logicians, but 
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 Thus it is no special problem for the defeasibility view that it fails to say anything new about 
these classical sorites arguments.  Nor does it need to—I might add.  For it is obvious what 
should be said concerning these arguments, independently of any analysis for the ordinary 
English if.  They are valid but unsound: each contains a false premise.34  Thus, for some n, #n is 
bald and #n+1 is not bald.  The existence of cutoffs for vague predicates is a well-known 
consequence of classical logic and semantics. (An infamous verdict—but what else can be said 
that isn’t revisionary?)  I take this to be of substantive metaphysical consequence, if anything: 
there is a fact of the matter about who in the series is the least bald bald man.  Whether to take 
this verdict seriously is an open question that faces every theory.35 
 Tolerance, by contrast, is an epistemic phenomenon. Tolerance principles encode norms of 
judgment: how ‘bald’ may or must apply to an individual under consideration in light of other 
information.  They do not determine or otherwise settle metaphysical issues concerning the facts 
about baldness.36  Nor do they verify all the premises of classical sorites arguments like (15)–
(17).  To otherwise deny the existence of cutoffs on account of tolerance is to conflate 
metaphysics with epistemology.  Whether a single hair can make the difference between being 
                                                     
reasonable nonetheless.  If the contextualist can make no sense of it, neither should this be expected of the 
defeasibilist.  
34 The first premise “#1 is bald” is indisputably true (disregarding nihilism).  Hence the false premise will 
be some instance of the relevant inductive premise: ∀n(Fan ⊃ Fan+1), ∀n¬(Fan &¬Fan+1), or ∀n(¬Fan ∨ 
Fan+1).  In the universally quantified versions, the inductive premise itself is therefore falsified. 
35 It should be noted that contextualists themselves are divided over the issue of bivalence.  Shapiro (2006) 
denies bivalence, claiming that indeterminacy in truth-value obtains even in individual conversational 
contexts.  Graff-Fara (2000) takes each context of judgment to come pre-equipped with a fully bivalent 
truth-value distribution. Raffman (2005b) claims her earlier contextualist work (1994, 1996) remained 
neutral on the question. 
36 The truth-functional premises of (15)–(17) say nothing about our judgments, internal psychological 
states, shared conversational score, or other facts about our epistemic situation, broadly speaking; as such, 
any distribution of truth-values is strictly determined independently of tolerance. 
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bald and not being bald is one issue (of metaphysics).  Whether we can so judge or ascertain in 
certain circumstances is another issue (of epistemology).  Teasing the two apart—fact from 
judgment—is essential in keeping metaphysical matters distinct from epistemological concerns.  
Contextualists disregard this distinction when they insist on reading the truth-values of sorites 
premises directly off our tolerance-conforming judgments.  Our inability to locate a fixed cutoff 
is no demonstration of its nonexistence.37  Nor is the act of refusing to extend a vague predicate 
past a certain point, as allowed for by the defeasibility of tolerance, any evidence that an actual 
cutoff exists there.38 
 I have argued that we should construe tolerance principles as issuing defeasible norms of 
judgment.  Insofar as sorites reasoning rests entirely upon tolerance, we should therefore construe 
sorites reasoning as a form of defeasible reasoning.  Insofar as sorites arguments are supposed to 
capture the way one would actually reason in a sorites series, we should therefore formulate these 
in a way that lays bare the defeasible, exception-admitting nature of such reasoning, as in (12)-
(14) or similar variants.   
 As such, classical sorites arguments like (15)-(17) do not constitute a form of sorites 
argument proper.  They are (I think) perfectly coherent arguments, no doubt, and available for 
anyone to discuss or advance.  What they serve to show, by way of reductio, is that the classical 
inductive premise is false and therefore that cutoffs exist.  But whether there is a cutoff in a 
sorites series (an issue of existence) is an entirely different matter from whether one may draw a 
                                                     
37 To echo (in spirit) a familiar lesson from the post-Kripkean literature on modality: just as necessary 
truths may elude a priori knowability, determinate truths about cutoffs may elude the cognitive faculties of 
competent speakers. 
38 Nor has any contextualist ever cared to suggest otherwise—providing yet further confirmation that 
tolerance has no bearing on the metaphysics of vagueness. 
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cutoff when proceeding along a sorites series (an issue of judgment).  Insofar as sorites arguments 
owe their plausibility to tolerance, any sorites inductive premise that ordinary subjects assent to 
must be a generic—something, as I have argued, that is properly expressed in terms of ordinary 
ifs and oughts (or shoulds, musts, cans, mays, or other cognates).  Once rightly recognized to be a 
generic, this premise gives zero support for the corresponding universal generalizations of the 
classical material premises in (15)-(17).39 
 One can be revisionist about the classical conditional, as really having generic truth 
conditions.  Or one can keep the material conditional as it is, and maintain that, sorites arguments, 
properly formulated, do not appear in material mode at all.  The difference lies in what one 
wishes to adopt a revisionist attitude toward: whether the classical connectives themselves or the 
formulation of arguments initially thought to employ those connectives.40  What then to revise, 
formulation or formulae?  This is a difficult issue, one I don’t intend to take up here.  The present 
account leaves both options open. 
 The metaphysics vs. epistemology distinction will apply at any higher order of vagueness (if 
such there be).  Whether a single hair can mark the boundary between being definitely bald and 
borderline bald is a metaphysical question.41  Whether one should or can continue to call the next 
individual definitely bald is a separate, epistemological question.  The same goes for other higher-
order distinctions—between being borderline bald and definitely not-bald, or definitely definitely 
bald and borderline definitely bald, or definitely borderline bald and borderline borderline bald, 
and so on, on up.  At each order, some norm of tolerance will mandate or license our extended 
                                                     
39 Although, as Sorensen (2012) suggests, ordinary speakers may easily conflate the two. 
40 Or one may question what logic has to do with (sorites) reasoning at all.  For such skepticism, see 
Harman (1984). 
41 One presupposing there is such a thing as being definitely bald and being borderline bald to begin with. 
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use of the vague predicate F in question (‘definitely bald’, ‘borderline definitely bald’, 
‘borderline borderline bald’, etc.), but only defeasibly.  The point of defeat will depend on 
whether O-TOLERANCE or P-TOLERANCE is in play: one need not continue applying the 
predicate when running up against cases that are borderline F (respectively: borderline definitely 
bald, definitely borderline bald, borderline borderline borderline bald, etc.), but must discontinue 
its use when finally encountering cases that are definitely not-F (respectively: definitely 
borderline bald, definitely definitely not-definitely-bald, definitely definitely definitely not-bald, 
etc.).  The phenomenological differences between these failures will be as before at the first-order 
level. 
 
6.8  Defeasibility vs. incoherence 
This paper has argued for an alternative theory that rivals contextualism in its ability to explain 
the phenomenology of vagueness.  A salient example for comparison is Hans Kamp’s (1981) 
pioneering contextualist treatment of vagueness in “The Paradox of the Heap”.   
 Accommodating our tolerance intuitions is what drove Kamp to abandon his earlier 
supervaluationist theory (Kamp 1975) in favor of a contextualist treatment of vagueness (Kamp 
1981). On the later view, every instance of the inductive principle  
 (1)  For each n < 1,000: if #n is bald, then #n+1 is bald 
is true in any context.  This is achieved by adopting a dynamic semantics for the conditional that 
is not truth-functional: a conditional is true in a context c just in case either its antecedent is false 
in c, or its consequent would be true in the updated context that results from incorporating the 
information carried by the antecedent of the conditional into the background information of c.  
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Given a suitable tolerance principle—wherever a and a% are similar and Fa is part of the 
background information of c, Fa% is true in c—this verifies each instance of the inductive premise.  
However, the inductive principle is itself false.  Kamp offers a revised semantics for the universal 
quantifier that involves the notion of an incoherent context: a universal generalization is true in a 
coherent context c just in case each of its instances is true and acceptance of the universally 
quantified sentence preserves coherence of context.  It follows that the inductive premise (1) is 
false, since attempting to incorporate all the information carried by the universal generalization 
into the background of one’s current context invariably creates an incoherent context. 
 Kamp’s view has a number of puzzling features.  One, it allows a false universal 
generalization like (1) to have all true instances.   
 Two, it has no way of defusing the sort of “step-by-step” sorites argument that does not 
invoke a single inductive premise but rather lists out its individual instances.  Once again, 
consider: 
 (2) #1 is bald 
If #1 is bald, #2 is bald 
If #2 is bald, #3 is bald 
Etc. 
If #999 is bald, #1,000 is bald 
#1,000 is bald 
Although each premise is true when evaluated individually, there is no coherent context in which 
all the premises are true; so the argument turns out trivially valid on any suitable dynamic 
conception of validity, now perhaps most naturally understood as preservation of truth across 
coherent contexts.  Yet one cannot reason through the argument and on that basis legitimately 
claim its conclusion: we all recognize that sorites reasoning is bad reasoning, even when carried 
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out step by step, however compelling each step may be.  This leaves us with a valid argument 
whose premises are each individually true, which nonetheless embodies bad reasoning.  Good 
reasoning requires preserving coherence with each update of context, but by assumption the 
information carried by the premises cannot be incorporated into a single context all at once; all 
tolerance guarantees is their individual truth, not their collective truth.  This is an odd 
consequence of the proposed semantics: it divorces good reasoning from truth and validity—
contrary to the spirit of dynamic approaches that fashion the logic after how we actually reason.   
 Three, the view seems to predict failure of sorites reasoning relatively late in the series 
toward the end of the borderline range—presumably, because this is where the subject begins to 
make false judgments, should he extend his use of ‘bald’ via tolerance and begin applying it to 
those who are clearly not bald; attempting to add such contradictory information to the overall 
context of judgment renders it incoherent.  And yet sorites reasoning appears suspect well before 
that point.  Kamp’s contextualist account, like its numerous successors, fails to adequately 
explain why.   
 The defeasibility view, in contrast, avoids these pitfalls.  In allowing both a sorites inductive 
premise and all its premises to be true, it respects our tolerance intuitions without having to posit, 
in radically revisionist fashion, false universal generalizations with all true instances.  In 
diagnosing all sorites arguments as invalidly drawing conclusions from true premises, it 
recognizes both the appeal and the limits of sorites reasoning without having to divorce reasoning 
from logic—in particular, we need not accept there are arguments which, despite being valid and 
having all true premises, nevertheless embody bad reasoning.  In distinguishing different types of 
sorites reasoning, it gets the phenomenology right without having to introduce all the extra 
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technical machinery related to an incoherent context—now, properly understood as introducing 
defeating information incompatible with one’s conclusion.42 
 Nevertheless, it preserves the original insight from Kamp’s work, largely ignored by later 
contextualists, that continued reasoning via tolerance really does fail beyond a certain point—and 
subsequently that failure of sorites reasoning is not, as later contextualists have maintained, 
simply a matter of switching one’s judgments and reasoning in accordance with tolerance in the 
reverse direction.  The view is thus closer in spirit to Kamp’s contextualism than that of Raffman, 
Soames, Fara, or Shapiro. 
 
6.9  Conditionals and consequence 
I have argued that we can exploit the defeasibility of deontic conditionals to defuse the sorites.  
To achieve this requires some combination of a nonmonotonic deontic logic: nonmonotonic, for 
modelling the defeasibility of sorites reasoning; deontic for capturing the implicit deontic content 
of tolerance principles.  Both elements are crucial: without defeasiblity, tolerance runs amok; 
                                                     
42 One subtler difference is worth noting.  On Kamp’s account, incoherence of context results from 
attempting to update the context with information carried by the antecedent of a sorites conditional.  
Suppose the “offending” conditional is Fak → Fak+1.  This predicts that one who has updated the context 
with {Fa1, Fa2,…, Fak-1} is still allowed to conclude Fak on the basis of Fak-1 → Fak without incoherence, 
since the truth of Fak-1 → Fak guarantees the truth of Fak in the updated context.  The context becomes 
incoherent only when one attempts to process the offending conditional Fak → Fak+1.  It follows that Fak, 
though unproblematically inferred from other information, cannot unproblematically serve as grounds for 
further conditional reasoning—which is odd.  More generally, the overall view seems to fault over-
accumulation of information as the reason why sorites reasoning fails.   
 In contrast, on my account, incoherence of context—now understood as conflict of requirement—
arises from introducing information that is incompatible with the consequent of the “offending” sorites 
conditional.  This forces one to withdraw the conclusion Fak, which he would otherwise infer on the basis 
of that conditional.  This removes the problem of having information that is both at once unproblematic 
when inferred on the basis of previous conditionals and problematic when used to infer further information.  
Failure of sorites reasoning is also no longer due to over-accumulation of information carried by previous 
conditionals, but rather a matter of recognizing certain features of the case at hand #k that suspend or 
overrule conclusions otherwise prescribed by tolerance. 
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without deontic expressions, there is no way to distinguish must-type and may-type sorites 
reasoning.43 
 The choice of analysis for deontic conditionals matters.  To see this, we might compare the 
current Asher-Bonevac-Morreau (ABM) analysis of deontic conditionals with the alternative 
Kratzer-style accounts defended in recent work by Kolodny & MacFarlane (2010) and Willer 
(2012).  These bear certain similarities to the ABM theory: Kolodny and MacFarlane’s account, 
like ABM’s, surrenders modus ponens, while Willer’s version shares the feature of 
nonmonoticity.  Although their analyses were not designed with vagueness in mind—rather, their 
concern is solving the Miners paradox—it may still be worth illustrating the differences, 
especially if the sorites is to be thought of as simply another species of deontic paradox.  
 On their semantics, deontic modals function like epistemic modals and so are specifications 
of informational modal operators: they quantify over a set of possible worlds that is determined 
by a separate informational parameter.  Sentences with deontic modals get evaluated relative to 
two parameters, a possible world w and an information state i (modeled as a set of worlds), with 
truth conditions: 
                                                     
43 Any attempt to reproduce the differences between must-type and may-type sorites within the conditional 
formulation itself is unlikely to succeed.  One could, for instance, try distinguishing two subjunctive 
versions of tolerance conditionals: “If #n were to count as F, so would #n+1” (would-tolerance) vs. “If #n 
were to count as F, so could #n+1” (could-tolerance), where these have their standard Lewis-Stalnaker 
truth-conditions: Fan → Fan+1 (or Fan ◊→ Fan+1) is true at w iff all (or some) of the closest Fan-worlds 
relative to w are Fan+1-worlds.  Presumably, would-type sorites reasoning will fail at the beginning of the 
borderline range, where an+1 is now borderline F and thus no longer F in all the closest worlds where its 
predecessor an is F, whereas could-type sorites reasoning will fail at the end of the borderline range, where 
an+1 is now definitely not-F and thus no longer F in even some of the closest worlds where the previous an is 
F.  This distinction is of course only available on the assumption of weak (rather than strong) centering; 
otherwise ◊→ collapses back into →.  The obvious problem with such subjunctive tolerance conditionals 
of either form is that any centered conditional like → or ◊→ will support modus ponens without 
restriction. On pain of validating sorites arguments, one of these (and hence their universal generalization) 
must be false—which is hardly a vindication of tolerance.  The decentered generic > escapes this snare by 
only licensing defeasible modus ponens. 
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  d φ is true at <w,i> iff for all w% ∈ d(i), φ is true at <w%,i> 
  ◊d φ is true at <w,i> iff for some w% ∈ d(i), φ is true at <w%,i> 
Deontic ought is a necessity operator whose domain (i.e. the ideal worlds) is selected by a deontic 
selection function d.  Deontic may is its dual possibility operator.  Conditionals take their familiar 
Kratzer interpretation on which they function as restrictors on informational modals, or in the 
case of deontic conditionals, deontic modals.  The simplest suggestion is that a conditional 
antecedent if φ contracts the information state by ruling out worlds in which the antecedent is 
false.  Thus, 
  if φ, ψ is true at <w,i> iff ψ is true at <w,i+φ> 
where the result of strengthening i with φ, i+φ, is defined by i+φ = i ∩{w: φ is true at <w,i>}.  
Where the consequent is a deontic modal such as ought, we get the truth conditions for a deontic 
conditional. 
  if φ, dψ is true at <w,i> iff for all w% ∈ d(i+φ), ψ is true at <w%,i+φ> 
Whether modus ponens is preserved depends on the notion of logical consequence at play.  For 
Kolodny and MacFarlane, this is the classical notion of truth-preservation at any point of 
evaluation (now <w,i>):  
CLASSICAL VALIDITY φ1,…, φn |= ψ iff for all w and i such that w ∈ i: `if <w,i> 
∈ φ1 and … and <w,i> ∈ φn, then <w,i> ∈ ψ 
This spells failure of modus ponens.  For both 7if φ, ψ8 and φ might be true at some index <w,i>, 
in which case we know that ψ is true at any φ-shifted point of evaluation <w,i+φ>, but this is 
compatible with ψ being false at the original index <w,i>.   
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 As far as the sorites is concerned, this would guarantee the defeasibility of reasoning with 
tolerance conditionals on their deontic conditional reading.  Modus ponens on tolerance 
conditionals will fail for some n where both Fan and 
7if Fan, dFan+1
8 are true at <w,i> but 
dFan+1 is false at <w,i>. Supposing i represents one’s knowledge of what to call items in a 
sorites series in light of what has been said so far, this corresponds to a situation where one has 
just called #n bald and it is true that if one calls #n bald then one ought to call #n+1 bald—such 
that in all the updated deontic ideal worlds (relative not to i but to the Fan-shifted information 
state of knowing that one has just called #n bald), upon knowing that one has just called #n bald, 
one does go on to call #n+1 bald—yet dFan+1 remains false in one’s present unshifted 
information state: in some ideal world (relative to one’s current information state of not knowing 
that one has just called #n bald) one fails to call the next #n+1 bald.  This will be, let us assume, 
due to familiar reasons: the ideal worlds selected by d(i) will presumably include some where 
#n+1 is recognized as being a borderline case and therefore (permissibly) counted as not-bald.  
Why does this not also falsify the conditional 7if Fan, dFan+1
8 at <w,i>?  Here is where tolerance 
comes into the picture.  On an information-theoretic semantics, the tolerance principle is best 
conceived of as a constraint on our update procedures.  The obvious suggestion is: 
O-TOLERANCE* For all i and for all an, an+1 that are sufficiently similar with 
respect to F, <w,i+Fan> ∈ dFan+1 
The idea is that updating with Fan in effect commits one to calling the next thing F, by throwing 
out all the ¬dFan+1-worlds from one’s information state (thereby eliminating the possibility that 
#n+1 could be a borderline case and hence permissibly counted to be not-F, i.e. ◊d¬Fan+1).  Thus 
there can be no world in d(i+Fan) where ¬Fan+1, which guarantees <w,i> ∈ if Fan, dFan+1.  
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 The problem with this proposal is that it appears unable to give a corresponding account of 
permission-based tolerance.  Consider the analogue principle for p-tolerance: 
P-TOLERANCE* For all i and for all an, an+1 that are sufficiently similar with 
respect to F, <w,i+◊dFan> ∈ ◊dFan+1 
This would predict that at the end of the borderline range, supposing one calls the last borderline 
case #h bald and updates accordingly with ◊dFah, one’s updated information state will include 
worlds in which it is permissible to call #h+1 bald, i.e. where ◊dFah+1 is true (relative to 
i+◊dFah)—contrary to the fact that, since #h+1 is no longer a borderline case but is definitely not-
bald, calling that individual bald is not allowed, regardless of one’s previous judgments.44  In this 
way, Kolodny and MacFarlane’s analysis appears only able to accommodate one, not both forms 
of tolerance. 
 Willer’s version of the analysis proposes an alternative, dynamic conception of logical 
consequence, one that keeps track of changes each added argument premise may induce on the 
information parameter: 
DYNAMIC VALIDITY φ1,…, φn |= ψ iff for all w and i such that w ∈ i:  
if <w, i> ∈ φ1 and … and <w, i+…+φn-1> ∈ φn,  
then <w,(i +…+ φn-1) +φn> ∈ ψ 
On this dynamic conception of validity, monotonicity is no longer guaranteed.  Since adding 
premises now affects the information parameter in light of which the argument conclusion is 
evaluated, this leaves open the possibility that the truth-value of the conclusion at a possible 
                                                     
44 Doing so would violate the constraint of CLEAR SANCTION, now expressed as: d(i+Det(φ)) ⊆ φ for 
any i.  Thus <w,i+◊dFah> ∈ ◊dFah+1, assuming one knows #h+1 is definitely not-F in the first place (i.e. 
that i ⊆ Det(ah+1)). 
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world may change from true to false.45  The situation of the sorites may be taken to illustrate this 
possibility.  Suppose one has just called #n bald.  Before ruling out the possibility that #n+1 is a 
borderline case, one needn’t call #n+1 bald.  In that case, <w,i> ∈ ¬dFan+1.  But since calling 
#n+1 bald is required after eliminating that possibility from one’s information state upon updating 
with Fan, we have <w,i+Fan> ∉ ¬dFan+1.  So we see that ¬dFan+1 |= ¬dFan+1 but 
¬dFan+1, Fan |/= ¬dFan+1.  Hence the failure of monotonicity. 
 This demonstrates how on Willer’s account, updating can make previously available 
information no longer available.  This allows arguments to be defeasible insofar as old 
conclusions drawn from certain premises need not stay established as new premises are added.  
Unfortunately, this feature is not enough to block certain undesirable new conclusions from being 
drawn.  Indeed, it is easily verified that the dynamic construal of logical consequence, together 
with the semantics for conditionals, validates modus ponens—and with it, any sorites argument 
like (6) applying modus ponens on tolerance conditionals.46  By contrast, ABM’s theory licenses 
such inferences only defeasibly.  This type of defeasibility is crucial for defusing the sorites, since 
it is newly derived information (e.g. concluding that borderline #k must be called bald or that 
definitely not-bald #h can be called bald) that produces soritical results, not the recycling of old 
information (e.g. calling #k-1 or #h-1 bald), which is harmless.  This suggests that it is 
defeasibility in the stronger sense of inferential defeat, not in the weaker sense of information 
                                                     
45 That is, unless we impose a constraint of Persistence (for any i% ⊆ i: if <w,i> ∈ φ then <w,i%> ∈ φ), 
which would ensure preservation of truth at a world under information strengthening. 
46 See Willer (2012:458) for proof.  I don’t, of course, dispute the merits of salvaging modus ponens, as far 
as the miners is concerned.  All this shows is that Willer’s style of analysis is not quite suited for addressing 
the sorites. 
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loss, that is required for delivering the sort of defeasibility in conditional reasoning needed to 
block the sorites. 
 
6.10  Permissive consequence 
The strategy of logical revisionism as a contextualist response to the sorites was pioneered by 
Kamp (1981).  An information-theoretic semantics is just one alternative way to implement this 
general strategy, by modifying either the semantics for the logical connectives or the very notion 
of logical consequence.  Contextualists who wish to keep modus ponens may instead weaken the 
notion of logical consequence in other ways, such as denying the transitivity of validity.  This is 
the strategy taken up by Cobreros et al. (2010, 2012). 
 They define a weakened notion of permissive consequence off two notions of non-classical 
truth: strict and tolerant.  Atomic Fa is strictly true (or s-true) iff every x similarF to a is F (i.e. Fx 
is classically true) and tolerantly true (or t-true) iff some x similarF to a is F; and ¬Fa is s-true (t-
true) iff Fa is not t-true (s-true).  Their preferred st-notion of entailment (where B is an st-valid 
consequence of A1,…,An iff B is t-true wherever A1,…,An are s-true) validates all tolerance 
conditionals Fan & anIFan+1 → Fan+1, where ‘IF’ means ‘is similar to (relative to F)’, as well as 
their universal generalization, since these are all t-valid.  Any inference from Fan and anIFan+1 to 
Fan+1 will be st-valid, though these cannot be chained together to reach soritical conclusions, 
given the non-transitivity of st-entailment.  
 The critical problem with this proposal is its failure to explain how tolerance relations apply 
to borderline cases.  Suppose Fan and Fan+1 are both merely t-true (i.e. t-true but not s-true) for 
some borderline cases an and an+1 that are similarF.  Assuming we have judged Fan, we cannot 
then apply tolerance and go on to judge Fan+1.  That is because Fan+1 cannot be inferred on the 
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basis of Fan and anIFan+1, since Fan is only t-true—even though (oddly enough) the tolerance 
inference is perfectly valid (i.e. valid in the st-sense), as is its corresponding tolerance 
conditional.  Cobreros et al. (2010) presuppose a classical bivalent logic.  This guarantees that 
reasoning by tolerance will fail for borderline cases right where some Fan is classically true yet 
Fan+1 is classically false—which is no better than the traditional epistemicist story of tolerance 
failing at the unknowable point of a sharp cutoff (Williamson 1994). 
 Even if we allow for truth-value gaps in the underlying logic (a possibility not considered by 
Cobreros et al.), the existence of such problem pairs of similarF borderline cases both merely 
tolerantly F is still guaranteed.  Proof: By definition, any similarityF relation (~F) effects a 
tripartition: the strict Fs, the merely tolerant Fs/non-Fs, and the strict non-Fs.  We make no 
assumptions about how this aligns or deviates from the tripartition of definite Fs, borderline 
Fs/non-Fs, and definite non-Fs.  Consider the last classically true F item, aT.  FaT will be merely t-
true.  That is because aT cannot be strictly F (otherwise, since anything similarF to a strict F is 
itself truly F and aT ~F aT+1, aT+1 would also be truly F—contrary to assumption), nor can it be 
strictly not-F (otherwise, it would, being self-similarF, be truly not-F—contrary to assumption).  
Now, aT+1 will be similarF (since adjacent) to aT and hence tolerantly F (given aT ~F aT+1 and FaT).  
So aT+1 must count as “borderline F”, whatever the truth-value structure of the underlying logic.  
If bivalence holds, aT+1 will be the first classically false F item (since aT is the last classically true 
F) and so must be borderline F (assuming the true-false cutoff lies within the borderline range).  
Otherwise, if bivalence fails and there are truth-value gaps, FaT+1 is truth-valueless, so again aT+1 
must be “borderline F” in either sense: as neither truly F nor falsely F (since FaT+1 has no 
classical truth-value) or as neither definitely F nor definitely not-F (assuming the true-truthless 
cutoff lies within the borderline range—which it must, since lacking truth/falsity means lacking 
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definite truth/falsity, i.e. being borderline).  Thus, for some borderline aT+1, (even the t-truth of) 
FaT+1 cannot be inferred from FaT and aTIFaT+1, despite the st-validity of aTIFaT+1, FaT ⇒ FaT+1. 
 The account therefore fails to explain how tolerance permits extending F across the 
borderline range.  Given that both premises and conclusion for such problematic tolerance 
inferences are merely t-true, the only other suitable version of logical consequence would be t-
validity (i.e. preservation of t-truth).  But this (as Cobreros et al. recognize) ceases to validate 
modus ponens, in which case one can no longer conclude FaT+1 by applying modus ponens to FaT 
& aTIFaT+1 → FaT+1.  Therefore, either the axiom or rule form of tolerance fails to license 
extending F across borderline cases—hardly a vindication of tolerance. 
 The defeasibility perspective therefore appears to capture what adopters of “contextualist 
logic” cannot explain: dual deontic distinctions within tolerance-related sorites reasoning and 
their defeasible nature.  In closing, I should stress that the Asher-Bonevac-Morreau theory 
remains just one among many possible ways to analyze tolerance in terms of deontic conditionals.  
No doubt, other contenders exist, with potentially more to offer.  The current proposal simply 
demonstrates what a theory of defeasible reasoning, more generally, can achieve in addressing 




What lies in store for the epistemicist conception of vagueness?  
 Our discussion has closely examined both pros and cons of traditional versions of the epistemicist 
theory, as exemplified by the account in Williamson’s Vagueness (1994). Much of the contemporary 
criticism was seen to be unfounded. Traditional epistemicism provides a compelling account of both the 
epistemology and the phenomenology of vagueness. The epistemicist principle of UNKNOWN—that 
vagueness-related indeterminacy entails ignorance—was seen to withstand the criticisms of Wright 
(2001), Dorr (2003), Barnett (2009), and Bobzien (2012). In comparison with their alternative proposals 
for explicating the epistemic consequences of vagueness, it remains the most plausible way to articulate 
the intuitive connection between vagueness and ignorance (see Chapter 2). It also provides a natural 
explanation for certain aspects of the phenomenology of vagueness, such as why our actual intuitions 
about vague matters fail to be response-dependent in the sense of enabling knowledge. Nonetheless, 
traditional epistemicist theories are perfectly equipped to accommodate the possibility of response-
dependence, as in Barnett’s (2010) hypothetical scenario of Zengland (see Chapter 1). 
 Yet traditional epistemicist accounts like Williamson’s suffer a number of shortcomings. First, they 
fail to vindicate the seemingly undeniable principles of tolerance guiding our use of vague predicates. Not 
even Greenough’s (2003) defense of “epistemic tolerance” meets this challenge, since such proposals 
merely give an epistemic interpretation of the so-called “gap principles” governing higher-order 
vagueness; as such, they do not constitute a defense of tolerance proper. Second, traditional epistemicism 
leaves no room for the open texture of vague predicates. This is one of the main reasons why 
contextualists like Shapiro (2006) and Soames (1999) prefer semantic treatments of vagueness that appear 
more conducive to explaining the permissibility phenomena related to vagueness. Yet Williamson’s 
independent commitment to a knowledge norm of assertion rules out any freedom of verdict within the 
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borderline range, provided everything there is unknowable (see Williamson 2000). Such an unavoidable 
posture of quietism strikes one as an unsatisfactory response in the face of vagueness. 
 Other reasons for discontent with traditional epistemicism are specific to Williamson’s own version 
of the theory. One, Williamson’s epistemicist account relies problematically on tenuous grounds for 
logical conservatism. Williamson offers partly pragmatist considerations in defense of classical logic and 
semantics: these should not be given up without due cause; fortunately, he argues, vagueness provides no 
compelling reason to relinquish, for example, the classical principles of bivalence and excluded middle. 
Williamson famously endeavored a global defense of bivalence: any meaningful sentence, whatever the 
nature of the discourse, must have exactly one classical truth-value, true or false (see his 1994:§§7.1,7.2). 
Yet the feasibility of the subsequent epistemic account of vagueness he proceeded to give rested entirely 
upon the success of his case for universal logical conservatism: rather high stakes for those solely 
concerned about vagueness. What right does a theory of vagueness have to any totalitarian imposition of 
classical logic and semantics everywhere, in all domains of inquiry, even those historically thought to 
motivate some form of logical revisionism? Witness the vast literature on future contingents, semantic 
paradoxes, presupposition failure, quantum indeterminacy, etc. No doubt Williamson’s appeal to a global 
logical conservatism alienated many who were attracted to logical revisionism elsewhere but would 
otherwise have been sympathetic to the epistemicist program. Surely the theory can win wider appeal.  
 Two, of perhaps greater concern is the very nature of Williamson’s arguments for logic conservatism. 
His pragmatist reasons for retaining classical logic and semantics, on grounds of theoretical simplicity 
and cross-domain unity—given how they are “vastly superior to the alternatives in simplicity, power, past 
success, and integration with theories in other domains” (1994:186)—betray an underlying operative 
antirealist attitude, as if identifying the correct logic and semantics for treating ordinary vague languages 
were a mere issue of theoretical preference, constrained by considerations of theoretical choice. Shapiro 
better conveys the heart of the realist perspective when he quips: “Classical logic was developed with 
mathematical languages in mind. The logic of vague expressions will be what it will.” (2006:72) Indeed, 
Williamson’s epistemic treatment of vagueness, on one reading of his (1994), can be understood as 
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serving to bolster a more general sustained effort to defend classical logic in its entirety, as applied to 
natural language semantics and beyond, with the upshot that challenges posed by vagueness in ordinary 
speech present no decisive reason to restrict the scope of applicability for classical logic and semantics.   
 Three, Williamson often appears to take the preservation of classical logic and semantics, bivalence 
and all, to be central to the epistemicist theory. This runs together two distinct sets of issues: the 
metaphysical existence of cutoffs and the epistemic status, unknowable or otherwise, of such facts. In 
general, Williamson’s philosophy of vagueness exhibits a tendency to prioritize the metaphysical issues 
over the epistemology of vagueness—for instance, in his “Definiteness and Knowability” (1995) his 
arguments to support the epistemic principle that knowability entails determinacy rely upon appeals to 
classical rules of reasoning and excluded middle. Issuing controversial metaphysical claims for the 
purposes of establishing such basic epistemic results seems strategically gratuitous, and runs contrary to 
the spirit of the K-first methodology developed in his later Knowledge and Its Limits (2000). In contrast, 
Greenough’s (2003) discussion served to separate the epistemology from the metaphysics of vagueness, 
by showing how—bivalence aside—the ignorance-entailing aspect of vagueness could be taken to be a 
relatively uncontroversial claim.  
 Four, Williamson’s account does not strictly speaking constitute a form of epistemicism proper. For it 
does not take vagueness to be either a type of ignorance or any sort of phenomenon that is epistemic in 
nature. Instead, it identifies the meaning instability—a semantic feature—of our vague terms as the direct 
source of all vagueness-related ignorance: vagueness, although a distinctive source of ignorance, turns out 
to be a semantic phenomenon on this view (see Chapter 2). At best, the account presents a hybrid form of 
epistemicism, if such semantic instability proves to involve a characteristically epistemic element.  
 Five, Williamson appears to deny the reality of determinacy. There is no such thing as determinacy, 
according to his account, since such a notion finds no ultimate expression in his theory: any determinacy 
operator, he claims, lacks any intelligible non-epistemic interpretation and so must be reinterpreted as a 
kind of epistemic operator (see Chapter 2). Yet without a non-epistemic determinacy operator, it is 
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difficult to see how one may make claims about the source of any vagueness-related ignorance (and not 
just the ignorance itself) or articulate any connections between vagueness and its epistemic consequences. 
 Six, there are theory-internal reasons to be dissatisfied with Williamson’s account. His insistence on 
exact semantic knowledge of the meanings of our vague terms does not sit well with the claim that these 
terms constantly undergo undetectable shifts in meaning, given his margin for error constraints on 
knowledge. Nor does Williamson’s underdeveloped account of semantic knowledge as induction into a 
linguistic practice offer much help in precluding the possibility of semantic ignorance or resisting the idea 
that any semantic knowledge is only inexact (see Chapter 4). 
 Hence my departure from Williamson. I propose a new direction for the epistemic conception of 
vagueness. Traditional epistemicism disregards our intuitions about the tolerance and open texture of 
vague predicates. I argued that these are features of vagueness that, once understood in epistemic terms, 
can be properly accounted for by the epistemic theory of vagueness. Chapter 5 outlined the general 
strategy for how to recover open texture on the epistemicist view. Chapter 6 argued for a normative 
interpretation of tolerance that, when combined with open texture, offers a diagnosis of the sorites 
paradox. A nonmonotonic logic is needed, however, to represent the defeasibility of such norms. To this 
extent the account diverges from Williamson’s insistence on classical logic and semantics, at least for the 
purposes of reasoning about vagueness-related norms. As far as tolerance is concerned, sorites reasoning 
is not classically valid, only defeasibly valid. A fuller treatment would situate this proposal within a 
broader framework offering a more general explanation of the defeasible nature of normative reasoning. I 
leave this idea for future work. 
 The account remains officially neutral on the question of cutoffs. Some may balk: Is it not simply part 
of the epistemicist thesis that sharp cutoffs exist for vague predicates? I see no reason to believe so. The 
epistemicist conception of vagueness maintains that vagueness is to be conceived as an inherently or 
fundamentally epistemic phenomenon. Characterized as such, epistemicism makes no obvious or 
immediate claims about the existence of cutoffs or sharp boundaries. Why tether the view to a 
controversial metaphysics? Better, instead, to free it of any such metaphysical commitments. To insist 
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otherwise is to fail to appreciate the distinction between the metaphysics and the epistemology of 
vagueness: these are two domains of inquiry concerning questions that are radically different in nature.   
 Of course, the normative interpretation of tolerance is entirely compatible with the existence of 
cutoffs. In that regard, my account of sorites reasoning can be viewed as a modified extension of 
Williamson’s theory (modulo the caveats mentioned above). Accounting for the existence of cutoffs and 
their unknowability might then follow the general outlines of Williamson’s margin for error model. This 
is a merit not a fault. I myself have never found the prediction of cutoffs to constitute a decisive refutation 
of the epistemicist theory. Why fault the theory for attracting incredulous stares on account of odd 
metaphysical claims? Queerness is the norm within metaphysics, which need not answer to intuition. 
 My own reluctance to endorse bivalence stems from the varying plausibility of claims to cutoffs: 
insisting there must be a fact of the matter is far more reasonable when vague matters really do matter 
(e.g. determining whether it is morally prohibited to abort a borderline viable fetus) than when matters 
detached from any serious practical consequence are seemingly open to arbitrary settlement (e.g. sorting 
paint chips or picking out bald men). Perhaps the verdict on cutoffs must wait until the normative 
consequences of vagueness have been more fully investigated. In the meantime, the epistemicist theory of 
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